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Epochs of History 





THE THIRTY YEARS' WAR, 1618-1648. 



Edited by Rev. G. W. Cox and Charles Sankey, M.A. 
Eleven volumes, i6mo, with 41 Maps and Plans 

TURE. By S. G. W. BeQ>amvQ. 



By Charles Sankev. 


EARLY ROME. Bv \V. Ihne. 

ROME AND CARTHAGE. Bv R. Bosworth Smith. 



THE EARLY EMPIRE. By W. Wolfe Capes. 



Edited by Edward E. Morris 

Eighteen volumes, iomo, with 77 Maps, Plans, and 

W. Church. 




EDWARD III. By W. Warburton. 

James Gairdner. 

By Frederic Seebohm. 

THE EARLY TUDORS. By C. E. Moberiy. 


THE THIRTY YEARS WAR. 1618-1648. By S. R. 



By G^roond Airv. 

THE AGE OF ANNE. By Edward E. Morris. 



PIRE. By W. O'Connor Morris. Appendix by 
Andrew D. White. 

THE EPOCH OF REFORM. 1830-1850. By Justin 


Prostestant Lay State* f 1 
Catholic Do. □ 


at the commencement of 


Bp.of -p 

|o U-Braneii/ 





j Danzig <> 

Le J! iSu r gv „ / J / 2 n 

CnW O V -Bo"{< I Ml">, -u- Vj> I 

Thirty Years' War 




Late Student of Christ Church 

flntkor of 'History of England from the Accession of fames I. t* tSi 

Disgrace of Justice Coke' and 'Prince Charles and the 

Spanish Marriage' 





If the present work should appear to be written for 
more advanced students than those for whom most 
if not all the other books of the series are designed, 
the nature of the subject must be pleaded in excuse. 
The mere fact that it relates exclusively to Continental 
history makes it unlikely that junior pupils would ap- 
proach it in any shape, and it is probably impossible 
to make the very complicated relations between the 
German states and other European nations interest- 
ing to those who are for the first time, or almost the 
first time, attempting to acquire historical knowledge. 
Every history, to be a history, must have a unity of its 
own, and here we have no unity of national life such 
as that which is reflected in the institutions of Eng- 
land and France, not even the unity of a great race of 
sovereigns handing down the traditions of government 
from one generation to another. The unity of the 
*ubject which I have chosen must be sought in the 
growth of the principle of religious toleration as it is 
adopted or repelled by the institutions under which 
Germany and France, the two principal nations with 
which we are concerned, are living. Thus the history 

. 821774 

vi Preface. 

of the period may be compared to a gigantic dissolving 
view. As we enter upon it our minds are filled with 
German men and things. But Germany fails to find 
the solution of the problem before it. Gradually 
France comes with increasing distinctness before us. 
It succeeds where Germany had failed, and occupies 
us more and more till it fills the whole field of action. 

But though, as I have said, the present work is not 
intended for young children, neither is it intended 
for those who require the results of original research. 
The data for a final judgment on the story are scat- 
tered in so many repositories that the Germans them- 
selves have now discovered that a complete investi- 
gation into one or other of the sections into which the 
war naturally falls, is sufficient work for any man. 
There must surely, however, be many, as well in the 
upper classes of schools as in more advanced life, who 
would be glad to know at second hand what is the 
result of recent inquiry in Germany into the causes of 
the failure of the last attempt, before our own day, to 
constitute a united German nation. The writer who 
undertakes such a task encounters, with his eyes open, 
all the hazards to which a second-hand narrative is 
liable. His impressions are less sharp, and are ex- 
posed to greater risk of error than those of one who 
goes direct to the fountain head. He must be con- 
tent to be the retailer rather than the manufacturer 
of history, knowing that each kind of work has its use. 

Not that the present book is a mere collection of 
other men's words. If I have often adopted without 
much change the narrative or opinions of German 

Preface. vii 

writers, I have never said any thing which I have not 
made my own, by passing it through my own mind. 
To reproduce with mere paste and scissors passages 
from the writings of men so opposed to one anothei 
as Ranke, Gindely, Ritter, Opel, Hurter, Droysen, 
Gfrorer, Klopp, Forster, Villermont, Uetterodt, 
Koch, and others, would be to bewilder, not to in- 
struct. And in forming my own opinions I have had 
the advantage not merely of being in the habit of 
writing from original documents, but of having studied 
at least some of the letters and State papers of the time. 
I have thus, for example, been able, from my know- 
ledge of the despatches of Sir Robert Anstruther, to 
neglect Droysen's elaborate argument that Christian 
IV. took part in the war through jealousy of Gustavus 
Adolphus ; and to speak, in opposition to Onno Klopp, 
of the persistence of the Dukes of Mecklenouig in Lie 
support which they gave to the King of Denmark. 

More valuable than the little additional knowledge 
thus obtained is the insight into the feelings and 
thoughts of the Catholic princes gained by a very 
slight acquaintance with their own correspondence. 
To start by trying to understand what a man appears 
to himself, and only when that has been done, to try 
him by the standard of the judgment of others, is in 
my opinion the first canon of historical portraiture; 
and it is one which till very recent times has been 
more neglected by writers on the Thirty Years' War 
than by students of any other portion of history. 

My teachers in Germany from whom I have bor- 
rowed so -freely ? and according to the rules o£ the se- 

riii Preface. 

ries, without acknowledgment in foot-notes, will, 1 
hope, accept this little book, not as an attempt to do 
that which they are so much better qualified to exe- 
cute, but as an expression of the sympathy which an 
Englishman cannot but feel for the misfortunes as 
well as the achievements of his kindred on the Con- 
tinent, and as an effort to tell something of the by- 
gone fortunes of their race to those amongst his own 
countrymen to whom, from youth or from circum- 
stances of education, German literature is a sealed 

I have only to add that the dates are according to 
the New Style. Ten days must be deducted to bring 
them in accordance with those used at the umi in 


Gvrntt in English History not noticed in the text, or euly rtferrtd t» 

are printed in Italics. 



SECTION I. — Political Institutions of Germany (1440-1317). 


National institutions of Germany defective . . . 1 

(a) As regarded the Emperor I 

(b) As regarded the great vassals .... 3 
Attempts made to introduce order by giving a regular 

form to the Diet 5 

These, though only partially successful, are not altoge- 
ther useless . 6 

Constitution of the Diet „ 6 

Section II. — Protestantism in Germany (1517-1570). 

Protestantism acceptable to the majority of the na- 
tion, but rejected by the Emperor and the Diet . 8 

The result is a civil war, resulting in a compromise, 
called the Peace of Augsburg (1555). Its terms be- 
ing ambiguous on some important points, give rise to 
controversy ia 

But as Protestantism is on the increase, the ambiguous 
points are, at first, construed by the Protestants in 
their own favour ....... 11 


% Contents. 


The main points at issue relate to the right of Protest- 
ants to hold bishoprics, and to the right of Protestant 
princes to secularize church lands . . . . la 

Section III. — Reaction against Protestantism (1570-1596). 

Theological controversies are carried on with bitterness 
amongst the Protestants ...... 13 

The Catholics, accordingly, begin to gain ground . 14 

And having the Emperor and Diet on their side, are 
able to use force as well as persuasion . . . 14 

Want of any popular representation prevents any fair 
settlement of the dispute 15 

Section IV. — Three Parlies and Three Leaders (1596-1612). 

Catholics, Lutherans, and Calvinists are respectively 
guided by Maximilian Duke of Bavaria, John George 
Elector of Saxony, and Christian of Anhalt . . 15 

Character and policy of Maximilian dangerous to the 
Protestants ........ 15 

The Protestants of the south more alive to the danger 
than the Protestants of the north . . . .17 

Spread of Calvinism, especially in the south, ac- 
counted for by the greater danger from Catholic 
States 17 

Character and policy of Christian of Anhalt . . . 18 
1603 Accession of James I. of England 
1605 Gunpowder Plot 

1607 Donauworth occupied by Maximilian . . . . 19 

1608 Formation of the Protestant Union and the Catholic 

League .si 

1609 The quarrel for the succession of Cleves does not result 

in open war 21 

1612 John George fruitlessly attempts to mediate between the 

Catholics and the Calvinists sa 

t6i3 Marriage of Frederick V., Elector Palatine, to Eliza- 
beth, dauglUer of James J. of England 

Contents. xi 


SECTION I. — The House of Austria and its Subjects (1600-1618). 


Political and religious dissensions between the rulers 

and their subjects 24 

1609 The Emperor Rudolph, as King of Bohemia, grants the 

Royal Charter to Bohemia 25 

161 1 He is succeeded by Matthias in spite of the intrigues of 

Christian of Anhalt 26 

Matthias erades the charter 27 

1617 Ferdinand accepted by the Bohemian Diet as King by 

hereditary right ........ 23 

1618 The Protestant churches on ecclesiastical lands de- 

clared illegal by the government of Matthias ; one at 
Braunau shut up, one at Klostergrab pulled down . 29 

Section II. — The Revolution at Prague {March-May 1618). 

Mar. 5. Meeting of the Protestant Estates of Bohemia . . 29 
May 23. Attack headed by Thurn upon the Regents at 
Prague. Martinitz and Slawata thrown out of win- 
dow. Beginning of the Thirty Years' War . . 30 
Appointment of Thirty Directors as a Revolutionary 
Government in Bohemia 31 

Section III. — The War in Bohemia {May 1618-February 1619). 

Aug. 13. Bohemia invaded by the Emperor's general, Bucquoi. 
The Bohemians look abroad for help. Mansfeld 
brings troops to them. He besieges Pilsen, whilst 
Thurn makes head against Bucquoi . . . -33 

Nov. 21. Pilsen surrenders 34 

Christian of Anhalt urges Frederick V., Elector Pala- 
tine, to intervene on behalf of the Bohemians, and 
asks the Duke of Savoy to help them . . -34 

T6t9 The Duke of Savoy talks of dividing the Austrian do- 

Fcb, minions with Frederick . . » . ' , . 35 

xii Contents. 

SECTION IV. — Ferdinand on his Defence (March-November 


Mar. 20. Death of Matthias 36 

June 5. Vienna besieged by Thurn. Ferdinand threatened 

by a deputation from the Estates of Lower Austria 36 
He is delivered by a regiment of horse, and Thurn 

raises the siege 37 

Aug. 28. Ferdinand II. elected Emperor . . . .38 
Aug. 26. Frederick, Elector Palatine, elected King of Bohe- 
mia, Ferdinand having been previously deposed . 38 
Nov. 4. Frederick crowned at Prague 39 



Section I. — The Attack upon Frederick (November 

l6ig-January 1621). 

1619 Maximilian of Bavaria prepares for war . . .39 
Vienna fruitlessly attacked by Bethlen Gabor . . 40 
Frederick finds no support in the Union . . .41 

1620 The North German Princes agree to neutrality at 
Mar. Muhlhausen 43 

June 3. Spinola, the Spanish General, prepares to attack the 
Palatinate, and the Union, being frightened, signs 
the treaty of Ulm, by which it agrees to observe 
neutrality towards the League . . . .4a 

June 23. Maximilian, with Tilly in command of his army, 
enters Austria and compels the Austrian Estates to 
submit, whilst Spinola reduces the Western Pala- 
tinate 42 

Maximilian joins Bucquoi, and enters Bohemia . 43 

Sep. 28. Frederick, having failed to organize resistance, joins 

the Bohemian army 44 

Nov. 8. Defeat of Frederick at the Battle of the White Hill, 
1619 and submission of Bohemia to the Emperor . . 45 

Jan. 22. Frederick put to the Ban of the Empire . . .46 

Contents. xiii 

Section II. — The War in the Upper Palatinate {January- 
October 1621). 


1621 Frederick does not abandon hope of regaining Bo- 
Jan, hernia 47 

Ap. 12. The Treaty of Mentz dissolves the Union . . .47 
Bad character of Mansfeld's Army . . . .48 

May. Mansfeld takes the offensive 49 

Aug. Recommencement of the War in the Lower Palatinate 50 
Oct. Mansfeld unable to hold out in the Upper Palatinate 50 
Oct. 10. Signs an engagement to disband his forces, but escapes 

with them to Alsace 50 

Section III. — Frederick's Allies {October 1621-May 1622). 

1621 James I. of England proposes to take Mansfeld into 

his pay, but he cannot agree with the House of 
Commons, and is therefore in want of money . 50 

1622 He then tries to obtain a settlement of the German 

disputes with the aid of Spain . . . .51 
May. A conference for the pacification of Germany held at 

Brussels 52 

Frederick prepares for War, with the help of Mans- 
feld, the Margrave of Baden, and Christian of 
Brunswick, the latter being a Protestant Adminis- 
trator of the Bishopric of Halberstadt . . .S3 

He ravages the diocese of Paderborn . ■ . .55 

Section IV. — The Fight for the Lower Palatinate {April- 
July 1622). 
Ap. 12. Frederick joins Mansfeld. Tilly defeats the Mar- 
May 6. grave of Baden at Wimpfen 57 

June. Frederick, hopeful of success, refuses to consent to a 

treaty, and seizes the Landgrave of Darmstadt . 58 
But is driven by Tilly to retreat . . . .59 
June 30. Defeat of Christian of Brunswick at Hochst . . 59 
July. Mansfeld abandons the Palatinate, and Frederick, 

after taking refuge at Sedan, retires to the Hague . 6a 

xiv Contents. 

Section I.— Mansfeld' s March into the Netherlands {July- 
November 1622). 


1622 Tilly proceeds to reduce the fortified places in the 

Lower Palatinate 60 

1623 The Electorate transferred from Frederick to Maxi- 
Feb. 13. milian 61 

1622 Change of feeling in North Germany . . . 61 
Aug. Mansfeld and Christian establish themselves in Lor- 
raine, and then try to cut their way through the 
Spanish Netherlands to join the Duke . . .63 
Aug. 28. Battle of Fleurus. Christian loses his arm . . 63 
Nov. Mansfeld establishes himself in East Friesland . . 64 

Section II. — Christian of Brunswick in Lower Saxony 
(November 1622-August 1623). 

1622 The Lower Saxon Circle urged by Tilly to join him 

against Mansfeld, and by Christian of Brunswick to 
join him against Tilly ...... 64 

1623, Feb. Warlike preparations of the Circle . . .65 
Aug. 6. Christian expelled from the Circle, and defeated by 

Tilly at Stadtlohn 66 

Section III. — Danger of the Lower Saxon Circle (Augustr- 
December 1623). 

1623 The North German Protestant Bishoprics in danger . 66 
Aug. Alarm in the Lower Saxon Circle . . . .68 
Dec. But nothing is done, and its troops are disbanded . 68 

Section IV. — England and France ( October 1623-August 1624). 

Oct. Foreign Powers ready to interfere . . . .69 

Return of the Prince of Wales from Madrid . . 70 

1624 Divergence between the English House of Commons 
Feb.-May. and James I. upon the mode of recovering the Pa- 
latinate ......... 70 

Position of the Huguenots in France . , .73 

Contents. xv 

Section V. — Rise of Richelieu {August i6a4-September 


Aug. Lewis XIII. makes Richelieu his chief minister. He 
is divided between a desire to combat Spain and a 
desire to reduce the Huguenots to submission . 72 
Richelieu's position less strong than it afterwards 
became. He has to make great allowances for the 
King's humour 74 

Dec. French attack upon the Spanish garrisons in the 

Valtelline 75 

1625 Failure of Mansfeld's expedition intended by James 
Jan.-June to recover the Palatinate 76 

Jan. Richelieu's plans for engaging more deeply in the 
war frustrated by the rising of the Huguenots of 
Rochelle ........ 77 

Sept The Huguenot fleet is defeated, but Rochelle holds 

out 77 

SECTION I. — Christian IV. and Gustavus Adolphus (1624). 
Character and position of Christian IV., King of 
Denmark ........ 78 

Genius of Gustavus Adolphus 79 

Sketch of the earlier part of his reign . . .80 
His interest in German affairs 82 

Section II. — English Diplomacy {August i(s2\-July 1625). 

1624 The Kings of Denmark and Sweden asked by James 
Aug. I. to join him in recovering the Palatinate , . 84 

1625 The English Government, thinking the demands of 
Jan. Gustavus exorbitant, forms an alliance with Chris- 
tian IV 8j 

June. Meeting of the first Parliament of Charles I, 

xvi Contents. 


June. Gustavus directs his forces against Poland . .86 
Mar. 27. Death of James I. Accession of Charles I. . . 86 
July 18. Christian IV., at the head of the Circle of Lower 
Saxony, enters upon war with the army of the 

League commanded by Tilly 87 

Aug. Dissolution of the first Parliament of Charles I. 

Section III. — Wallenstein's Armament (July 1625- 
February 1626). 

The Emperor needs more forces . . . .87 
Wallenstein offers to raise an army for him. Account 

of Wallenstein's early life . ... 89 

The system by which the army is to be supported is 

to be one of forced contributions . . . .90 
Oppressive burdens laid thereby on the country . 91 
Wallenstein enters the dioceses of Magdeburg and 
Halberstadt, and lies quietly there during the win- 
ter 92 

C626, Feb. Failure of negotiations for peace . . . .93 

Section W.— Defeat of Mansfeld and ChrUtian IV. 

{February-August 1626). 

1626 Numerical superiority on the side of the King of 
Feb. Denmark, but the Imperialists are superioi in other 

respects 94 

Failure of the supplies promised to Christian by 

Charles 1 95 

Feb. Meeting of the second Parliament of Charles I. — 
Impeachment of Buckingham 
Ap. 25. Mansfeld defeated by Wallenstein at the Bridge of 

Dessau 96 

June. Dissolution of the second Parliament of Charles I. 
Aug. 27. Christian IV. defeated by Tilly at Lutter . . . 97 
Wallenstein pursues Mansfeld into Hungary . . 97 

Contents. xvii 


Section I. — Fresh Successes of Wallenstein {August 1626- 
October 1627). 


1626 Divergence between the League and Wallenstein . . 98 
Nov. Wallenstein advocates religious equality and the pre- 
dominance of the army 98 

1627 He persuades Ferdinand to increase his army, and is 
Jan. created Duke of Friedland, in spite of the growing 

dissatisfaction with his proceedings . . . 100 
May-Aug. The King of Denmark hopes to resist Tilly, but 
Wallenstein returns from Hungary, and gains pos- 
session ol Silesia 101 

Sept. 20. Defeat of the Margrave of Baden at Heiligen-hafen 102 
Oct. Christian IV. flies to the Island of Fiinen, leaving 

Jutland to Wallenstein 102 

Section II. — Resistance to Wallenstein in the fflnpire 
(October 1627-February 1628). 
t627 Meeting of the Electors at Miihlhausen. They com- 
Oct. piain of Wallenstein 103 

1628 The commercial towns of North Gewnany jealous of 

Wallenstein 105 

Feb. The Emperor declares the Dukes of Mecklenburg to 
have forfeited their lands and titles, and pledges the 

territory to Wallenstein 106 

Wallenstein tries in vain to gain over the Hanse 

Towns 106 

He attempts to establish himself on the coast of the 
Baltic by getting possession of the towns . . 108 

Section III. — The Siege of Stralsund (August-February 1628). 
Feb. As Stralsund refuses to admit a garrison, it is at- 
tacked by Wallenstein's orders .... 108 
May. It is succoured by Denmark and Sweden . . . 109 

Aug. 3. The siege is raised no 


xviii Contents. 

Section IV. — The Siege of Rochelle (1625-1628). 


1625 Richelieu would have made peace with the Hugue- 

nots if he had been able na 

1626 An agreement is effected, but comes to nothing 

through the jealousy of Charles 1 11a 

1627 War between France and England, Buckingham's 

expedition to Rhe 113 

Nov. Richelieu besieges Rochelle 114 

1628. Mar. Meeting of the third Parliament of Charles I. 
May. Failure of an English fleet to succour Rochelle . 115 
June. The Petition of Right granted 
Aug. Murder of the Duke of Buckingham . . .113 

Nov. 1. Surrender of Rochelle 113 

Contrast between France and Germany. Toleration 
granted to the Huguenots n<! 



SECTION I. — Oppression of the Protestants {March 
i62S-3fay 1629). 

1628, Mar. Surrender of Stade to Tilly 117 

1629, Jan. Wallenstein fails to take Gliickstadt . . .117 
Mar. Dissolution of the third Parliament of Charles I. 

May 22. Peace of Lubeck between Christian IV. and the 

Emperor 118 

Wallenstein invested with the Duchy of Mecklen- 
burg 118 

1628 The Protestants oppressed in the South of Germany 119 
1629, Mar. 29. Issue of the Edict of Restitution . . 120 

Section II. — French Intervention in Italy (1628-1630). 

1628 War in Italy for the succession to the Duchy of 

Mantua 121 

1629 Richelieu enters Italy, and compels the Spaniards to 
Mar. raise the siege of Casale 12a 

Rebellion of Rohan in the south of Franc* . . 123 

Contents. xix 


1629 Richelieu again enters Italy, seizes Pignerol and 

Saluces, and again forces the Spaniards to raise the 
siege of Casale 123 

1630 Negotiations between France and Sweden . . 124 

Section III. — Wallenstein deprived of his Command 
(March 1629-September 1630). 

1629 Wallenstein increases his forces .... 125 
Jealousy between him and the Catholic Electors . 126 

1630 Assembly at Ratisbon 127 

July 3. It demands that Wallenstein be deprived of his 

command 127 

July 4. Landing of Gustavus Adolphus in Germany . . 128 

Sept. Dismissal of Wallenstein 129 

Tilly in command . 130 

Section IV. — The Swedes establish themselves on the CW* oj *he 
Baltic (July 1630-January 163 1). 

July. Discipline in the Swedish Army .... 13c 
The Duke of Pomerania submits to hiro- r«it the 
Elector of Brandenburg declares himself neutral . 130 
1651 The treaty of Barwalde between France and Sweden 13a 

Section V. — The Fall of Magdeburg (January- May 1631). 

Jan. Success of Gustavus on the Baltic coast . . . 137 
March. The Electors of Saxony hold a Protestant / >sembly 

at Leipzig 133 

Tilly attacks the Swedes, but is driven to retJ-eat . 134 
Ap. 26. Treaty of Cherasco between France and the English 135 
May 15. Convention between Gustavus and the Elector of 

Brandenburg 136 

May 20. Magdeburg stormed, plundered, and burnt . . 136 
The Emperor refuses to cancel the Edict of Restitu- 
tion 137 

xx Contents. 



Section I. — Alliance between the Swedes and the Saxont 
(June-September 1631). 


June 21. Gustavus compels the Elector of Brandenburg to an 

alliance 138 

Tuly. Gustavus at the Camp of Werben .... 138 

Aug. Tilly summons the Elector of Saxony to submit . 139 
Sept. He attacks Saxony, upon which the Elector forms an 

alliance with Gustavus ...... 139 

Gustavus joins the Saxons ..... 140 

Section II. — Battle of Breitenfeld (September 1631). 

Sept. 17. Victory of Gustavus over Tilly at Breitenfeld . . 141 

Wallenstein's intrigues with Gustavus . . . 142 

Wallenstein and Gustavus unlikely to agree . . 143 

Political and military designs of Gustavus . . 144 

He looks for a basis of operations on the Rhine . 146 

Section III. — March of Ghistavus into South Germany 
(October 1631-May 1632). 
Oct. March of Gustavus to Mentz , . . . . , 148 
1632 In spite of the objections of the French, he attacks ' 

Bavaria .149 

Ap. 14. Tilly defeated and mortally wounded at the passage 

of the Lech 149 

May 17. Gustavus enters Munich 150 

Section IV. — Wallenstein's Restoration to command . 
(September 1631-June 1632). ^ 

Sept. Wallenstein breaks off all intercourse with Gustavus 151 
Nov. Attempts to reconcile the Elector of Saxony with the 

Emperor 15a 

Dec. Is reinstated temporarily in the command of the Im- 
perial Army 153 

Contents. xxi 


1632 Character of that Army 153 

April. Wallenstein permanently appointed Commander . 155 
May. Offers peace to the Saxons, and drives them out of 

Bohemia 155 

June. Gustavus does not approve of the terms of peace of- 
fered by Wallenstein 156 

Section V. — Struggle between Gustavus and Wallenstein 
{June-October 1632). 
June. Gustavus and Wallenstein opposed to one another at 

Nuremberg 157 

Efforts of Gustavus to maintain discipline . . 159 

Sept. 4. Fails to storm Wallenstein's lines .... 160 

Sept. 18. Gustavus leaves Nuremberg ..... 160 

Oct. Wallenstein marches into Saxony . . . 160 

Section VI. — The Battle of Lutzen {October-November 1632). 
Oct. Gustavus follows Wallenstein into Saxony . . 161 

Nov. 16. Battle of Lutzen 162 

Death of Gustavus ....... 163 

Victory of the Swedes 164 

Irreparable loss by the death of Gustavus to the Pro- 
testants 164 



Section I. — French Influence in Germany {November 1632- 

April 1633). 

1633 Differences between Bernhard and Oxenstjerna . 166 

Ap. 23. The League of Heilbronn signed .... 167 

Firm establishment of Richelieu's authority in 

France 168 

Richelieu's interposition in German affairs . . 169 

xxii Contents. 

Section II. — Wallenstein's Attempt to dictate Peace 
(April-December 1633). 


1633 Wallenstein's peace negotiations with the Swedes 

and Saxons ........ 170 

Oct. He drives the Saxons out of Silesia .... 172 

Nov. Ratisbon taken by Bernhard 173 

Spanish opposition to a peace which would leave 
Spain exposed to French attacks .... I73 
Dec. Wallenstein thinks of making peace, whether the Em- 
peror consents or not ...... 175 

Section III. — Resistance to Wallenstein' $ Plans 
(January-February 1634). 

1634 Onate, the Spanish Ambassador, persuades the Em- 
Jan, peror that Wallenstein is a traitor .... 175 

Ferdinand determines to displace Wallenstein . . 176 
Feb. 19. Wallenstein engages the Colonels to support him . -177 

Section IV. — Assassination of Wallenstein (February 1634). 

Feb. 18. Wallenstein declared a traitor 179 

Feb. 21. The garrison of Prague declares against him . . 179 

Feb. 24. Wallenstein at Eger 179 

Feb. 25. He is assassinated ....... 181 

Comparison between Gustavus and Wallenstein . 181 

Section V. — Imperialist Victories and the Treaty of Prague 
(February 1634-May 1635). 

1634 The King of Hungary reorganizes the imperial 
Feb. army 181 

Sept. 6. In conjunction with the Cardinal-Infant, he defeats 

Bernhard at Nordlingen 183 

Consequent necessity of an increased French inter- 
vention 184 

1635 Peace of Prague 184 

May 30. It is not universally accepted 185 

Miserable condition of Germany. Notes of an Eng- 
lish traveller . . . r, . . . '. 187 

Contents. xxiii 



SECTION I. — Open Intervention of France (May 1635). 


1635 Protestantism not out of danger . . . .189 

May. Close alliance of some of the Princes with France . 190 

Importance of the possession of Alsace and Lorraine 191 

May 19. France declares war against Spain .... 192 

Section II. — Spanish Successes (May \63$-Dccer>iber 1637). 

1635 Failure of the French attack on the Spanish Nether- 

lands 192 

1636 Spanish invasion of France 193 

Oct. 4. Baner's victory at Wittstock 194 

1637 Death of Ferdinand II. Accession of Ferdinand 
Feb. 15. Ill 194 

Imperialist success in Germany . . , .195 

Section III. — The Struggle for Alsace {January 1638-July 


1638 Bernhard's victories in the Breisgau and Alsace . 195 
July 8. Death of Bernhard 196 

Section IV. — French Successes (July 1639-Dec. 1642). 

French maritime successes 197 

1639 Spanish fleet taking refuge in the Downs . . . 198 
It is destroyed by the Dutch 198 

1640 Insurrection of Catalonia 199 

Nov. Independence of Portugal ..... 200 

1641 Defeat of the Imperialists at Wolfenbuttel . . 201 

1642 Defeat of the Imperialists at Kempten . . . 201 
Aug. Charles I. sets up his standard. Beginning of the 

English Civil War 
Dec 4, Death of Richelieu 201 

xxiv Contents. 

SECTION V. — Aims and Character of Richelieu {December 1642- 
May 1643). 


Richelieu's domestic policy 201 

Contrast between France and England . . . 203 
Richelieu's foreign policy ...... 203 

1643 Moderation of his aims 204 

May 14. Death of Lewis XIII 205 

Section VI. — More French Victories {May i6^-Augv^t 1645). 

1643 Rule of Cardinal Mazarin 205 

May 19. Enghien defeats the Spaniards at Rocroy . . . 206 

The French kept in check in Germany . . . 207 

1644 Enghien and Turenne. Battle of Freiburg . . 208 
July. Battle of Marston Moor 

1645, Aug. 3. Second Battle of Nordlingen .... 208 
Mar. 6. Swedish victory at Jankow ..... S09 


Section I. — Turenne's Strategy {June \6$$-Octobcr 1648). 

1645 Negotiations for peace begun 209 

June. Battle of Naseby 

Aims of the Emperor and the Duke of Bavaria . . 210 

1646 Turenne outmanoeuvres the Imperialists . . . 213 

1647, May-Sept. Truce between the French and the Bavarians 213 

1648, May 17. Defeat of the Bavarians at Zusmarshausen . 213 

Section II.— The Treaty of Westphalia {Oct. 1648). 

1648 Terms of the peace 213 

Oct. 24. How far was toleration effected by it . . . 214 
General desire for peace 217 

Contents. xxv 

SECTION III. — Condition of Germany. 


Debasing effects of the war 217 

Decrease of the population 218 

Moral and intellectual decadence .... 218 
Disintegration of Germany ..... 220 
Protestantism saved, and with it the future culture of 
Germany 220 

Section IV. — Continuance of the War between France and 
Spain (1648-1660). 

1648 Recognition of the independence of the Dutch 

Republic 221 

1649 Execution of Charles I. 

The Fronde 222 

. 223 
. 223 
. 224 

Continuance of the war with Spain . 
Alliance between France and Cromwell 
1660 Treaty of Pyrenees .... 
French greatness based on Tolerance 
Intolerance of Lewis XIV. and downfall of the 
French monarchy 226 





Section I. — Political Institutions of Germany. 

It was the misfortune of Germany in the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries that, with most of the conditions 
requisite for the formation of national unity, . 

.,...?*■ Want of 

she had no really national institutions, national insti- 

— , i i i j tutions in 

There was an emperor, who looked some- Germany, 
thing like an English king, and a Diet, or 
General Assembly, which looked something like an 
English Parliament, but the resemblance was far greater 
in appearance than in reality. 

The Emperor was chosen by three ecclesiastical 
electors, the Archbishops of Mentz, Treves and Cologne, 
and four lay electors, the Elector Palatine, 
the Electors of Saxony and Brandenburg, pe ror . e m 
and the King of Bohemia. In theory he was 
the successor of the Roman Emperors Julius and Con- 
stantine. the ruler of the world, or of so much of it at 
least as he could bring under his sway. More particu- 
larly, he was the successor of Charles the Great and Otto 

2 Causes of the Thirty Years 1 War. 1440-15 17. 

the Great, the lay head of Western Christendom. The 
Emperor Sigismund, on his death-bed, had directed that 
his body should lie in state for some days, that men might 
see ' that the lord of all the world was dead.' ' We have 
chosen your grace,' said the electors to Frederick III., 
' as head, protector, and governor of all Christendom.' 
Yet it would be hard to find a single fragment of reality 
corresponding to the magnificence of the claim. 

As far, however, as the period now under review is 
concerned, though the name of Emperor was retained, it 
is unnecessary to trouble ourselves with the 
man kingship* rights, real or imaginary, connected with the 
imperial dignity. Charles the Great, before 
the imperial crown was conferred on him, ruled as king, 
by national assent or by conquest, over a great part of 
Western Europe. When his dominions were divided 
amongst his successors, the rule of those successors in 
Germany or elsewhere had no necessary connexion with 
the imperial crown. Henry the Fowler, one of the great- 
est of the Kings of the Germans, was never an emperor 
at all, and though, after the reign of his son Otto the 
Great, the German kings claimed from the Pope the im- 
perial crown as their right, they never failed also to re- 
ceive a special German crown at Aachen [Azx-ta-C/ia' 
pelle) or at Frankfort as the symbol of their headship 
over German lands and German men. 

When, therefore, the writers of the 16th or 17th centu- 
ries speak of the rights of the Emperor in Germany, they 

, . really mean to speak of the rights of the Em- 

U- Its con- . , . . ,-,. , • 

nexion with peror in his capacity of German king, just as, 

mpire. w j ien t ^ e y S p ea k f the Empire, they mean 
what we call Germany, together with certain surround- 
ing districts, such as Switzerland, the Netherlands, Lor- 
raine, and Eastern Burgundy or Franche Comte, which 

I44 0_I S I 7- Political Institutions of Germany. 3 

are not now, if Alsace and the newly-conquered part of 
Lorraine be excepted, included under that name. In the 
Eame way the mere fragments of feudal supremacy, and 
the payment of feudal dues which the emperors claimed 
in Italy, belonged to them, not as emperors, but simply 
as Italian kings, and as wearers of the iron crown of 
Lombardy, which, as the legends told, was formed of 
nails taken from the Saviour's cross. 

Not that it would be wise, even if it were possible, to 
do otherwise than to follow the practice of contem- 
poraries. The strange form, Emperor of 
Germany, by which, at a later period, men confusion 
unfamiliar with Germany history strove to 
reconcile the old claims with something like the actual 
fact, had not been yet invented. And, after all, the 
confusions of history, the use of words and titles when 
their meaning is changed, are so many tokens to remind 
us of the unity of successive generations, and of the 
impossibility of any one of them building anew without 
regarding the foundations of their fathers. All that is 
needed is to remember that the emperor of later times is 
a personage whose rights and functions can be profitably 
compared with those of Henry VIII. of England or 
Lewis XIV. of France, not with Julius or Constantine 
Whose successor he professed himself to be. 

' Take away the rights of the Emperor,' said a law 
«oook of the fifteenth century, in language which would 
have startled an old Roman legislator, ' and „ mi 

§ 0. The 

who can say, "This house is mine, this vd- great 
lage belongs to me?'" But the princes 
and bishops, the counts and cities, who were glad enough 
to plead on their own behalf that their lands were held 
directly from the head of the Empire, took care to allow 
him scarcely any real authority. This kingly dignity 

4 Causes of the Thirty Years' War. 1440-15 17. 

which passed under the name of the Empire was indeed 
very weak. It had never outgrown the needs of the 
Middle Ages, and was still essentially a feudal kingship. 
From circumstances which it would take too much space 
to notice here, it had failed in placing itself at the head 
of a national organization, and in becoming the guard- 
ian of the rights of the tillers of the soil and the burghers 
of the towns, who found no place in the ranks of the 
feudal chivalry. 

The immediate vassals of the Empire, in fact, were 
almost independent sovereigns, like the Dukes of Nor- 
mandy in the France of the tenth century, 
independence. or tne Dukes of Burgundy in the France of 
the fifteenth century. They quarrelled and 
made war with one another like the Kings of England 
and France. Their own vassals, their own peasants, their 
own towns could only reach the Emperor through them, 
if anybody thought it worth while to reach him at all. 

The prospect of reviving the German kingship which 
was veiled under the august title of Emperor seemed far 
distant at the beginning of the fifteenth cen- 
of order.° SpeCt tury. But whilst the Empire, in its old sense, 
with its claims to universal dominion, was a 
dream, this German kingship needed but wisdom in the 
occupant of the throne to seize the national feeling, which 
was certain sooner or later to call out for a national ruler, 
in order to clothe itself in all the authority which was 
needed for the maintenance of the unity and the safety 
of the German people. That, when the time came, the 
man to grasp the opportunity was not there, was the chief 
amongst the causes of that unhappy tragedy of disunion 
which culminated in the Thirty Years' War. 

In the middle of the fifteenth century an effort was 
made to introduce a system of regular assemblies, un- 

I44° -I 5 I 7' Political Institutions of Germany 5 
der the name of a Diet, in order to stem the . 

. 2 9- Attempt! 

tide of anarchy. But it never entered into to introduce 
the mind of the wisest statesman living to 
summon any general representation of the people. In 
the old feudal assemblies no one had taken part who 
was not an immediate vassal of the Empire, and the 
Diet professed to be only a more regular organization of 
the old feudal assemblies. 

From the Diet, therefore, all subjects of the territorial 
princes were rigorously excluded. Whatever their wishes 
or opinions might be, they had neither part nor lot in 
the counsels of the nation. There was nothing in the 
Diet answering to those representatives of 
English counties, men not great enough to Diet,or geno- 
assume the state of independent princes, nor ^^Empire. 
small enough to be content simply to regis- 
ter without question the decrees of those in authority 
who with us did more than any other class to cement 
town and country, king and people together. Nor did 
even the less powerful of the immediate vassals take 
part in the meetings. Like the lesser barons of the early 
Plantagenet reigns, they slipped out of a position to 
which they seemed to have a right by the fact that they 
held their few square miles of land as directly from the 
Emperor as the Dukes of Bavaria or the Electors of 
Saxony held the goodly principalities over which they 

Such a body was more like a congress of the repre- 
sentatives of European sovereigns than an English Par- 
liament. Each member came in his own \ %%. The 
right. He might or might not speak the fit^eforThe 
sentiments of his subjects, and, even if he Diet - 
did, he naturally preferred deciding pretty much as he 
pleased at home to allowing the question to be debated 

6 Causes of the Thirty Years' War. 1440-15 17. 

by an assembly of his equals. An Elector of Saxony, a 
Landgrave of Hesse, or an Archduke of Austria knew 
that taxes were levied, armies trained, temporal and 
spiritual wants provided for at his own court at Dresden, 
at Cassel, or at Vienna, and he had no wish that it should 
be otherwise. Nor was it easy, even when a prince had 
made himself so obnoxious as to call down upon him- 
self the condemnation of his fellows, to subject him to 
punishment. He might, indeed, be put to the ban of 
the Empire, a kind of secular excommunication. But if 
he were powerful himself, and had powerful friends, it 
might be difficult to put it in execution. It would be 
necessary to levy war against him, and that war might 
not be successful. 

Still, at the end of the fifteenth and the beginning of 

the sixteenth centuries some progress was made. An 

Imperial Court {Reichskammergcricht) came 

sortoforder into existence, mainly nominated by the 

established. ■ r .* -r> j ^i_ j .. 

princes of the Empire, and authorized to 
pronounce judgment upon cases arising between the 
rulers of the various territories. In order to secure the 
better execution of the sentences of this court, Germany 
was divided into circles, in each of which the princes 
and cities who were entitled to a voice in the Diet of the 
Empire were authorized to meet together and to levy 
troops for the maintenance of order. 

These princes, lay and ecclesiastical, together with the 

cities holding immediately from the Empire, were called 

_, the Estates of the Empire. When they met 

g 13. The . * . J 

three Houses in the general Diet they voted in three 
houses. The first house was composed of 
the seven Electors, though it was only at an Imperial 
election that the number was complete. At all ordi- 
nary meetings for legislation, or for the dispatch of busi- 

I44° _I 5 I 7- Protestantism in Germany. 7 

ness, the king of Bohemia was excluded, and six Electors 
only appeared. The next house was the House of 
Princes, comprising all those persons, lay or ecclesiasti- 
cal, who had the right of sitting in the Diet. Lastly, 
came the Free Imperial Cities, the only popular element 
in the Diet. But they were treated as decidedly inferior 
to the other two houses. When the Electors and the 
Princes had agreed upon a proposition, then and not till 
then it was submitted to the House of Cities. 

The special risk attending such a constitution was that 
it provided almost exclusively for the wants of the 
princes and electors. In the Diet, in the circles, and in 
the Imperial Court, the princes and electors g I4 . The 
exercised a preponderating, if not quite an Cltles to ° weak - 
exclusive influence. In ordinary times there might be 
no danger. But if extraordinary times arose, if any 
great movement swept over the surface of the nation, it 
might very well be that the nation would be on one side 
and the princes and the electors on the other. And if 
this were the case there would be great difficulty in 
bringing the nation into harmony with its institutions. 
In England the sovereign could alter a hostile majority 
in the House of Lords by a fresh creation of peers, and 
the constituencies could alter a hostile majority of the 
House of Commons by a fresh election. In Germany 
there was no House of Commons, and an emperor who 
should try to create fresh princes out of the immediate 
vassals who were too weak to be summoned to the Diet 
would only render himself ridiculous by an attempt to 
place in check the real possessors of power by the help 
of those who had the mere appearance of it. 

Section II. — Protestantism in Germany. 

When, in the sixteenth century, Protestantism sud- 

8 Causes of the Thirty Years' War. 151 7—1552. 
denly raised its head, the institutions of the 

\ 1. The * . ' 

German peo- Empire were tried to the uttermost. For 
ProtesuntLm ; tne mass of the nation declared itself in 
the Diet op- favour of change, and the Diet was so com- 

Dosed to it. h ' 

posed as to be hostile to change, as soon as 
it appeared that it was likely to take the direction of 
Lutheranism. In the Electoral House, indeed, the votes 
of the three ecclesiastical electors were met by the votes 
of the three lay electors. But in the House of Princes 
there were thirty-eight ecclesiastical dignitaries and but 
eighteen laymen. It was a body, in short, like the Eng- 
lish House of Lords before the Reformation, and there 
was no Henry VIII. to bring it into harmony with the 
direction which lay society was taking, by some act 
equivalent to the dissolution of the monasteries, and the 
consequent exclusion of the mitred abbots from their 
seats in Parliament. To pass measures favourable to 
Protestantism through such a house was simply impossi- 
ble. Yet it can hardly be doubted that a really national 
Parliament would have adopted Lutheranism, more or 
less modified, as the religion of the nation. Before Pro- 
testantism was fifty years old, in spite of all difficulties, 
ninety per cent, of the population of Germany were Pro- 

In default of national action in favor of Protestantism, 
it was adopted and supported by most of the lay princes 

and electors. A new principle of disinte- 
\ 2. Most of . . , 

the lay princes gration was thus introduced into Germany, 

a opt ' as these princes were forced to act in op- 

position to the views adopted by the Diet. 

If the Diet was unlikely to play the part 


\ 3 The Em- 

peror Charles of an English Parliament, neither was the 

Emperor likely to play the part of Henry 
VIII. For the interests of Germany, Charles V., who 

I 5 I 7 -I 55 2 - Protestantism in Germany. 9 

had been elected in 1519, was weak where he ought 
to have been strong, and strong where he ought to have 
been weak. As Emperor, he was nothing. As feudal 
sovereign and national ruler, he was very little. But he 
was also a prince of the Empire, and as such he ruled 
over the Austrian duchies and Tyrol. Further than this, 
he was one of the most powerful sovereigns of Europe. 
He was king of Spain, and of the Indies with all their 
mines. In Italy, he disposed of Naples and the Mila- 
nese. Sicily and Sardinia were his, and, under various 
titles, he ruled over the fragments of the old Burgundian 
inheritance, Franche Comte, and the seventeen pro- 
vinces of the Netherlands. Such a man would influence 
the progress of affairs in Germany with a weight out of 
all proportion to his position in the German constitution. 
And unhappily, with the power of a foreign sovereign, 
he brought the mind of a foreigner. His mother's 
Spanish blood beat in his veins, and he had the instinc- 
tive aversion of a Spaniard to anything which savoured 
of opposition to the doctrines of the Church. 'That 
man,' he said, when he caught sight of Luther for the 
first time, ' shall never make me a heretic' 

Of this antagonism between the minority of the 
princes backed by the majority of the nation, and the 
majority of the princes backed by an Em- i 552 . 

peror who was also a foreign sovereign, Convention 
civil war was the natural result. In the end, of Passau - 
the triumph of the Protestants was so far secured that 
they forced their opponents in 1 552 to yield to the Conven- 
tion of Passau, by which it was arranged that a Diet should 
be held as soon as possible for a general pacification. 

That Diet, which was assembled at Augs- 1555. 

burg in 1555, met under remarkably fa- peace of 6 
vourable circumstances. Charles V., baffled Au s^ nir 8r 

io Causes of the Thirty Years' War. 1555. 

and disappointed, had retired from the scene, and had 
left behind him, as his representative, his more con- 
ciliatory brother Ferdinand, who was already King of 
Hungary and Bohemia, and was his destined successor 
in the German possessions of the House of Austria. 
Both he and the leading men on either side were anxious 
for peace, and v/ere jealous of the influence which 
Philip, the son of Charles V., and his successor in Spain, 
Italy, and the Netherlands, might gain from a continu- 
ance of the war. 

There was little difficulty in arranging that the Pro- 
testant princes, who, before the date of the Convention 

, ,. , of Passau, had seized ecclesiastical property 

I 6. Its terms. . r tr J 

within their own territories, either for their 
own purposes or for the support of Protestant worship, 
should no longer be subject to the law or authority of 
the Catholic clergy. The real difficulty arose in pro- 
viding for the future. With Protestantism as a growing 
religion, the princes might be inclined to proceed further 
with the secularizing of the Church property still left un- 
touched within their own territories ; and besides this, 
it was possible that even bishops or abbots themselves, 
being princes of the Empire, might be inclined to aban- 
don their religion, and to adopt Protestantism. 

The first of these difficulties was left by the treaty in 
some obscurity ; but, from the stress laid on the aban- 
? 7. Might donment by the Catholics of the lands se- 
sefzi"more cularized before the Convention of Passau, 
lands? j t would seem that they might fairly urge 

that they had never abandoned their claims to lands 
which at that date had not been secularized. 

The second difficulty led to long discussions. The 
Protestants wished that any bishop or abbot who pleased 
might be allowed to turn Protestant, and might then 

x 555- Protestantism in Germany. n 

establish Protestantism as the religion of g 8. Might 
his subjects. The Catholics insisted that t ; cs turn p r0 "_ 
any bishop or abbot who changed his religion testants? 
should be compelled to vacate his post, and this view of 
the case prevailed, under the name of the Ecclesiastical 
Reservation. It was further agreed that the peace 
should apply to the Lutheran Church alone, no other 
confession having been as yet adopted by any of the 

Such a peace, acceptable as it was at the time, was 
pregnant with future evil. Owing its origin to a Diet in 
which everything was arranged by the princes and 
electors, it settled all questions as if nobody but princes 
and electors had any interest in the matter. , _ 

J § g. Dangers 

And, besides this, there was a most unstates- of the future, 
manlike want of provision for future change. 
The year 1552 was to give the line by which the religious 
institutions of Germany were to be measured for all 
time. There was nothing elastic about such legislation. 
It did not, on the one hand, adopt the religion of the vast 
majority as the established religion of the Empire. It 
did not, on the other hand, adopt the principle of reli- 
gious liberty. In thinking of themselves and their 
rights, the princes had forgotten the German people. 

The barriers set up against Protestantism were so 
plainly artificial that they soon gave way. The princes 
claimed the right of continuing to secularize 
Church lands within their territories as inse- croachments"* 
parable from their general right of providing IjP°? Church 
for the religion of their subjects. At all 
events they had might on their side. About a hundred 
monasteries are said to have fallen victims in the Pala- 
tinate alone, and an almost equal number, the gleanings 
of a richer harvest which had been reaped before the 

12 Causes of the Thirty Years' War. 1555-1570. 

Convention of Passau, were taken possession of in 
Northern Germany. 

The Ecclesiastical Reservation applied to a different 

class of property, namely, to the bishoprics and abbeys 

held immediately of the Empire. Here, too, 

jii. The Ec- / v ' ' 

cicsiastical the Protestants found an excuse for evading 
the Treaty of Augsburg. The object of the 
reservation, they argued, was not to keep the bishoprics 
in Catholic hands, but to prevent quarrels arising be- 
tween the bishops and their chapters. If, therefore, a 
bishop elected as a Catholic chose to turn Protestant, he 
must resign his see in order to avoid giving offence to 
the Catholic chapter. But where a chapter, itself already 
Protestant, elected a Protestant bishop, he might take 
the see without hesitation, and hold it as long as he 

In this way eight of the great northern bishoprics 

soon came under Protestant rule. Not that the Protest- 

_ ant occupant was in any real sense of the 

£12. The , 

northern bish- word a bishop. He was simply an elected 
testant. "" prince, calling himself a bishop, or often 

more modestly an administrator, and look- 
ing after the temporal affairs of his dominions. 

In some respects the arrangement was a good one. 
The populations of these territories were mainly Protest- 
ant, and they had no cause to complain, 
bad side of the Besides, if only a sufficient number of these 
arrangement, bishoprics could be gained to Protestantism, 
the factitious majority in the Diet might be reversed, 
and an assembly obtained more truly representing the 
nation than that which was in existence. But it must be 
acknowledged that the whole thing had an ugly look ; 
and it is no wonder that Catholics pronounced these ad- 
ministrators to be no bishops at all, and to have no right 

X 57 0_I 595- Reaction against Protestantism. 13 

to hold the bishops' lands, or to take their seat as bishops 
in the Diet of the Empire. 

Section III. — Reaction against Protestantism. 
In course of time Protestantism, in its turn, exposed 
itself to attack. Each petty court soon had its own 
school of theologians, whose minds were . _,. , . 

. * \ 1. lheologi- 

dwarfed to the limits of the circle which they cai deputes 
influenced with their logic and their elo- tenants.™ 
quence. The healthful feeling which springs 
from action on a large stage was wanting to them. 
Bitterly wrangling with one another, they were eager to 
call in the secular arm against their opponents. Seizing 
the opportunity, the newly-constituted order of Jesuits 
stepped forward to bid silence in the name of the reno- 
vated Papal Church, alone, as they urged, able to give 
peace instead of strife, certainty instead of disputation. 
The Protestants were taken at a disadvantage. The 
enthusiasm of a national life, which repelled the Jesuits 
in the England of the sixteenth century, and the enthu- 
siasm of scientific knowledge which repels them in the 
Germany of the nineteenth century, were alike wanting 
to a Germany in which national life was a dream of the 
past, and science a dream of the future. Luther had 
long ago passed away from the world. Melanchthon's 
last days were spent in hopeless protest against the evil 
around him. ' For two reasons,' he said, as he lay upon 
his death-bed, ' I desire to leave this life : First, that I 
may enjoy the sight, which I long for, of the Son of God 
and of the Church in Heaven. Next, that I may be set 
free from the monstrous and implacable hatreds of the 

In the face of a divided people, or self-seeking 
princes, and of conflicting theories, the Jesuits made 

14 Causes of the Tliv'ty Years' War. 15 70-1 59 6. 

their way. Step by step the Catholic reac- 
Catholics tion gained ground, not without compulsion, 

\n e progress, j^ ^^ nQt without that moral force which 
makes compulsion possible. The bishops and abbots 
gave their subjects the choice between conversion and 
exile. An attempt made by the Archbishop of Cologne 
to marry and turn Protestant was too plainly in contradic- 
tion to the Ecclesiastical Reservation to prosper, and 
when the Protestant majority of the Chapter of Stras- 
burg elected a Protestant bishop they were soon over- 
powered. A Protestant Archbishop of Magdeburg offer- 
ing to take his place amongst the princes of the Empire 
at the Diet was refused admission, and though nothing 
was done to dispossess him and the other northern ad- 
ministrators of their sees, yet a slur had been cast upon 
'their title which they were anxious to efface. A few 
years later a legal decision was obtained in the cases of 
four monasteries secularized after the Convention of 
Passau, and that decision was adverse to the claim of 
the Protestants. 

Out of these two disputes — the dispute about the Pro- 
testant administrators and the dispute about the secular- 
l 3. The dis- ized lands — the Thirty Years' War arose. 
Fed finally to The Catholic party stood upon the strict let- 
war - ter of the law, according, at least, to their 

own interpretation, and asked that everything might be 
replaced in the condition in which it was in 1552, the 
date of the Convention of Passau. The Protestant view, 
that consideration should be taken for changes, many 
of which at the end of the sixteenth century were at 
least a generation old, may or may not have been in 
accordance with the law, but it was certainly in accord* 
ance with the desires of the greater part of the popula* 
tion affected by them. 

1596-1607. Three Parties and Three Leaders. 15 

There is every reason to believe that if Germany had 
possessed anything like a popular representation its 
voice would have spoken in favour of some , 

. $ 4- Nopopu- 

kind of compromise. There is no trace of far represen- 

,,.,., , , tation. 

any mutual hostility between the popula- 
tions of the Catholic and Protestant districts apart from 
their rulers. 

Section IV. — Three Parties and Three Leaders. 

Two men stood forward to personify the elements of 
strife — Maximilian, the Catholic Duke of Bavaria, and the 
Calvinist Prince Christian of Anhalt, whilst „ _ 

i 1. Tne 

the warmest advocate of peace was John leaders of 
George, the Lutheran Elector of Saxony. 

Maximilian of Bavaria was the only lay prince of any 
importance on the side of the Catholics. He had long 
been known as a wise administrator of his own domin- 
ions. No other ruler was provided with so , 

I 2. Maximi- 

well-filled a treasury, or so disciplined an lianoftsava- 
army. No other ruler was so capable of 
forming designs which were likely to win the approba- 
tion of others, or so patient in waiting till the proper time 
arrived for their execution. ' What the Duke of Bava- 
ria does,' said one of his most discerning opponents, 
' has hands and feet.' His plans, when once they were 
launched into the world, seemed to march forwards of 
themselves to success. 

Such a man was not likely to take up the wild theories 
which were here and there springing up, of the duty of 
uprooting Protestantism at all times and all a 3 His love 
places, or to declare, as some were declar- ofle g allt y- 
ing, that the Peace of Augsburg was invalid because it 
had never been confirmed by the Pope. To him the 
Peace of Augsburg was the legal settlement by which all 

1 6 Causes of the Thirty Years' War. 1596-1' ^7. 

questions were to be tried. What he read there was 
hostile to the Protestant administrators and the seculariz- 
ing princes. Yet he did not propose to carry his views 
into instant action. He would await his opportunity. 
But he would do his best to be strong, in order that he 
might not be found wanting when the opportunity ar- 
rived, and, in spite of his enthusiasm for legal rights, it 
was by no means unlikely that, if a difficult point arose, 
he might be inclined to strain the law in his own favour. 
Such an opponent, so moderate and yet so resolute, 
was a far more dangerous enemy to the Protestants than 
^ the most blatant declaimer against their 

I 4. Danger & 

of the Protest- doctrines. Naturally, the Protestants re- 
garded his views as entirely inadmissible. 
They implied nothing less than the forcible conversion 
of the thousands of Protestants who were inhabitants of 
the administrators' dominions, and the occupation by 
the Catholic clergy of points of vantage which would 
serve them in their operations upon the surrounding dis- 
tricts. It is true that the change, if effected would sim- 
ply replace matters in the position which had been found 
endurable in 1552. But that which could be borne when 
the Catholics were weak and despondent might be an 
intolerable menace when they were confident and ag- 

Resistance, therefore, became a duty, a duty to which 
the princes were all the more likely to pay attention be- 
cause it coincided with their private interest. 

g 5. Danger 

of the Protest- In the bishoprics and chapters they found 
provision for their younger sons, from 
which they would be cut off if Protestants were hereafter 
to be excluded. 

The only question was in what spirit the resistance 
should be offered. The tie which bound the Empire to- 

1596-1607. Three Parties and Three Leaders. i"] 

gether was so loose, and resistance to law, \ 6. Protest- 
or what was thought to be law, was so like- north and 
ly to lead to resistance to law in general, south - 
that it was the more incumbent on the Protestants to 
choose their ground well. And in Germany, at least, 
there was not likely to be any hasty provocation to give 
Maximilian an excuse for reclaiming the bishoprics. 
Far removed from the danger, these northern Lutherans 
found it difficult to conceive that there was any real dan- 
ger at all. The states of the south, lying like a wedge 
driven into the heart of European Catholicism, were 
forced by their geographical position to be ever on the 
alert. They knew that they were the advanced guard 
of Protestantism. On the one flank was the Catholic 
duchy of Bavaria, and the bishoprics of Wurzburg and 
Bamberg. On the other flank were the ecclesiastical 
electorates on the Rhine and the Moselle, the bishoprics 
of Worms, Spires, and Strasburg, the Austrian lands in 
Swabia and Alsace, and the long line of the Spanish 
frontier in Franche Comte and the Netherlands garri- 
soned by the troops of the first military monarchy in 
Europe. What wonder if men so endangered were in 
haste to cut the knot which threatened to strangle them, 
and to meet the enemy by flying in his face rather than 
by awaiting the onslaught which they believed to be in- 

Under the influence of this feeling the princes of these 
southern regions for the most part adopted a religion 
very different from the courtly Lutheranism , 

? 7- Spread 

of the north. If Wurtemberg continued of Calvinism. 
Lutheran under the influence of the Univer- 
sity of Tubingen, the rulers of the Palatinate, of Hesse 
Cassel, of Baden-Durlach, of Zwei-Briicken, sought for 
strength in the iron discipline of Calvinism, a form of 

1 8 Causes of the Thirty Years' 1 War. 15 96-1 607. 

religion which always came into favour when there 
was an immediate prospect of a death-struggle with 

Unhappily, German Calvinism differed from that of 
Scotland and the Netherlands. Owing to its adoption 
, c by the princes rather than 

character of failed in gaining that hardy growth which 
Germany. made it invincible on its native soil. It had 

less of the discipline of an army about it, 
less resolute defiance, less strength altogether. And 
whilst it was weaker it was more provocative. Excluded 
from the benefits of the Peace of Augsburg, which knew 
of no Protestant body except the Lutheran, the Calvin- 
ists were apt to talk about the institutions of the Empire 
in a manner so disparaging as to give offence to Luther- 
ans and Catholics alike. 

Of this Calvinist feeling Christian of Anhalt became 

the impersonation. The leadership of the Calvinist 

states in the beginning of the seventeenth 

j? 9. Frede- 

rick IV., century would naturally have devolved on 

Palatine. Frederick IV., Elector Palatine. But Fred- 

erick was an incapable drunkard, and his 

councillors, with Christian at their head, were left to act 

in his name. 
Christian of Anhalt possessed a brain of inexhaustible 

fertility. As soon as one plan which he had framed ap- 
peared impracticable, he was ready with 

? 10. Chris- r _*; , ,. , / , 

tian of another. He was a born diplomatist, and 

all the chief politicians of Europe were in- 
timately known to him by report, whilst with many of 
them he carried on a close personal intercourse. His 
leading idea was that the maintenance of peace was 
hopeless, and that either Protestantism must get rid of 
the House of Austria, or the House of Austria would get 

1607. Three Parties and Three Leaders. 19 

rid of Protestantism. Whether this were true or false, it 
is certain that he committed the terrible fault of under- 
estimating his enemy. Whilst Maximilian was drilling 
soldiers and saving money, Christian was trusting to 
mere diplomatic finesse. He had no idea of the tena- 
c ? *"y with which men will cling to institutions, however 
rotten, till they feel sure that some other institutions will 
be substituted for them, or of the strength which Maxi- 
milian derived from the appearance of conservatism in 
which his revolutionary designs were shrouded even 
from his own observation. In order to give to Protes- 
tantism that development which in Christian's eyes was 
necessary to its safety, it would be needful to overthrow 
the authority of the Emperor and of the Diet. And if 
the Emperor and the Diet were overthrown, what had 
Christian to offer to save Germany from anarchy ? If 
his plan included, as there is little doubt that it did, the 
seizure of the lands of the neighbouring bishops, and a 
fresh secularization of ecclesiastical property, even Pro- 
testant towns might begin to ask whether their turn 
would not come next. A return to the old days of 
private war and the law of the strongest would be 
welcome to very few. 

In 1607 an event occurred which raised the alarm of 
the southern Protestants to fever heat. In the free city 

of Donauworth the abbot of a monastery 

saw fit to send out a procession to flaunt its ? n. The 

banners in the face of an almost" entirely of Donau" 
Protestant population. Before the starting- wSrth - 
point was regained mud and stones were thrown, and 
some of those who had taken part in the proceedings 
were roughly handled. The Imperial Court (Reich- 
skammergericht) , whose duty it was to settle such quar- 
rels, was out of working order in consequence of the 

2o Causes of the Thirty Years' War. 1608. 

religious disputes ; but there was an Imperial Council 
(Reichshofrath), consisting of nominees of the Emperor, 
and professing to act out of the plenitude of imperial au- 
thority. By this council Donauworth was put to the ban 
of the Empire without due form of trial, and Maximilian 
was appointed to execute the decree. He at once 
marched a small army into the place, and, taking pos- 
session of the town, declared his intention of retaining 
his hold till his expenses had been paid, handing over 
the parish church in the meanwhile to the Catholic 
clergy. It had only been given over to Protestant wor- 
ship after the date of the Convention of Passau, and 
Maximilian could persuade himself that he was only 
carrying out the law. 

It was a flagrant case of religious aggression under 
the name of the law. The knowledge that a partial 

tribunal was ready to give effect to the com- 
a 12. The plaints of Catholics at once threw the great 

Protestant cities of the South — Nuremberg, 
Ulm, and Strasburg into the arms of the neighbouring 
princes of whom they had hitherto been jealous. Yet 
there was much in the policy of those princes which 
would hardly have reassured them. At the Diet of 1608 
the representatives of the Elector Palatine were foremost 
in demanding that the minority should not be bound by 
the majority in questions of taxation or religion ; that is 
to say, that they should not contribute to the common 
defence unless they pleased, and that they should not 
be subject to any regulation about ecclesiastical proper- 
ty unless they pleased. Did this mean only that they 
were to keep what they had got, or that they might take 
more as soon as it was convenient ? The one was the 
Protestant, the other the Catholic interpretation of their 

1609. Three Parties and Three Leaders. 21 

On May 14, 160S, the Protestant Union, to which Lu- 
therans and Calvinists were alike admitted, came into 
existence under the guidance of Christian . 

2 1 3- Forma- 

of Anhalt. It was mainly composed of the tion of the 
princes and towns of the south. Its ostensi- 
ble purpose was for self-defence, and in this sense it was 
accepted by most of those who took part in it. Its 
leaders had very different views. 

A Catholic League was at once formed under Maximi- 
lian. It was composed of a large number of bishops 
and abbots, who believed that the princes . 

. . § 14. Forma- 

of the Union wished to annex their territo- tion of the 
ries. Maximilian's ability gave it a unity 
of action which the Union never possessed. It, too, was 
constituted for self-defence, but whether that word was 
to include the resumption of the lands lost since the 
Convention of Passau was a question probably left for 
circumstances to decide. 

Whatever the majority of the princes of the Union 
may have meant, there can be no doubt § 15. Revoiu- 
that Christian of Anhalt meant aggression, c^ofthe 
He believed that the safety of Protestantism Uoion. 
could not be secured without the overthrow of the Ger- 
man branch of the House of Austria, and he was san- 
guine enough to fancy that an act which would call up 
all Catholic Europe in arms against him was a very easy 

Scarcely had the Union been formed when events 

occurred which aknost dragged Germ-any into war. In 

the spring of 1609 the Duke of Cleves died. 

The Elector of Brandenburg and the son of §16. The sue 

the Duke of Neuburg laid claim to the sue- cieves! ° 

cession. On the plea that the Emperor had 

the right to settle the point, a Catholic army advanced 

3 2 Causes of the Thirty Years' War. 1612. 

to take possession of the country. The two pretenders, 

both of them Lutherans, made common cause against 

the invaders. Henry IV. of France found 
1610. . J 

in the dispute a pretext for commencing his 

long-meditated attack upon Spain and her allies. But 

his life was cut short by an assassin, and his widow only 

thought of sending a small French force to join the 

English and the Dutch in maintaining the claims of the 

two princes, who were ready to unite for a time against 

a third party. 

It was not easy to bring the princes to an arrangement 
/t>r the future. One day the young Prince of Neuburg 
proposed what seemed to him an excellent 
$17. Vhe box way out of the difficulty. ' He was ready,' 
on the ear. k e sa j j ) < to maiT y the Elector's daughter, 
if only he might have the territory.' Enraged at the 
impudence of the proposal, the Elector raised his hand 
and boxed his young rival's ears. The blow had unex- 
pected consequences. The injured prince renounced his 
Protestantism, and invoked, as a good Catholic, the aid 
of Spain and the League. The Elector passed from 
Lutheranism to Calvinism, and took a more active part 
than before in the affairs of the Union. That immediate 
war in Germany did not result from the quarrel is proba- 
bly the strongest possible evidence of the reluctance of 
the German people to break the peace. 

The third party, the German Lutherans, looked with 
equal abhorrence upon aggression on either side. Their 
leader, John George, Elector of Saxony, stood 
?i8. John aloof alike from Christian of Anhalt, and 
tor°o7saxony. from Maximilian of Bavaria. He. was at- 
tached by the traditions of his house as well 
as by his own character to the Empire and the House 
of Austria. But he was anxious to obtain security for 

1 613. Three parties and three Leaders. 23 

his brother Protestants. He saw there must be a change ; 
but he wisely desired to make the change as slight as 
possible. In 1612, therefore, he proposed that the high- 
est jurisdiction should still be retained by the Imperial 
Council, but that the Council, though still nominated by 
the Emperor, should contain an equal number of Catho- 
lics and Protestants. Sentences such as that which had 
deprived Donauworth of its civil rights would be in future 

Unhappily, John George had not the gift of ruling 
men. He was a hard drinker and a bold huntsman, but 
to convert his wishes into actual facts was . 
beyond his power. When he saw his plan weakness of 
threatened with opposition on either side he 
left it to take care of itself. In 161 3 a Diet met, and 
broke up in confusion, leaving matters in such a state 
that any spark might give rise to a general confla- 



Section I. — The Hottse of Austria and its Subjects. 

At the beginning of the seventeenth century the domi- 
nions of the German branch of the House of Austria were 

parcelled out amongst the various descen - 
Austrian dants of Ferdinand I., the brother of Charles 

V. The head of the family, the Emperor 
Rudolph II., was Archduke of Austria — a name which in 
those days was used simply to indicate the archduchy 
itself, and not the group of territories which are at pre- 
sent ruled over by the Austrian sovereign — and he was 
also King of Bohemia and of Hungary. His brothel 
Maximilian governed Tyrol, and his cousin Ferdinand 
ruled in Styria, Carinthia, and Carniola. 

The main difficulty of government arose from the fact 
that whilst every member of the family clung firmly to 

the old creed, the greater part of the no- 

# 2. Ans- ° r r 

tocracyand pulation, excepting in Tyrol, had adopted 

Protestantism. ,, , . .. . ., 

the new ; that is to say, that on the great 
question of the day the subjects and the rulers had no 
thoughts in common. And this difficulty was aggravated 
by the further fact that Protestantism prospered mainly 
from the support given to it by a powerful aristocracy, so 
that political disagreement was added to the difference 
in religion. Ferdinand had, indeed, contrived to put 
down with a strong hand the exercise of Protestantism 
in his own dominions so easily as almost to suggest the 
inference that it had not taken very deep root in those 
Alpine regions. But Rudolph was quite incapable of 

1609^ The House of Austria and its Subjects. 25 

following his example. If not absolutely insane, he was 

subject to sudden outbursts of temper, proceeding from 

mental disease. 

In 1606, a peace having been concluded with the 

f urks, Rudolph fancied that his hands were at last free 

to deal with his subjects as Ferdinand had 

J 1606 

dealt with his. The result was a general \ 3. Rudolph 

uprising, and if Rudolph's brother Matthias 

had not placed himself at the head of the movement, in 

order to save the interests of the family, some stranger 

would probably have been selected as a rival to the 

princes of the House of Austria. 

In the end, two years later, Austria and Hungary were 
assigned to Matthias, whilst Bohemia, Moravia and 
Silesia were left to Rudolph for his lifetime. 

The result of Rudolph's ill-advised energy was to 

strengthen the hands of the Protestant nobility. In 

Hungary the Turks were too near to make 

. 1609. 

it easy for Matthias to refuse concessions to a 4. The 

a people who might, at any time, throw f°Bohemi" e * 
themselves into the arms of the enemy, and 
in Austria he was driven, after some resistance, to agree 
to a compromise. In Bohemia, in 1609, the Estates ex- 
torted from Rudolph the Royal Charter {Majesiatsbrief) 
which guaranteed freedom of conscience to every inha- 
bitant of Bohemia, as long as he kept to certain recognised 
creeds. Bnt freedom of conscience did not by any 
means imply freedom of worship. A man might think 
as he pleased, but the building of churches and the per-, 
formance of divine service were matters for the authori- 
ties to decide upon. The only question was, who the 
authorities were. 

By the Royal Charter this authority was given over to 
members of the Estates, that is to say, to about 1,400 of 

26 7 he Bohemian Revolution. 1609. 

the feudal aristocracy and 42 towns. In an agreement 

attached to the charter, a special exception was made for 

„ . . the royal domains. A Protestant landowner 

$ 5. Position J 

of the land- could and would prohibit the erection of a 
Catholic church on his own lands, but the 

king was not to have that privilege. On his domains 

worship was to be free. 

From this bondage, as he counted it, Rudolph strug- 
gled to liberate himself. There was fresh violence, 
ending in 161 1 in Rudolph's dethronement 

tiies to get in favour of Matthias, who thus became king 
of Bohemia. The next year he died, and 

Matthias succeeded him as Emperor also. 

During all these troubles, Christian of Anhalt had 

done all that he could to frustrate a peaceful settlement. 

, „, . . ' When Hungary, Moravia, Austria, and 

jf 7. Christian _ ° ' 

of Anhalt Silesia are on our side,' he 

generai fore the Royal Charter had been granted, to 

confusion. & diplomatist in his employment, ' the 

House of Hapsburg will have no further strength to re 
sist us, except in Bohemia, Bavaria, and a few bishop- 
rics. Speaking humanly, we shall be strong enough not 
only to resist these, but to reform all the clergy, and 
bring them into submission to our religion. The game 
will begin in this fashion. As soon as Bavaria arms to 
use compulsion against Austria,' (that is to say, against 
the Austrian Protestants, who were at that time resisting 
Matthias) ' we shall arm to attack Bavaria, and retake 
Donauworth. In the same way, we shall get hold of 
two or three bishops to supply us with money. Cer- 
tainly, it seems that by proceeding dexterously we shall 
give the law to all, and set up for rulers whom we will.' 
For the time Christian was disappointed. The do- 
minions of Matthias settled down into quietness. But 

(6i 7- The House of Austria and its Subjects. 27 

Matthias was preparing another opportunity for his an- 
tagonist. Whether it would have been possible in those 
days for a Catholic king to have kept a Protestant nation 
in working order we cannot say. At all 
events, Matthias did not give the experi- thias King of 

r . . 1TT ,.. .. , . Bohemia. 

ment a fair trial. He did not, indeed, attack 
the Royal Charter directly on the lands of the aristocracy. 
But he did his best to undermine it on his own. The 
Protestants of Braunau, on the lands of the Abbot of 
Braunau and the Protestants of Klostergrab, on the 
lands of the Archbishop of Prague, built churches for 
themselves, the use of which was prohibited by the abbot 
and the archbishop. A dispute immediately arose as to 
the rights of ecclesiastical landowners, and it was ar- 
gued on the Protestant side, that their lands were tech- 
nically Crown lands, and that they had therefore no 
right to close the churches. Matthias took the opposite 

On his own estates Matthias found means to evade 
the charter. He appointed Catholic priests to Protes- 
tant churches, and allowed measures to be . 

2 9. He 

taken to compel Protestants to attend the evades the 
Catholic service. Yet for a long time the 
Protestant nobility kept quiet. Matthias was old and 
infirm, and when he died they would, as they supposed, 
have an opportunity of choosing their next king, and it 
was generally believed that the election would fall upon 
a Protestant. The only question was whether the Elec- 
tor Palatine or the Elector of Saxony would be chosen. 

Suddenly, in 1617, the Bohemian Diet 
was summoned. When the Estates of the l6 

kingdom met they were told that it was a ? IO -, *"«■<«- 

' nana pro- 

mistake to suppose that the crown of Bo- posed as king 

, . , . „ . . of Bohemia. 

hernia was elective. Evidence was pro- 

2 8 The Bohemian Revolution. 1617. 

duced that for some time before the election of Matthias 
the Estates had acknowledged the throne to be heredi- 
tary, and the precedent of Matthias was to be set aside 
as occurring in revolutionary times. Intimidation was 
used to assist the argument, and men in the confidence 
of the court whispered in the ears of those who refused 
to be convinced that it was to be hoped that they had at 
least two heads on their shoulders. 

If ever there was a moment for resistance, if resist- 
ance was to be made at all, it was this. The arguments 
of the court were undoubtedly strong, but a 
Bohemians skilful lawyer could easily have found tech- 
him'aTthefr 6 nicalities on the other side, and the real 
king. evasion of the Royal Charter might have 

been urged as a reason why the court had no right to 
press technical arguments too closely. The danger was 
all the greater as it was known that by the renunciation 
of all intermediate heirs the hereditary right fell upon 
Ferdinand of Styria, the man who had already stamped 
Protestantism out in his own dominions. Yet, in spite 
of this, the Diet did as it was bidden, and renounced the 
right of election by acknowledging Ferdinand as their 
hereditary king. 

The new king was more of a devotee and less of a 
statesman than Maximilian of Bavaria, his cousin on his 
» I2 His mother's side. But their judgments of events 
character. were formed on the same lines. Neither 

of them were mere ordinary bigots, keeping no faith 
with heretics. But they were both likely to be guided 
in their interpretation of the law by that which they 
conceived to be profitable to their church. Ferdinand 
was personally brave ; but except when his course was 
very clear before him, he was apt to let difficulties settle 
themselves rather than come to a decision. 

ioiS. The Revolution at Prague. 29 

He had at once to consider whether he would swear 
to the Royal Charter. He consulted the Jesuits, and 
was told that, though it had been a sin to grant it, it 
was no sin to accept it now that it was the law of the 
land. As he walked in state to his coronation, he 
turned to a nobleman who was by his side. . 
' I am glad,' he said, ' that I have attained takes the 
the Bohemian crown without any pangs of Royal 
conscience.' He took the oath without Charter - 
further difficulty. 

The Bohemians were not long in feeling the effects of 
the change. Hitherto the hold of the House of Austria 
upon the country had been limited to the life of one old 
man. It had now, by the admission of the Diet itself, 
fixed itself for ever upon Bohemia. The proceedings 
against the Protestants on the royal domains assumed a 
sharper character. The Braunau worshippers were 
rigorously excluded from their church. The walls of 
the new church of Klostergrab were actually levelled 
with the ground. 

Section II. — Hie Revolution at Prague. 
The Bohemians had thus to resist in 1618, under every 
disadvantage, the attack which they had done nothing 
to meet in 1617. Certain persons named 
Defensors had, by law, the right of sum- ji. The 

t , r , . . j. Bohemians 

moning an assembly of representatives of petition 
the Protestant Estates. Such an assembly Matthias, 
met on March 5, and having prepared a petition to 
Matthias, who was absent from the kingdom, adjourned 
to May 21. 

Long before the time of meeting came, an answer was 
sent from Matthias justifying all that had been done, 
and declaring the assembly illegal. It was believed at 

30 The Bohoytian Revolution. 1618. 

I 2. Reply of ^ e time, though incorrectly, that the answer 
Matthias. was prepared by Slawata and Martinitz, 

two members of the regency who had been notorious 
for the vigour of their opposition to Protestantism. 

In the Protestant assembly there was a knot of men, 
headed by Count Henry of Thurn, which was bent on 

the dethronement of Ferdinand. They re- 
counse'u. ent solved to take advantage of the popular 

feeling to effect the murder of the two re- 
gents, and so to place an impassable gulf between the 
nation and the king. 

Accordingly, on the morning of Mav 23, the ' begin- 
ning and cause,' as a contemporary calls it, ' of all the 

coming evil,' the first day, though men as 
nitz and Sla- yet knew it not, of thirty years of war, 
out of vrifr" Thurn sallied forth at the head of a band o\ 
dow ' noblemen and their followers, all of them 

with arms in their hands. Trooping into the room where 
the regents were seated, they charged the obnoxious two 
with being the authors of the king's reply. After a bitter 
altercation both Martinitz and Slawata were dragged to 
a window which overlooked the fosse below from a dizzy 
height of some seventy feet. Martinitz, struggling 
against his enemies, pleaded hard for a confessor. 
' Commend thy soul to God,' was the stern answer. 
' Shall we allow the Jesuit scoundrels to come here ? ' 
In an instant he was hurled out, crying, "Jesus, Mary ! ' 
' Let us see," said some one mockingly, ' Whether his 
Mary will help him." A moment later he added : " By 
God, his Mary has helped him." Slawata followed, 
and then the secretary Fabricius. By a wonderful pre- 
servation, in which pious Catholics discerned the pro- 
tecting hand of God, all three crawled away from the 
spot without serious hurt. 

1618. The Revolution at Prague. 31 

There are moments when the character of a nation or 
party stands revealed as by a lightning 
flash, and this was one of them. It is not beginning, 
in such a way as this that successful revolu- 
tions are begun. 

The first steps to constitute a new government were 
easy. Thirty Directors were appointed, and the Jesuits 
were expelled from Bohemia. The Diet met . „,, 

. . ? 6. The re- 

and ordered soldiers to be levied to form an voiutionary 
army. But to support this army money governmen 
wo_uld be needed, and the existing taxes were insuffi- 
cient. A loan was accordingly thought of, and the 
nobles resolved to request the towns to make up the 
sum, they themselves contributing nothing. The pro- 
ject falling dead upon the resistance of the towns, new 
taxes were voted ; but no steps were taken to collect 
them, and the army was left to depend in a great mea- 
sure upon chance. 

Would the princes of Germany come to the help of 
the Directors ? John George of Saxony told them that 
he deeply sympathized with them, but that „ M 

... . 9. 7- The 

rebellion was a serious matter. To one who Elector of 
asked him what he meant to do, he replied, w t^h^ y f r 
' Help to put out the fire.' P eace - 

There was more help for them at Heidelberg than at 
Dresden. Frederick IV. had died in 1610, and his son, 
the young Frederick V., looked up to Chris- 
tian of Anhalt as the first statesman of his Elector Pala- 
age. By his marriage with Elizabeth, the outhopes of 
daughter of James I. of England, he had assistance - 
contracted an alliance which gave him the appearance 
rather than the reality of strength. He offered every 
encouragement to the Bohemians, but for the time held 
back from giving them actual assistance. 

5 2 The Bohemian Revolution. 1618. 

Section III. — The War in Bohemia. 

The Directors were thus thrown on their own re- 
sources. Ferdinand had secured his elec- 
ofwar." tion as king of Hungary, and, returning to 

Vienna, had taken up the reins of govern- 
ment in the name of Matthias. He had got together an 
army of 14,000 men, under the command of Bucquoi, 
an officer from the great school of military art in the 
Netherlands, and on August 13, the Bohemian frontier 
was invaded. War could hardly be avoided by either 
side. Budweis and Pilsen, two Catholic towns in Bo- 
hemia, naturally clung to their sovereign, and as soon 
as the Directors ordered an attack upon Budweis, the 
troops of Matthias prepared to advance to its succour. 

The Directors took alarm, and proposed to the Diet 

that new taxes should be raised and not merely voted, 

„, _, and that, in addition to the army of regular 

3 2. The Bo- . ' ° 

hemians vote soldiers, there should be a general levy of a 
ject 'to paying large portion of the population. To the 
taxes. j eV y ^g r^jet consented without difficulty. 

But before the day fixed for discussing the proposed 
taxes arrived, the majority of the members deliberately 
returned to their homes, and no new taxes were to be had. 

This day, August 30, may fairly be taken as the date 

of the political suicide of the Bohemian aristocracy. In 

almost every country in Europe order was 

are not likely maintained by concentrating the chief 

1 ""'"'' powers of the State in the hands of a single 

governor, whether he were called king, duke, or elector. 
To this rule there were exceptions in Venice, Switzer- 
land, and the Netherlands, and by-and-by there would 
be an exception on a grander scale in England. But 
the peoples who formed these exceptions had proved 

j6iS. The War in Bohemia. 33 

themselves worthy of the distinction, and there would be 
no room in the world for men who had got rid of their 
king without being able to establish order upon anothel 

Still there were too many governments in Europe hos- 
tile to the House of Austria to allow the Bo- 3 4 . Help 
hemians to fall at once. Charles Em- irom &ilvo *- 
manuel, Duke of Savoy, had just brought a war with 
Spain to a close, but he had not become any better dis- 
posed towards his late adversary. He accordingly en- 
tered into an agreement with the leaders of the Union, 
by which 2,000 men who had been raised for his service 
were to be placed at the disposal of the Bohemian Di- 

The commander of these troops was Count Ernest of 
Mansfeld, an illegitimate son of a famous general in 
the service of Spain. He had changed his 3 5 . Mans- 
religion and deserted his king. He now eld- 
put himself forward as a champion of Protestantism. 
He was brave, active, and versatile, and was possessed 
of those gifts which win the confidence of professional 
soldiers. But he was already notorious for the readiness 
with which he allowed his soldiers to support themselves 
on the most unbridled pillage. An adventurer himself, 
he was just the man to lead an army of adventurers. 

Soon after his arrival in Bohemia, Mansfeld was em- 
ployed in the siege of Pilsen, whilst Thurn was occupied 
with holding Bucquoi in check. The failure » 6 ^ forced 
in obtaining additional taxes had led the ' oan - 
Directors to adopt the simple expedient of levying a 
forced loan from the few rich. 

For a time this desperate expedient was successful. 
The help offered to Ferdinand by Spain was not great, 
and it was long in coming. The prudent Maximilian ve> 

34 The Bohemian Revolution. 16 tj. 

fused to ruin himself by engaging in an ap- 
oftheBo- parently hopeless cause. At last the Silc* 

' sians, who had hesitated long, threw in 

their lot with their neighbours, and sent their troops to 
their help early in November. Bucquoi was in full re- 
treat to Budweis. On the 21st Pilsen surrendered to 
Mansfeld. Further warfare was stopped as winter came 
on — a terrible winter for the unhappy dwellers in 
Southern Bohemia. Starving armies are not particular 
in their methods of supplying their wants. Plunder, de- 
vastation and reckless atrocities of every kind fell to the 
lot of the doomed peasants, Bucquoi's Hungarians being 
conspicuous for barbarity. 

Meanwhile, Christian of Anhalt was luring on the 
young Elector Palatine to more active intervention. The 
. _ _ , Bohemian leaders had already beeun to talk 

{J 8. Scheme . J ° 

of christian of placing the crown on Frederick's head. 
Frederick, anxious and undecided, consent- 
ed on the one hand, at the Emperor's invitation, to join 
the Duke of Bavaria and the Electors of Mentz and 
Saxony in mediating an arangement, whilst, on the other 
hand, he gave his assent to an embassy to Turin, the 
object of which was to dazzle the Duke of Savoy with 
the prospect of obtaining the imperial crown after the 
death of Matthias, and to urge him to join in an attack 
upon the German dominions of the House of Austria. 

The path on which Frederick was entering was the 

more evidently unsafe, as the Union, which met at Hcil- 

_ , bronn in September, had shown great cool- 

\<). Coolness , * _, . . c 

of the ness in the Bohemian cause. Christian of 

Anhalt had not ventured even to hint at the 
projects which he entertained. If Vie was afterwards de- 
serted by the Union he could not say that its members 
as a body had engaged to support him 

1619. Ferdinand on his Defence. 35 

The Duke of Savoy, on the other hand, at least talked 
as if the Austrian territories were at his feet. In August 
1618 he had given his consent to the pro- l6l „ 

posed elevation of Frederick to the Bohe- ^^ ^ e avoy 
mian throne. In February 1619 he ex- gives hopes, 
plained that he wished to have Bohemia for himself. 
Frederick might be compensated with the Austrian lands 
in Alsace and Swabia. He might, perhaps, have the 
Archduchy of Austria too, or become King of Hungary. 
If he wished to fall upon the bishops' lands, let him do it 
quickly, before the Pope had time to interfere. This 
sort of talk, wild as it was, delighted the little circle of 
Frederick's confidants. The Margrave of Anspach, who, 
as general of the army of the Union, was admitted into 
the secret, was beyond measure pleased : ' We have now,' 
he said, ' the means of upsetting the world.' 

For the present, these negotiations were veiled in 
secresy. They engendered a confident „ 

. . 1 xr - Conser- 

levity, which was certain to shock that con- vative feeling 
servative, peace-loving feeling which the 
Bohemians had already done much to alienate. 

Section IV. — Ferdinand on his Defence. 
If the assistance of the Union was thus likely to do 
more harm than good to the Bohemians, their hopes of 
aid from other powers were still more delu- a 1. The Bo- 
sive. The Dutch, indeed, sent something, fejd n f r0 m k 
and would willingly have sent more, but they fore 'g n powers, 
had too many difficulties at home to be very profuse in 
their offers. James of England told his son-in-law 
plainly that he would have nothing to do with any en- 
croachment upon the rights of others, and he had under- 
taken at the instigation of Spain a formal mediation 
between the Bohemians and their king — a mediation 

36 The Bohemian Revolution. 1619. 

which had been offered him merely in order to keep his 
hands tied whilst others were arming. 

On March 20, before the next campaign opened, 
Matthias died. Ferdinand's renewed promises to respect 
the Royal Charter — made doubtless under 
upon Vienna. tne reservation of putting his own interpreta- 
tion upon the disputed points — were rejected 
with scorn by the Directors. The sword was to decide 
the quarrel. With the money received from the Dutch, 
and with aid in money and munitions of war from Hei- 
delberg, Thurn and Mansfeld were enabled to take the 
field. The latter remained to watch Bucquoi, whilst the 
former undertook to win the other territories, which had 
hitherto submitted to Matthias, and had stood aloof from 
the movement in Bohemia. Without much difficulty he 
succeeded in revolutionizing Moravia, and he arrived on 
June 5 under the walls of Vienna. Within was Ferdi- 
nand himself, with a petty garrison of 300 men, and as 
many volunteers as he could attach to his cause. Thurn 
hoped that his partisans inside the cities would open the 
gates to admit him. But he lost time in negotiations 
with the Austrian nobility. The estates of the two terri- 
tories of Upper and Lower Austria were to a great extent 
Protestant, and they had refused to do homage to Fer- 
dinand on the death of Matthias. The Lower Austrian? 
now sent a deputation to Vienna to demand permission 
to form a confederation with the Bohemians, on terms, 
which would practically have converted the whole coun- 
try, from the Styrian frontier to the borders of Silesia, 
into a federal aristocratic republic. 

In Ferdinand they had to do with a man who was 
not to be overawed by personal danger. He knew well 
that by yielding he would be giving a legal basis to a 
system which he regarded as opposed to all law, human 

1 6 1 9 . Ferdinand on his Defence. 3 7 

and divine. Throwing himself before the . 

b I 3. Ferdi- 

crucifix, he found strength for the conflict nand resists 
into which he entered on behalf of his fami- of'theTower 
ly, his church, and, as he firmly believed, ^f a c ^ n 
of his country and his God — strength none 
the less real because the figure on the cross did not, as 
men not long afterwards came fondly to believe, bow 
its head towards the suppliant, or utter the consoling 
words: ' Ferdinand, I will not forsake thee.' 

To a deputation from the Austrian Estates he was firm 
and unbending. They might threaten as they pleased, 
but the confederation with Bohemia he would not sign. 
Rougher and rougher grew the menaces addressed to 
him. Some one, it is said, talked of de- g 4 R escue 
throning him and of educating his children arnves - 
in the Protestant religion. Suddenly the blare of a 
trumpet was heard in the court below. A regiment of 
horse had slipped in through a gate unguarded by 
Thurn, and had hurried to Ferdinand's defence. The 
deputation, lately so imperious, slunk away, glad enough 
to escape punishment. 

Little would so slight a reinforcement have availed if 
Thurn had been capable of assaulting the city. But, un- 
provided with stores of food or siege muni- 3 . The 
tions, he had counted on treason within. sie s e raised. 
Disappointed of his prey, he returned to Bohemia, to 
find that Bucquoi had broken out of Budweis, and had 
inflicted a serious defeat on Mansfeld. 

Ferdinand did not linger at Vienna to dispute his 

rghts with his Austrian subjects. The election of a new 

Emperor was to take place at Frankfort, . „, 
, . . . - ?• 6 The 

and it was of importance to him to be on imperial 
the spot. To the German Protestants the e ec 10n- 
transfer of the Imperial crown to his head could not be 

38 The Bohemian Revolution. 1619. 

a matter of indifference. If he succeeded, as there 
seemed every probability of his succeeding, in re-estab- 
lishing his authority over Bohemia, he would weigh with 
a far heavier weight than Matthias upon the disputes by 
which Germany was distracted. The Elector Palatine 
and his councillors had a thousand schemes for getting 
rid of him, without fixing upon any. John George of 
Saxony, in 1619 as in 161 2, had a definite plan to pro- 
pose. Ferdinand, he said, was not in possession of 
Bohemia, and could not, therefore, vote as King of Bo- 
hemia at the election. The election must, therefore, be 
postponed till the Bohemian question had been settled 
by mediation. If only the three Protestant electors 
could have been brought to agree to this course, an im- 
mediate choice of Ferdinand would have been impossi- 

Whatever might be the merits of the proposal itself, 

it had the inestimable advantage of embarking the Lu- 

„ ,. therans of the North and the Calvinists of 

I 7. Ferdi- . 

nand chosen the South in a common cause. But Frede- 

mperor. ^.^ distrusted John George, and preferred 

another plan of his own. John George lost his tempei, 

and voted unconditionally for Ferdinand. Frederick, 

if he did not mean to be left alone in impotent isolation, 

had nothing for it but to follow his example. He had 

no other candidate seriously to propose ; and on August 

28, 1619, Ferdinand was chosen by a unanimous vote. 

He was now known as the Emperor Ferdinand II. 

Two days before, another election had taken place at 

Prague. The Bohemians, after deposing 

I 8. Frede- 9 • , . . r & 

rick elected Ferdinand from the throne, which in 1017 
Bohfmia. they had acknowledged to be his, chose 

Frederick to fill the vacant seat. 
Would Frederick accept the perilous offer ? Opinions 

i620. The Attack upon Frederick. 39 

round him were divided on the advisability of the step. 
The princes of the Union, and even his own coun- 
cillors, took opposite sides. In his own , 

. ? 9- He 

family, his mother raised a voice of warn- accepts the 
ing. His wife, Elizabeth of England, the 
beautiful and high-spirited, urged him to the enterprise. 
The poor young man himself was well-nigh distracted. 
At last he found a consolation in the comfortable belief 
that his election was the act of God. Amidst the tears 
of the good people of Heidelberg he set out from the 
proud castle, magnificent even now in its ruins as it 
looks down upon the rushing stream of the Neckar. 
' He is carrying the Palatinate into Bohemia,' said his 
sorrowing mother. On November 4 he was crowned at 
Prague, and the last act of the Bohemian Revolution 
was accomplished. 




Section I. — The Attack upon Frederick. 
The news of Frederick's acceptance of the Bohemian 
crown sent a thrill of confidence through the ranks of 
his opponents. 'That prince' said the 

, . . ' ? 1- Maximi- 

Pope, ' has cast himself into a fine laby- lian prepares 
rinth.' 'He will only be a winter-king,' 
whispered the Jesuits to one another, certain that the 
summer's campaign would see his pretensions at an end. 
Up to that time the Bohemian cause stood upon its own 
merits. But if one prince of the Empire was to be al- 
lowed, on any pretext, to seize upon the territories of 
another, what bulwark was there against a return of the 

40 Imperialist Victories in Bohemia. 1620 

old fist-right, or general anarchy ? Frederick had at- 
tacked the foundations on which the institutions of his 
time rested, without calling up anything to take their 

Maximilian saw more clearly than any one the mis- 

take that had been committed. In an interview with 

the new Emperor he en^aired to forsake his 

a 2. Makes 

use of inaction. Hitherto he had kept quiet, be- 

nilstakes. S cause he knew well that the apparent ag- 
gressor would have the general opinion of 
the world against him. Now that the blunder had been 
committed, he was ready to take advantage of it. At 
the same time, he did not forget his own interests, and 
he stipulated that, when all was over, Frederick's electo- 
ral dignity — not necessarily his territory — should be 
transferred to himself, and that he should retain Upper 
Austria in pledge till his military expenses had been re- 

The effect of the change from the passive endurance 
of Ferdinand to the active vigour of Maximilian was 
immediately perceptible. His first object 
Gabor attacks was to gain over or neutralize the German 
Protestants, and events in the East were 
seconding him to a marvel. About one-fifth only of Hun- 
gary was in Ferdinand's possession. The rest was about 
equally divided between the Turks and Bethlen Gabor, 
the Protestant Prince of Transylvania, a semi-barbarous 
but energetic chieftain, who hoped, with Turkish sup- 
port, to make himself master of all Hungary, if not of Aus- 
tria as well. In the first days of November, his hordes, 
in friendly alliance with the Bohemians, were burning 
and plundering round the walls of Vienna. But such 
armies as his can only support themselves by continuous 
success ; and Bethlen Gabor found the capture of Vienna 

1620. The Attack upon Frederick. 41 

as hopeless in the winter as Thurn had found it in the 
summer. Retiring eastwards, he left behind him a bit' 
ter indignation against those who had abetted his pro- 
ceedings, and who had not been ashamed, as their ad- 
versaries declared, to plant the Crescent upon the ruins 
of Christianity and civilization. 

Such declamation, overstrained as it was, was not 
without its effect. German Protestantism had no enthu- 
siasm to spare for Frederick's enterprise in ? 4. The 
Bohemia. At a meeting of the Union at t o support 
Nuremberg, Frederick's cause found no Fredenck - 
support. Maximilian could well afford to leave the 
Union to its own hesitation, and to think only of concili- 
ating the Elector of Saxony and the North German 

That John George should have taken serious alarm at 
his rival's increase of power is not surprising. Not only 
did it assail whatever shadow still remained 1620. 

of the protecting institutions of the Empire, | g reement of 
but it did so in a way likely to be especially Muhihausen. 
disagreeable at Dresden. The revolution at Prague did 
not simply raise an otherwise powerless person into 
Ferdinand's place. It gave the crown of Bohemia to a 
man whose territories were already so extensive that if 
he managed to consolidate his new dominion with them 
he would unite in his hands a power which would be 
unequalled in the Empire, and which would bring with 
it the unheard-of accumulation of two votes upon one 
person at imperial elections. John George would de- 
scend from being one of the first of the German princes 
to a mere second-rate position. 

John George was not to be won for nothing. At an 
assembly held at Muhihausen in March 1620, the 
League promised that they would never attempt to 

4.2 Imperialist Victories in Bohemia. 1620. 

J 6. The ec- recover by force the lands of the Protestant 

clesiastical . . . 

lands held by administrators, or the secularized lands in 
guaranteed the northern territories, as long as the 
juwjercondi- holders continued to act as loyal subjects; 
and this promise was confirmed by the 

That this engagement was not enough, later events 
were to show. For the present it seemed satisfactory to" 
I 7. Spinola John George, and Maximilian was able to 
attackHe turn his attention to the actual preparations 
Palatinate. f or wan j n M a y orders had been issued 
from Madrid to Spinola, the Spanish general in the 
Netherlands, to make ready to march to the Emperor's 
defence ; and on June 3 the frightened Union signed the 
treaty of Ulm, by which they promised to observe neu- 
trality towards the League, thus securing to Maximilian 
freedom from attack in the rear during his march into 
Bohemia. The Union, however, if it should be attacked, 
was to be allowed to defend its own territories, including 
the Palatinate. 

At the head of Maximilian's army was the Walloon 
Tilly, a man capable of inspiring confidence alike by the 
l 8. The probity of his character and by the posses- 

mvasions. sion of eminent military capacity. On June 

23 he crossed the Austrian frontier. On August 20 the 
Estates of Upper Austria unconditionally bowed to Fer- 
dinand as their lord and master. Lower Austria had 
already submitted to its fate. About the same time 
John George had entered Lusatia, and was besieging 
Bautzen in Ferdinand's name. Spinola, too, had 
marched along the Rhine, and had reached Mentz by 
the end of August. 

The army of the Union was drawn up to oppose the 
Spaniards. But there was no harmony amongst the 

1620. The Attack upon Frederick. 43 

leaders ; no spirit in the troops. Falling | u 9 bdu ^ s pi t n ^ a 
upon one town after another, Spinola now Western 
brought into his power nearly the whole of 
that portion of the Palatinate which lay on the left bank 
of the Rhine. The army of the Union retreated help- 
lessly to Worms, waiting for what might happen next. 
Maximilian was now ready to attack Bo- , 

.... g 10. Inva' 

hernia. He soon effected a junction with sionof 
Bucquoi. Frederick's position was deplor- 

At first he had been received at Prague with tha 
liveliest joy. When a son was born to him, who was 
in after days to become the Prince Rupert |n, Grow- 
of our English civil wars, every sign of re- ianty"of >PU " 
joicing accompanied the child to the font. Frederick. 
But it was not long before Frederick's Lutheran subjects 
were offended by his Calvinistic proceedings. In the 
royal chapel pictures of the saints were ruthlessly torn 
down from the walls, and the great crucifix, an object 
of reverence to the Lutheran as well as the Catholic, was 
tossed aside like a common log of wood. The treasures 
of art which Rudolph II. had collected during his life of 
seclusion were catalogued that they might be offered for 
sale ; and it is said that many of them were carried off 
by the officials entrusted with the duty. And besides 
real grievances, there were others that were purely ima- 
ginary. A story has been told which, whether true or 
false, is a good illustration of the impracticable nature 
of the Bohemian aristocracy. Frederick is said to have 
convened some of them to council early in the morning 
and to have received an answer that it was against their 
privileges to get up so soon. 

The Bohemians were not long in discovering that no 
real strength had been brought to them bv Frederick, 

44 Imperialist Victories in Bohemia. 1620. 

I i2. Frede- He had been set upon the throne, not for 
strengthM* the ms personal qualities, but because he was 
Bohemians. supposed to have good friends, and to be able 
to prop up the falling cause of Bohemia by aid from all 
parts of Protestant Europe. But his friends gave him 
little or no help, and he was himself looking tranquilly 
on whilst the storm was gathering before his eyes. In 
his ranks there was neither organization nor devotion. 
Christian of Anhalt had been placed in command of the 
army, but, though personally brave he did not inspire 
confidence. The other generals were quarrelling about 
precedence. New levies were ordered, but the men 
either remained at home or took the earliest opportunity 
to slink away. Those who remained, scantily provided 
with the necessities of life, were on the verge of mutiny. 
On September 28 Frederick joined the army. He 
still cherished hope. Bethlen Gabor, who had deserted 
his cause a few months before, had repented his dcfec- 
., , tion, and was now coming to his aid. Sick- 

jS 13. March . ° 

ofi'iiiy and ness was raging in the enemy's camp. Yet, 
in spite of sickness, Tilly pressed on, taking 
town after town, and choosing his positions too skilfully 
to be compelled to fight unless it suited him. On the 
morning of November 8 the Imperialists were close 
upon Prague. The enemy was posted on the White 
Hill, a rising ground of no great height outside the walls. 
The Imperial army had been weakened by its suffer- 
ings ; and Bucquoi still counselled delay. But Tilly 
knew better, and urged an immediate advance. As the 
commanders were disputing, a Dominican friar, who ac- 
companied the armies, stepped forward. ' Sons of the 
church,' he said, ' why do you hang back ? We ought 
to march straight forward, for the Lord hath delivered 
►ne enemy into our hands. We shall overcome them as 

1620. The Attack upon Frederick. 45 

sure as we are alive.' Then showing them a figure of 
the Virgin which had been defaced by Protestant 
hands, ' See here,' he said, ' what they have done. The 
prayers of the Holy Virgin shall be yours. Trust in 
God, and go boldly to the battle. He fights on your 
side, and will give you the victory.' Before the fiery 
utterances of the friar Bucquoi withdrew his opposition. 
It was a Sunday morning, and the gospel of the day 
contained the, words, ' Render unto Caesar the things 
that be Caesar's,' and the warriors of the . „ 

. g 14. The 

Caesar at Vienna felt themselves inspired to battle of the 
fulfil the Saviour's words. The task which 
they had before them was more difficult in appearance 
than in reality. Frederick was inside the city entertain- 
ing two English ambassadors at dinner whilst the blow 
was being struck. Some Hungarians on whom he chief- 
ly relied set the example of flight, and the day was irre- 
trievably lost. Frederick fled for his life through North 
Germany, till he found a refuge at the Hague. 

The reign of the Bohemian aristocracy was at an end. 
Tilly, indeed, had mercifully given time to the leaders 
to make their escape. But, blind in adver- 

f . ? £ 5- Sub- 

sity as they had been in prosperity, they mission of 
made no use of the opportunity. The chiefs °' emia ' 
perished on the scaffold. Their lands were confiscated, 
and a new German and Catholic nobility arose, which 
owed its possessions to its sovereign, and which, even 
if the Royal Charter had remained in existence, would 
have entered into the privileges which allowed their 
predecessors to convert the churches in their domains 
to what use they pleased. But the Royal Charter was 
declared to have been forfeited by rebellion, and the 
Protestant churches in the towns and on the royal es- 
tates had nothing to depend on but the will of the con- 

46 Imperialist Victories in Bohemia. 1620. 

queror. The ministers of one great body, — the Bohe« 
mian Brethren — were expelled at once. The Lutherans 
were spared for a time. 

Was it yet possible to keep the Bohemian war from 
growing into a German one ? Ferdinand and Maximi- 
lian were hardly likely to stop of themselves 
rick put to in their career of victory. To them Frede- 

the ban. . , , ., 

rick was a mere aggressor, on whom they 
were bound to inflict condign punishment. Would he 
not, if he were allowed to recover strength, play the 
same game over again ? Besides, the expenses of the 
war had been heavy. Ferdinand had been obliged to 
leave Upper Austria in pledge with Maximilian till his 
share of those expenses had been repaid to him. It 
would be much pleasanter for both parties if Maximilian 
could have a slice of the Palatinate instead. With this 
and the promised transference of the electorate to Maxi- 
milian, there would be some chance of securing order and 
a due respect for the Catholic ecclesiastical lands. On 
January 22, therefore, Frederick was solemnly put to the 
ban, and his lands and dignities declared to be forfeited. 
Whether Ferdinand was justified in doing this was 
long a moot point. He had certainly promised at his 
_ election that he would not put anyone to the 

2 17. Danger 

of the Pro- ban without giving him the benefit of a fair 
trial. But he argued that this only applied 
to one whose guilt was doubtful, and that Frederick's 
guilt had been open and palpable. However this may 
have been, something of far greater importance than a 
legal or personal question was at issue. For Frederick 
there was little sympathy in Germany ; but there was a 
strong feeling that it would not do to allow a Protestant 
country to fall into Catholic hands, both for its own saka 
and for the sake of its Protestant neighbours. 

r62i. Hie War in the Upper Palatinate. 4 J 

Section II. — The War in the Upper Palatinate. 

If Frederick could only have made it clear that he had 
really renounced all his pretensions to meddle with other 
people's lands he might possibly have ended i F ^^ 
his days peaceably at Heidelberg. But he rick does not 

. , . i-i r ■ • i • give up hope. 

could not give up his hopes of regaining his 
lost kingdom. One day he talked of peace; another 
day he talked of war. When he was most peaceably in- 
clined he would give up his claim if he could have an 
amnesty for the past. But he would not first give up his 
claim and then ask for an amnesty. 

Even to this he had been driven half un- , _ 

jS 2. Part taken 

willingly by his father-in-law. The King by James of 
of England charged himself with the office ng an 
of a mediator, and fancied that it was unnecessary to 
arm in the meantime. 

The states of the Union were in great perplexity. 
The Landgrave of Hesse Cassel was compelled by his 
own subjects to come to terms with Spinola. „ 

. . I 3- Dissolu- 

The cities of Strasburg, Ulm, and Nurem- t'ionofthe 
berg were the next to give way. On April 
12 a treaty was signed at Mentz, by which the Union 
dissolved itself, and engaged to withdraw its troops from 
the Palatinate. On the other hand, Spinola promised to 
suspend hostilities till May 14. 

The danger to which the Palatinate was exposed, and 
the hints let drop that the conquest of the Palatinate 
might be followed by the transference of the . 

- , , ?, 4- Chances 

electorate, caused alarm m quarters by no in Frederick's 
means favourable to Frederick. John George 
began to raise objections, and even the Catholic eccle* 
siastics were frightened at the prospects of the enlarge 
ment of the war, and at the risk of seeing many pow°*"} 

4-8 Imperialist Victories in the Palatinate. 1621. 

hitherto neutral, taking the part of the proscribed Elec 


The claim kept up by Frederick to Bohemia was 

something more than a claim to an empty title. He had 

appointed Mansfeld to act there as his gene- 
Z 5. He still rr & 

holds places in ral ; and, though Mansfeld had lost one post 

after another, at the end of April he still 
held Tabor and Wittingau in Frederick's name. 

The appointment of Mansfeld was unfortunately in it- 
self fatal to the chances of peace. Ever since the capture 
of Pilsen, his troops, destitute of support, had been the 

terror of the country they were called upon 

1 6 Mans- J ' r 

fold's army. to defend. In those days, indeed, the most 
disciplined army was often guilty of excesses 
from which in our days the most depraved outcasts would 
shrink. The soldiers, engaged merely for as long a 
time as they happened to be wanted, passed from side 
to side as the prospect of pay or booty allured them. 
No tie of nationality bound the mercenary to the stan- 
dard under which accident had placed him. He had 
sold himself to his hirer for the time being, and he sought 
his recompense in the gratification of every evil passion 
of which human nature in its deepest degradation is 

Yet, even in this terrible war, there was a difference 

between one army and another. In an enemy's country 

all plundered alike. Tilly's Bavarians had 

g 7. Soldiers . 

of the Thirty been guilty of horrible excesses in Bohemia. 
But a commander like Tilly, who could pay 
his soldiers, and could inspire them with confidence in 
his generalship, had it in his power to preserve some 
sort of discipline ; and if, as Tilly once told a complain- 
ing official, his men were not nuns, they were at all 
events able to refrain on occasion from outrageous vil- 

i O2 1. The War in the Upper Palatinate. 49 

(any. A commander like Mansfeld, who could not pay 
his soldiers, must, of necessity, plunder wherever he 
was. His movements would not be governed by mili- 
tary or political reasons. As soon as his men had eaten 
up one part of the country they must go to another, if 
they were not to die of starvation. They obeyed, like 
the elements, a law of their own, quite independent of 
the wishes or needs of the sovereign whose interests they 
were supposed to serve. 

Before the end of May the breaking up of the army of 
the Union sent fresh swarms of recruits to Mansfeld's 
camp. He was soon at the head of a force . 

r {S 8. Mans- 

of 16,000 men in the Upper Palatinate. The feid takes the 
inhabitants suffered terribly, but he was 
strong enough to maintain his position for a time. Nor 
was he content with standing on the defensive. He 
seized a post within the frontiers of Bohemia, and threat- 
ened to harry the lands of the Bishop of Bamberg and 
Wurzburg if he did not withdraw his troops from the 
army of the League. He then fell upon Leuchtenberg, 
and carried off the Landgrave a prisoner to his camp. 

The first attack of the Bavarians failed entirely. 
Bethlen Gabor, too, was again moving in Hungary, had 

slain Bucquoi, and was driving the Empe- „ 

. . 2 9- A truce 

ror's army before him. Under these cir- impossible 

cumstances, even Ferdinand seems to have 
hesitated, and to have doubted whether he had not bet- 
ter accept the English offer of mediation. Yet such was 
the character of Mansfeld's army that it made mediation 
impossible. It must attack somebody in order to exist. 

Yet it was in the Lower, not in the Upper, Palatinate 
that the first blow was struck. Sir Horace Vere, who 
had gone out the year before, with a rejri- ? «>■ Vere '■ 

*•',.., . the Lower 

ment ot English volunteers, was now in Palatinate. 

50 Imperialist Victories in the Palatinate. 1621. 

command for Frederick. But Frederick had neithei 
money nor provisions to give him, and the sup- 
plies of the Palatinate were almost exhausted. The 
existing truce had been prolonged by the Spaniards. 
But the lands of the Bishop of Spires lay temptingly near. 
Salving his conscience by issuing the strictest orders 
against pillage, he quartered some of his men upon them. 
The whole Catholic party was roused to indignation. 

1 11. War re- Cordova, left in command of the Spanish 
in'the Lower troops after Spinola's return to Brussels, de- 
Palatmate. clared the truce to have been broken, and 
commenced operations against Vere. 

By this time Mansfeld's power of defending the 

Upper Palatinate was at an end. The magistrates of the 

towns were sick of his presence, and pre- 

2 12. Mans- . . , . ... 

feld driven ferred coming to terms with Maximilian to 
U ppcr submitting any longer to the extortions of 

Palatinate. their master's army. Mansfeld, seeing how 
matters stood, offered to sell himself and his troops to 
the Emperor. But he had no real intention of carrying 
out the bargain. On October 10 he signed an engage- 
ment to disband his forces. Before the next sun arose he 
had slipped away, and was in full march for Heidelberg. 

Tilly followed hard upon his heels. But Mans- 
feld did not stop to fight him. Throwing himself upon 
Alsace, he seized upon Hagenau, and converted it into 
a place of strength. 

Section III. — Frederick's Allies. 

The winter was coming on, and there would be time 
for negotiations before another blow was struck. But to 
I 1. Proposal give negotiations a chance it was necessary 
feld into Eng- th at Mansfeld's army should be fed, in order 
giish pay. t h at h e might be able to keep quiet while 

the diplomatists were disputing. James, therefore, wise- 

1 6 2 2 . Frederick ' s A Hies. 5 1 

ly proposed to provide a sum of money for this purpose 
But a quarrel with the House of Commons hurried on a 
dissolution, and he was unable to raise money sufficient 
for the purpose without a grant from Parliament. 

James, poor and helpless, was thus compelled to fall 
back upon the friendship of Spain, a friendship which he 
hoped to knit more closely by a marriage <s 2 . England 
between his son, the Prince of Wales, and a and Spain- 
Spanish Infanta. The Spanish Government was anx- 
ious, if possible, to avoid an extension of the war in Ger- 
many. Though all the riches of the Indies were at its 
disposal, that government was miserably poor. In a 
land where industry, the source of wealth, was held in 
dishonour, all the gold in the world was thrown away. 
Scarcely able to pay the armies she maintained in time 
of peace, Spain had now again to find money for the 
war in the Netherlands. In 162 1 the twelve years' truce 
with the Dutch had come to an end, and Spinola's 
armies in Brabant and Flanders could not live, like 
Mansfeld's at the expense of the country, for fear of 
throwing the whole of the obedient provinces, as they 
were called, into the enemies' hands. If possible, there- 
fore, that yawning gulf of the German war, which 
threatened to swallow up so many millions of ducats, 
must be closed. And yet how was it to be done ? The 
great difficulty in the way of peace did not lie in Frede- 
rick's pretensions. They could easily be swept aside. 
The great difficulty lay in this — that the Catholics, hav- 
ing already the institutions of the Empire in their hands, 
were now also in possession of a successful army. How, 
under such circumstances, was Protestantism, with which 
so many temporal interests were bound up, to feel itself 
secure ? And without giving security to Protestantism, 
how could a permanent peace be obtained ? 

5 2 Imperialist Victories in the Palatinate. 1622. 

To this problem the Spanish ministers did not care to 
address themselves. They thought that it would be 
j 3 Spanish enough to satisfy personal interests^ They 
P ,ans - ' offered James a larger portion with the In- 

fanta than any other sovereign in Europe would have 
given. They opposed tooth and nail the project for 
transferring the Electorate to Maximilian, as likely to 
lead to endless war. But into the heart of the great 
question they dared not go, tied and bound as they were 
by their devotion to the Church. Could not Frederick 
and James, they asked, be bought off by the assurance 
of the Palatinate to Frederick's heirs, on the simple con- 
dition of his delivering up his eldest son to be educated 
at Vienna? Though they said nothing whatever about 
any change in the boy's religion, they undoubtedly 
hoped that he would there learn to become a good 

Such a policy was hopeless from the beginning. Fred- 
erick had many faults. He was shallow and obstinate. 
\ 4. Frederick But he really did believe in his religion as 
ac'ede^o l ° firmly as any Spaniard in Madrid believed 
them. j n hjg. an( j j t was certain that he would 

never expose his children to the allurements of the 
Jesuits of Vienna. 

It was settled that a conference should be held at 
Brussels, the capital of the Spanish Netherlands, first 
|s 5. A con- to arrange terms for a suspension of arms, 
held at t0 6 an d then to prepare the way for a general 
Brussels. peace. The Spanish plan of pacification was 

net yet announced. But Frederick can hardly be blamed 
for suspecting that no good would come from diplomacy, 
or for discerning that a few regiments on his side would 
weigh more heavily in his favour than a million of words. 

The only question for him to decide was the quarter 

1 62 2. Frederick" 1 s Allies. 53 

in which he should seek for strength. His weakness 
had hitherto arisen from his confidence in \ 6. Where 
physical strength alone. To get together as J^ck toexpect 
many thousand men as possible and to hel P ? 
launch them at the enemy had been his only policy, and 
he had done nothing to conciliate the order-loving portion 
of the population. The cities stood aloof from his cause. 
„ The North German princes would have nothing to say 
to him. If he could only have renounced his past, if he 
could have acknowledged that all he had hitherto done 
had been the fruitful root of disaster, if he could, with 
noble self-renunciation, have entreated others to take up 
the cause of German Protestantism, which in his hands 
had suffered so deeply, then it is not impossible that 
opinion, whilst opinion was still a power in Germany, 
would have passed over to his side, and that the coming 
mischief might yet have been averted. 

But Frederick did not do this. If he had been capable 
of doing it he must have been other than he was. In 
1622, as in 1610, the pupil of Christian of „ „. 

g 7. His pre- 

Anhalt looked to the mere development of pactions for 
numerical strength, without regard to the 
moral basis of force. 

It must be acknowledged that if numbers could give 
power, Frederick's prospects were never better than in 
the spring of 1622. Mansfeld's army was g 8. Frede- 
not, this time, to stand alone. ' In the south rick ' s allies - 
the Margrave of Baden-Durlach was arming in Frede- 
rick's cause. In the north, Christian of Brunswick was 
preparing to march to the aid of the Palatinate. Such 
names as these call up at once before us the two main 
difficulties which would have remained in the way of 
peace even if the question of the Palatinate could have 
rbeen laid aside. 

54 Imperialist Victories in the Palatinate. 1622. 

The Margrave of Baden-Durlach had long been no- 
_ torious for the skill with which he had found 

fq. 1 he 

Margrave of excuses for appropriating ecclesiastical pro- 
perty, and for defeating legal attempts to 
embarrass him in his proceedings. 

Christian of Brunswick was a younger brother of the 
Duke of Brunswick-Wolfenbuttel. By the influence of 
1616. his family he secured in 1616 his election to 

tian of ' the bishopric or administratorship of Hal- 
Brunswick, berstadt. The ceremonies observed at the 
institution of the youth, who had nothing of the bishop 
but the name, may well have seemed a degrading pro- 
fanation in the eyes of a Catholic of that day. As he 
entered the Cathedral the Te Deum was sung to the 
pealing organ. He was led to the high altar amidst the 
blaze of lighted candles. Then, whilst the choir sang 
'Oh Lord! save thy people,' the four eldest canons 
placed him upon the altar. Subsequently he descended 
and, kneeling with the canons before the altar, three 
times intoned the words ' Oh Lord, save thy servant.' 
Then he was placed again upon the altar whilst a hymn 
of praise was sung. Lastly, he took his place opposite 
the pulpit whilst the courtly preacher explained that 
Christian's election had been in accordance with the ex- 
press will of God. This,' he cried'triumphantly, 'is the 
bishop whom God himself has elected. This is the man 
whom God has set as the ruler of the land.' 

Christian's subsequent proceedings by no means cor- 
responded with the expectations of his enthusiastic ad- 
_ . mirers. Like one who has been handed 

J XI. Chris- , 

tian's fond- down to evu renown in early English his- 

fighting. tory, he did nought bishoplike. He was 

not even a good ruler of his domain. He 

left his people to be misgoverned by officials, whilst he 

1622. Frederick's Allies. 55 

wandered about the world in quest of action. As brain- 
less for all higher purposes as Murat, the young Bishop 
was a born cavalry officer. He took to fighting for very 
love of it, just as young men in more peaceful times take 
to athletic sports. 

And, if he was to fight at all, there could be no ques- 
tion on which side he would be found. There was 3 
certain heroism about him which made him . 

g 12. He 

love to look upon himself as the champion takes up the 
of high causes and the promoter of noble Elizabeth, 
aims. To such an one it would seem to be 
altogether debasing to hold his bishopric on the mere 
tenure of the agreement of Muhlhausen, to be debarred 
from taking the place due to him in the Diet of the Em- 
pire, and to be told that if he was very loyal and very 
obedient to the Emperor, no force would be employed to 
wrest from him -that part of the property of the Church 
which he held through a system of iniquitous robbery. 
Then, too, came a visit to the Hague, where the bright 
eyes of his fair cousin the titular Queen of Bohemia 
chained him for ever to her cause, a cause which might 
soon become his own. For who could tell, when once 
the Palatinate was lost, whether the agreement of Miihl- 
hausen would be any longer regarded ? 

In the summer of 1621 Christian levied a force with 
which he marched into the Catholic bishopric of Pader- 
born. The country was in the course of . 

g jj, [fig 

forcible conversion by its bishop, and there ravages in 
was still in it a strong Lutheran element, ofPiader- 

which would perhaps have answered the bora - 
appeal of a leader who was less purely an adventurer. 
But except in word, Catholic and Protestant were alike 
to Christian, so long as money could be got to support 
his army. Castles, towns, farmhouses were ransacked 

56 Imperialist Victories in the Palatinate. 1622. 

for the treasure of the rich, and the scanty hoard of the 
poor. We need not be too hard on him if he tore dowt 
the silver shrine of a saint in the cathedral of Paderborn, 
and melted it into coin bearing the legend : — ' The 
friend of God and the enemy of the priests.' But it is 
impossible to forget he was the enemy of the peasants 
as well. Burning-masters appear among the regulai 
officers of his army ; and many a village, unable to 
satisfy his demands, went up in flames, with its peaceful 
industry ruined for ever. At last, satiated with plundei, 
he turned southward to the support of Mansfeld. 

Such were the commanders into whose hands the for- 
tunes of German Protestantism had fallen. Mansfeld 
told Vere plainly that whether there were a 

2 14. Mans- 
feld will not truce or not, he at least would not lay down 

make peace. i_ • i -i j • ^ j r 

his arms unless he were indemnified for 
his expenses by a slice out of the Austrian possession of 

If the three armies of the Margrave of Baden, of 
Christian of Brunswick, and of Mansfeld, could be 
brought to co-operate, Tilly, even if supported by Cordo- 
va's Spaniards, would be in a decided numerical inferiori- 
ty. But he had the advantage of a central situation, of 
commanding veteran troops by whom he was trusted, 
and above all of being able to march or re- 
in the midst mam quiet at his pleasure, as not being de- 
■iies Sene pendent on mere pillage for his commis- 

sariat. He was inspired, too, by a childlike 
faith in the cause for which he was fighting as the cause 
of order and religion against anarchy and vice. 

Section IV. — The Fight for the Lower Palatinate 
By the middle of April the hostile armies were l»t 
movement, converging upon the Palatinate, where the 

1 62 2. The Fight for the Lower Palatinate. 57 

fortresses of Heidelberg, Mannheim, and \ 1. Frede- 
Frankenthal were safe in Vere's keeping. ManifeW in 
Frederick himself had joined Mansfeld's the Palatinate. 
army in Alsace, and his first operations were attended 
with success. Effecting a junction with the Margrave 
of Baden he inflicted a severe check upon Tilly at Wies- 
loch. The old Walloon retreated to Wimpfen, calling 
Cordova to his aid, and he did not call in vain. Mans- 
feld, on the other hand, and the Margrave could not 
agree. Each had his own plan for the campaign, and 
neither would give way to the other. Besides, there were 
no means of feeding so large an army if it kept together. 
Mansfeld marched away, leaving the Margrave to his 

The battle of Wimpfen was the result. On May 6 
Tilly and Cordova caught the Margrave alone, and de- 
feated him completely. As soon as the ac- « 2 _ Battle of 
tion was over, Cordova left the field to re- Wimpfen. 
sist the progress of Mansfeld ; and Mansfeld, whose, 
men were almost starving, was unable to overcome seri- 
ous resistance. There was nothing for it but a speedy 
retreat to Alsace. 

In the meantime the diplomatists had met at Brussels. 
After some difficulties of form had been got over, Sir 
Richard Weston, the representative of Eng- 
land, sent to ask Frederick to agree to a Congress at 
truce. When the message reached him the russe s * 
battle of Wimpfen had not been fought, and his hopes 
were still high. A truce, he wrote to his father-in-law, 
would be his utter ruin. The country was exhausted. 
Unless his army lived by plunder it could not exist. A 
few days later he was a beaten man. On May 13 he 
gave way, and promised to agree to the truce. On the 
28th all was again changed. He had learned that the 

58 Imperialist Victories in the Palatitiate. 1022. 

Margrave of Baden hoped to bring back his army into 
the field. He knew that Christian of Brunswick was ap- 
proaching from beyond the Main ; and he informed 
Weston that he could do nothing to assist the negotia- 
tions at Brussels. 

On June 1 Frederick and Mansfeld marched out of 
Mannheim to meet Christian. On their way they passed 
I 4. Seizure by Darmstadt. The Landgrave was espe- 
grave of " " cially obnoxious to them, as a Lutheran 
Darmstadt. prince who had warmly adopted the Em- 
peror's side. Love of peace, combined with pretensions 
to lands in dispute with the Landgrave of Hesse Cassel, 
in which he hoped to be supported by Ferdinand, had 
made him a bitter enemy of Mansfeld and his proceed- 
ings ; and though it was not known at the time that he 
was actually in receipt of a Spanish pension, Frederick 
was not likely to attribute to other than interested mo- 
tives a line of action which seemed so incomprehensi- 

As soon as the troops reached Darmstadt, they com- 
», r , , menced their usual work, ravaging the 

§ 5. Mansfeld . o o 

unable to pass country, and driving off the cattle. To the 

the Main. T , , . , , . . 

Landgrave, who recommended submission 
to the Emperor as the best way of recovering peace, 
Frederick used high language. It was not in quest of 
peace that he had come so far. The Landgrave had a 
fortified post which commanded a passage over the 
Main, and its possession would enable the army to join 
Christian without difficulty. But the Landgrave was 
firm ; and finding that a denial would not be taken, tried 
to avoid his importunate guests by flight. He was over- 
taken and brought back a prisoner. But even in this 
plight he would give no orders for the surrender of the 
post, and its commander resolutely refused to give it up 

1 62 2. The Fight for the Lower Palatinate. 59 

without instructions. Before another passage could be 
found, Tilly had received reinforcements, and Frede- 
rick, carrying the Landgrave with him, was driven to re- 
treat to Mannheim, not without loss. 

Once more Frederick was ready to consent to the ces- 
sation of arms proposed at Brussels. But Cordova and 

Tilly were now of a different opinion. , , _ ,, 
1 ? 6- Condi- 

Christian, they knew, would soon be on the Hon of Mans- 

Main, and they were resolved to crush him e sarmy - 
whilst he was still unaided. Lord Chichester, who had 
come out to care for English interests in the Palatinate, 
and who judged all that he saw with the eye of an ex- 
perienced soldier, perceived clearly the causes of Frede- 
rick's failure. ' I observe,' he wrote, ' so much of the 
armies of the Margrave of Baden and of Count Mans^ 
feld, which I have seen, and of their ill discipline and 
order, that I must conceive that kingdom and principali- 
ty for which they shall fight to be in great danger and 
hazard. The Duke of Brunswick's, it is said, is not 
much better governed : and how can it be better or 
otherwise where men are raised out of the scum of the 
people by princes who have no dominion over them, 
nor power, for want of pay, to punish them, nor means 
to reward them, living only upon rapine and spoil as 
they do ? ' 

On June 20, the day before these words were written, 
Tilly and Cordova had met with Christian at Hochst, and 
though they did not prevent him from crossing the Main, 
they inflicted on him such enormous losses * , B att i e of 
that he joined Mansfeld with the mere frag- H ** 5 '- 
ments of his army. 

Great was the consternation at Mannheim when the 
truth was known. The Margrave of Baden at onco 

Bo Mansfeld and Christian in the North. 1623. 
, „ ,, abandoned his associates. Mansfeld and 

\ 8. Mans- 
feld abandons Christian, taking Frederick with them, re- 
treated into Alsace, where Frederick form- 
ally dismissed them from his service, and thus washed 
his hands of all responsibility for their future proceed- 

Retiring for a time to Sedan, he watched events as 

they passed from that quiet retreat. ' Would to God,' 

„ , he wrote to his wife, ' that we possessed a 

I 9. Frede- * 

rick goes back little corner of the earth where we could 
ague. rest tQggfkgj. j n p eace# ' The destinies of 

Germany and Europe had to be decided by clearer 
heads and stronger wills than his. After a short delay 
he found his way back to the Hague, to prove, as many 
a wiser man had proved before him, how bitter a lot it is 
to go up and down on the stairs which lead to the ante- 
chambers of the great : to plead for help which never is 
given, and to plan victories which never come. 



Section. I. — Mansfeld' s March into the Netherlands. 
When once Tilly had got the better of the armies in the 
field, the reduction of the fortresses in the Palatinate was 

merely a work of time. Heidelberg surren- 
t'ionofthe dered on September 16. On November 8 

Vere found Mannheim no longer tenable. 
Frankenthal alone held out for a few months longer, and 
was then given up to the Spaniards. 

James still hoped that peace was possible, though the 
conference at Brussels had broken up in September. In 

£623. Mansfeld 's March into the Netherlands. 61 

the meanwhile, Ferdinand and Maximilian 
were pushing on to the end which they had Catholics, 
long foreseen ; and an assembly of princes 
was invited to meet at Ratisbon in November to assent 
to the transference of the electorate to the Duke of Ba- 

Constitutional opposition on the part of the Protestants 
was impossible. In addition to the majority against them 
amongst the princes, there was now, by the 
mere fact of Frederick's exclusion, a major- \ 3. The Elec- 
ity against them amongst the Electors, a re( j to Maxi- 
majority which was all the more firmly es- ITilllian - 
tablished when, on February 13, the transfer was sol- 
emnly declared. Maximilian was to be Elector for his 
lifetime. If any of Frederick's relations claimed that 
the electorate ought rather to pass over to them, they 
would be heard, and if their case appeared to be a good 
one, they would receive what was due to them after 
Maximilian's death. If, in the meanwhile, Frederick 
chose to ask humbly for forgiveness, and to abandon 
his claim to the electoral dignity, the Emperor would take 
his request for the restitution of his lands into favourable 
consideration. Against all this the Spanish ambassador 
protested ; but the protest was evidently not meant to be 
followed by action. 

The question of peace or war now depended mainly on 
the North German Protestants, Nobody doubted that, 
if they could hit upon a united plan of action, , _ ^ T . 

/ r r <S 4. Tfee North 

and if they vigorously set to work to carry German Pro- 
it out, they would bring an irresistible weight 
to bear upon the points at issue. Unfortunately, however, 
such uniformity of action was of all things most improba- 
ble. John George, indeed, had more than -cwice been 
urged in different directions during the past years by 

62 Mansf eld and Christian in the Ncrrth. 16*3. 

events as they successively arose. The invasion of the 
Palatinate had shaken him in his friendship for the Em- 
peror. Then had come the kidnapping of the Landgrave 
of Darmstadt to give him a shock on the other side. 
Later in the year the news that an excuse had been found 
for driving the Lutheran clergy out of Bohemia had 
deeply exasperated him, and his exasperation had been 
increased by the transference of the electorate, by which 
the Protestants were left in a hopeless minority in the 
Electoral House. But the idea of making war upon the 
Emperor, and unsettling what yet remained as a security 
for peace, was altogether so displeasing to John George 
that it is doubtful whether anything short of absolute ne- 
cessity would have driven him to war. What he would 
have liked would have been a solemn meeting, at which 
he might have had the opportunity of advancing his 
views. But if those views had been seriously opposed 
he would hardly have drawn the sword to uphold 

If the only danger to be apprehended by the North 

Germans had been the march of Tilly's army, it is not 

unlikely that the war would here have come to an end. 

,,, Ferdinand and Maximilian would doubtless 

\ 5. Mansfetd 

and Christian have respected the agreement of Miihlhau- 
sen, and there would hardly have been 
found sufficient determination in the northern princes to 
induce them to arm for the recovery of the Palatinate. 
But a new danger had arisen. Mansfeld and Christian 
had not laid down their arms when Frederick dismissed 
them in July, and so far from being ready to make sacri- 
fices for peace, they were ready to make any sacrifices 
for the sake of the continuance of the war. 

It was not long before the adventurers were forced to 
leave Alsace. They had eaten up everything that was 

1623. MansfelcT s March into the Netherlands, 63 

to be eaten there, and the enemy was known 
to be on their track. Throwing themselves r ifoa. 
into Lorraine, they settled down for a time tabiish Then* 
like a swarm of locusts upon that smiling *!^ s in Lor ' 
land. But where were they to turn next ? 
The French government hurried up reinforcements to 
guard their frontier. That road, at all events, was 
barred to them, and Christian, whose troops were in a 
state of mutiny, tried in vain to lead them towards the 
Lower Rhine. Whilst the leaders hardly knew what to 
do, they received an invitation to place themselves for 
three months at the disposal of the Dutch Republic. 

Matters had not been going well with the Dutch since 
the re-opening of the war in 1621. Their garrison at 
Juliers had surrendered to Spinola in the 
winter, and the great Spanish commander j^em-us" 6 
was now laying siege to Bergen-op-Zoom, 
with every prospect of reducing it. To come to its relief 
Mansfeld would have to march across the Spanish 
Netherlands. On August 28 he found Cordova on his 
way to Fleurus, as he had stood in his way in the Palati- 
nate the year before. Worse than all. two of his own 
regiments broke out into mutiny, refusing to fight unless 
they were paid. At such a time Mansfeld was at his 
best. He was a man of cool courage and infinite re- 
source, and he rode up to the mutineers, entreating them 
if they would not fight at least to look as if they meanl 
to fight. Then, with the rest of his force, he charged the 
enemy. Christian seconded him bravely at the head of 
his cavalry, fighting on in spite of a shot in his left arm. 
Three horses were killed under him. The loss was 
enormous on both sides, but Mansfeld gained his object, 
and was able to pursue his way in safety. 

Christian's arm was amputated. He ordered tha^, the 

64 Mans/eld and Christian in the North. 1623. 

operation should be. performed to the sound of trumpets. 

1 The arm that is left,' he said, ' shall give 

loses his arm 3 " mv enemies enough to do.' He coined 

money out of the silver he had taken from 

the Spaniards, with the inscription ' Altera restat.' 

Bergen-op-Zoom was saved. Spinola raised the siege. 

But Mansfeld's disorderly habits did not comport well 

r,j with the regular discipline of the Dutch 

I 9. Mansfeld ° r 

in Munsterand army. Those whom he had served were 
glad to be rid of him. In November he 
was dismissed, and marched to seek his fortune in the 
diocese of Munster. But the enemy was too strong for 
him there, and he turned his steps to East Friesland, a 
land rich and fertile, easily fortified against attack, yet 
perfectly helpless. There he- settled down to remain till 
the stock of money and provisions which he was able 
to wring from the inhabitants had been exhausted. 

Section II. — Christian of Brunswick in Lower Saxony. 

Here then was a new rock of offence, a new call for 

the Emperor to interfere, if he was in any way to be re- 

, _._ , . garded as the preserver of the peace of the 

|t. Difficulties ° r r 

of the Lower Empire. But a march of Tilly against an 

Saxon circle. .„„.,. . . 

enemy in East r nesland was not a simply 
military operation. Not a few amongst the northern 
princes doubted whether a victorious Catholic army 
would respect the agreement of Miihlhausen. Christian 
of Brunswick, of course, lost no time in favouring the 
doubt. For, whatever else might be questionable there 
was no question that the diocese of Halberstadt was no 
longer secured by the provisions of that agreement. 
Neither the League nor the Emperor had given any pro- 
mise to those administrators who did not continue loyal 
to the Emperor, and no one could for a moment contend 
that Christian had ever shown a spark of loyalty. 

1623. Christian of Brunswick in Lower Saxony. 65 

On the one side was Christian, assuring those poor 
princes that neutrality was impossible, and 
that it was their plain duty to fight for the | n d Till" urge 
bishoprics and Protestantism. On the other ^, em to °pp°" 

" site courses. 

side was Tilly, equally assuring them that 
neutrality was impossible, but asserting that it was their 
plain duty to fight for their Emperor against Mansfeld 
and brigandage. The princes felt that it was all very 
hard. How desirable it would be if only the war would 
take some other direction, or if Tilly and Christian would 
mutually exterminate one another, and rid them of the 
difficulty of solving such terrible questions ! 

But the question could not be disposed of. Halberstadt 
was a member of the Lower Saxon circle, 
one of those districts of which the princes s f a |' t danger, 
and cities were legally bound together for 
mutual defence. The Lower Saxon circle, therefore, 
was placed between two fires. The Catholic troops were 
gathering round them on the south. Mansfeld was issu- 
ing forth from his fastness in East Friesland and threat- 
ening to occupy the line of the Weser on the north. 

In February the circle determined to levy troops and 
prepare for war. But the preparations were % Warlike 
father directed against Mansfeld than against preparations. 
Tilly. If the Emperor could only have given satisfaction 
about the bishoprics, he would have had no vassals more 
loyal than the Lower Saxon princes. But in Ferdinand's 
eyes to acknowledge more than had been acknowledged 
at Miihlhausen would be to make himself partaker in 
other men's sins. It would have been to acknowledge 
that robbery might give a lawful title to possession. 

Almost unavoidably the circle became further involved 
in opposition to the Emperor. Christian's brother, 
Frederick Ulric, the reigning Duke of Bruns- 

66 Mansf eld and Christian in the North. 1623. 

}■ 5*. Christian wick-Wolfenbiittel, was a weak and incom- 

mvited to take . »»»•«*• 

service under petent prince much under his mother's 

his brother. . . . . , . 

guidance. Anxious to save her favourite 
son, the dashing Christian, from destruction, the Duch- 
ess persuaded the Duke to offer his brother a refuge in his 
dominions. If he would bring his troops there, he and 
they would be taken into the service of the Duke, a re- 
spectable law-abiding prince, and time would be afforded 
him to make his peace with the Emperor. 

Christian at once accepted the offer, and entered into 
negotiations with Ferdinand. But he had never any- 
thought of really abandoning his adventur- 
of SudUohn" le ous career. Young princes, eager for dis- 
tinction, levied troops and gathered round 
his standard. Every week the number of his followers 
increased. At last the neighbouring states could bear it 
no longer. The authorities of the circle told him plainly 
to be gone. Reproaching them for their sluggishness in 
thus abandoning the cause of the Gospel, he started for 
the Dutch Netherlands, with Tilly following closely upon 
him. On August 6 he was overtaken at Stadtlohn, within 
a few hours' march of the frontier, behind which he would 
have been in safety. His hastily levied recruits were no 
match for Tilly's veterans. Of 20,000 men only 6,000 
found their way across the border. 

Section III. — Danger of the Lower Saxon Circle. 

Christian's defeat, however disastrous, settled nothing. 
Mansfeld was still in East Friesland. The princes of 

Lower Saxony were still anxious about the 
of the bishoprics. Even if the agreement of Miihl- 

bishopnics. hausen were scrupulously observed, was it 

so very certain that the bishoprics might 
not be wrenched from them in another way than by 

1623. Danger of the Lower Saxon Circle. 67 

force of arms ? The administrators held the sees simply 
because they had been elected by the chapters, and if 
only a Catholic majority could be obtained in a chaptei 
the election at the next vacancy would be certain to fall 
~upon a Catholic. Often it happened that the Protestant 
majority had taken care to perpetuate its power by- 
methods of very doubtful legality, and it would be open 
to the Emperor to question those methods. It might 
even come to pass that strict law might turn the majority 
into a minority. Already, on April 18, the chapter of 
Osnabriick had chosen a Catholic to succeed a Protest- 
ant bishop, perhaps not altogether uninfluenced by the 
near neighbourhood of a Catholic army. Christian of 
Brunswick, certain that he would not be allowed to re- 
tain his see, had formally given in his resignation, and 
it was not impossible that with some manipulation the 
chapter of Halberstadt might be induced to follow the 
example of Osnabriick. The question of the bishoprics 
had, no doubt, its low and petty side. It may be spoken 
of simply as a question interesting to a handful of aristo- 
cratic sinecurists, who had had the luck to reap the good 
things of the old bishops without doing their work. But 
this would be a very incomplete account of the matter. 
Scattered as these bishoprics were over the surface of 
North Germany, their restitution meant nothing less than 
the occupation by the Emperor and his armies of points 
of vantage over the whole of the north. No one who 
casts his eyes over the map can doubt for an instant 
that, with these bishoprics open to the troops ot the 
League, or it might be even to the troops of the King of 
Spain, the independence of the princes would have been 
a thing of the past ; and it must never be forgotten that, 
as matters stood, the cause of the independence of the 
princes was inextricably bound up with the independ* 

68 Man sf eld and Christian in the North. 1623. 

ence of Protestantism. If Ferdinand and Maximilian 
had their way, German Protestantism would exist merely 
upon sufferance ; and whatever they 'and the Jesuits 
might say, German Protestantism was, in spite of all its 
shortcomings, too noble a creed to exist on suffer^ 

Would the members of the circle of Lower Saxony be 
strong enough to maintain their neutrality ? They sent 
, _ ambassadors to the Emperor, asking him to 

i 1. The x ° 

Lower Saxon settle the question of the bishoprics in their 
nothing. favour, and to John George to ask for his 

support. The Emperor replied that he 
would not go beyond the agreement of Muhlhausen. 
John George gave them good advice, but nothing more. 
And, worse than all, they were disunited amongst them- 
selves. Princes and towns, after agreeing to support 
troops for the common defence, had done their best to 
evade their duties. As few men as possible had been 
sent, and the money needed for their support was still 
slower in coming in. As usual, unpaid men were more 
dangerous to the country which they were called upon 
to protect than to the enemy. The circle came to the 
conclusion that it would be better to send the troops 
home than to keep them under arms. By the beginning 
of the new year, Lower Saxony was undefended, a 
tempting prey to him who could first stretch out his 
hand to take it. 

It was the old story. With the Empire, the Diet and 

the Church in the hands of mere partisans, there was 

nothing to remind men of their duty as citi- 

g 3. Low state ° . . , 

of public feel- zens of a great nation. Even the idea of 

being members of a circle was too high to 

be seriously entertained. The cities strove to thrust the 

burden of defence upon the princes, and the princes 

1624. England and France. 6q 

thrust it back upon the cities. The flood was rising 
rapidly which was to swallow them all. 

Section IV. — England and France. 
In the spring of 1624 there was rest for a moment. 
Mansfeld, having stripped East Friesland bare, drew 
back into the Netherlands. The only army 

_ _ $ 1. Foreign 

still on foot was the army of the League, powers ready 
and if Germany had been an island in the oinerere - 
middle of the Atlantic, exercising no influence upon 
other powers and uninfluenced by them, the continuance 
in arms of those troops might fairly be cited in evidence 
that the Emperor and the League wished to push their 
advantages still further, in spite of their assertions that 
they wanted nothing more than assurance of peace. 

But Germany was not an island. Around it lay a 
multitude of powers with conflicting interests, but all 
finding in her distractions a fair field for „ , 

° ? 2. Ferdi- 

pursuing their own objects. Ferdinand, in nand's weak- 
fact, had made himself just strong enough 
to raise the jealousy of his neighbours, but not strong 
enough to impose an impassible barrier to their attacks. 
He had got on his side the legal and military elements 
of success. He had put down all resistance. He hao 
frightened those who dreaded anarchy. But he had not 
touched the national heart. He had taught men to 
make it a mere matter of calculation whether a foreign 
invasion was likely to do them more damage than the 
success of their own Emperor. Whilst he affected to 
speak in the name of Germany, more than half of Ger- 
many was neutral if not adverse in the struggle. 

England, at last, was giving signs of warlike prepara- 
tion. Prince Charles had paid a visit to Madrid in 
hopes of bringing home a Spanish bride, and of 

70 Mansfeld and Christian in the North. 1624. 

1623. regaining the Palatinate for his brother-in- 

betweeiT^Eng- l aw - He had come back without a wife, 
s r 'ain ind an( * W ^ tne P ros P ect °f getting back the 

Palatinate as distant as ever. He had 
learned what the Spanish plan was, that wonderful 
scheme for educating Frederick's children at Vienna, 
with all ostensible guarantees for keeping them in their 
father's faith, which were, however, almost certain to 
come to nothing when reduced to practice. And so he 
came back angry with the Spaniards, and resolved to 
urge his father to take up arms. In the spring of 1624 
all negotiations between England and Spain were 
brought to an end, and Parliament was discussing with 
the king the best means of recovering the Palatinate. 

In the English House of Commons there was but little 
real knowledge of German affairs. The progress of the 

Emperor and the League was of too recent 
plans." 815 a date to be thoroughly comprehended. 

Men, remembering the days of Philip II., 
were inclined to overestimate the power of Spain, and 
to underestimate the power of the Emperor. They there- 
fore fancied that it would be enough to attack Spain by 
sea, and to send a few thousand soldiers to the aid 01 
the Dutch Republic. 

James, if he was not prompt in action, at all events 

knew better than this. He believed that the Imperial 

_ power was now too firmly rooted in Germany 

$ 5. Ques- r * ' 

t'ion between to fall before anything short of a great Euro* 
the House of pean confederacy. From this the Commons 
Commons. shrunk. A war upon the continent would be 

extremely expensive, and, after all, their wrath had been 
directed against Spain, which had meddled with their 
internal affairs, rather than against the Emperor, who 
had nevtr taken the slightest interest in English politics. 

r 6 2 4. England and France. 7 1 

The utmost they would do was to accept the king's 
statement that he would enter into negotiations with 
other powers and would lay the results before them in 
_ the winter. 

James first applied to France. He saw truly that the 
moment the struggle in Germany developed into a Euro- 
pean war the key to success would lie in the , , _ 

1 J f 6. The 

hands of the French governmment. In that French 
great country, then as now, ideas of the and the 
most opposite character were striving for the Hu s uenots - 
mastery. Old thoughts which had been abandoned in 
England in the sixteenth century were at issue with new 
thoughts which would hardly be adopted in England 
before the eighteenth. In France as well as in England 
and Germany, the question of the day was how religious 
toleration could be granted without breaking up the 
national unity. In England that unity was so strong that 
no party in the state could yet be brought to acknow- 
ledge that toleration should be granted at all. But for 
that very reason the question was on the fair way to a 
better settlement than it could have in France or Ger- 
many. When the nation was once brought face to face 
with the difficulty, men would ask, not whether one 
religion should be established in Northumberland and 
another in Cornwall, but what amount of religious liberty 
was good for men as men all over England. In Ger- 
many it could not be so. There the only question was 
where the geographical frontier was to be drawn between 
two religions. Neither those who wished to increase the 
power of the princes, nor those who wished to increase 
the power of the Emperor, were able to rise above the idea 
of a local and geographical division. And to some 
extent France was in the same condition. The Edict of 
Nantes had recognised some hundreds of the country 

/2 Mansfeld and Christian in the North. 1624, 

houses of the aristocracy, and certain cities and towns, 
as places where the reformed religious doctrines might 
be preached without interference. But in France the 
ideal of national unity, though far weaker than it was hi 
England, was far stronger than it was in Germany. In 
order to give security to the Protestant, or Huguenot 
♦owns as they were called in France, they had been 
allowed the right of garrisoning themselves, and of exclud- 
ing the royal troops. They had thus maintained them- 
selves as petty republics in the heart of France, pra*- tically 
independent of the royal authority. 

Section V. — Rise of Rickelieu. 

Such a state of things could not last. The Hea in- 
volved in the exaltation of the monarchy was the unity 
a z of the nation. The idea involved in the 

Lewis XIII. maintenance of these guarantees wa c its dis- 
integration. Ever since the young king, Lew.c XIII., 
had been old enough to take an active part in i-<Tairs he 
had been striving to establish his authority from one end 
of the kingdom to the other. 

The supremacy and greatness of the mona'chy was 
the thought in which he lived and moved. His intellect 
was not of a high order, and he was not likely *o origi- 
nate statesmanlike projects, or to carry them ouj success- 
fully to execution. But he was capable of appreciating 
merit, and he would give his undivided confidence to 
1 2. His an Y man w h° could do the thing which he 

ideas. desired to have done, without himself ex- 

actly knowing how to do it. 

During the first years of his reign everything seemed 

falling to pieces. As soon as his father's strong hand 

was removed some of the nobility fell back 

years rfffi into half-independenre of the Crown, 

reign. whilst others submitted to <t in c«nsidera- 

1624. Rise of Richelieu. 73 

tion of receiving large pensions and high positions in 
the state. To this Lewis was for the time obliged to 
submit. But the privileges of the Huguenot towns 
roused his indignation. It was not long before he levied 
war upon them, determined to reduce them to submis- 
sion to the royal authority. 

All this foreboded a future for France not unlike the 
future which appeared to be opening upon Germany. 
There were too many signs that the estab- The 

lishment of the king's authority over the intolerant 
towns would be followed by the forcible es- court* 
tablishment of his religion. There was a 
large party at Court crying out with bigoted intolerance 
against any attempt to treat the Huguenots with con- 
sideration, and that cry found an echo in the mind of 
the king. For he was himself a devout Catholic, and 
nothing would have pleased him better than to see the 
victories of his arms attended by the victories of the 
Church to which he was attached. 

If Lewis was not a Ferdinand, it was not because he 
was a nobler or a better man, but because he had his eye 
open to dangers from more quarters than 
one. When the troubles in Germany first jealous of 
broke out, French influence was exerted on paw 
the side of the Emperor. French ambassadors had taken 
part in the negotiations which preceded the treaty of 
Ulm, and had thrown all their weight in the scale to se« 
cure the safety of Maximilian's march into Bohemia. 
But in 1622 the conquest of the Palatinate brought other 
thoughts into the mind of the King of France. His 
monarchical authority was likely to suffer far more from 
the victorious union between the two branches of the 
House of Austria than from a few Huguenot towns. For 
many a long year Spain had planted her standards not 

74 Mansfeld and Christian in the North. 1624. 

only beyond the Pyrenees, but in Naples, Milan, 
Franche Comto, and the Netherlands. Frankenthal 
and the Western Palatinate were now garrisoned by her 
troops, and behind those troops was the old shadowy 
empire once more taking form and substance, and pre- 
senting itself before the world as a power hereafter to be 
counted with. In 1622, accordingly, Lewis made peace 
with the Huguenots at home. In 1623 he sent some 
slight aid to Mansfeld. In 1624 he called Richelieu to 
his counsels. 

It would be a mistake to suppose that the cool and 
far-sighted Cardinal who was thus suddenly placed at 
„ , „. , the head of the French ministry had it all 

i 6. Kiche- . ■* 

Iicu's acces- his own way from the first. He had to take 
p owcr . into account the ebb and flow of feeling in 

the Court and the country, and the ebb and 
flow of feeling in Lewis himself. There was still with 
Lewis the old anxiety to crush the Huguenots and to 
make himself absolute master at home, alongside with 
the new anxiety to shake off the superiority of the House 
of Austria abroad. It was Richelieu's task to show him 
how to satisfy both his longings ; how to strike down re- 
bellion whilst welcoming religious liberty, and how, by 
uniting Catholic and Protestant in willing obedience to 
his throne, he might make himself feared abroad in pro- 
portion as he was respected at home. 

Richelieu's first idea was not altogether a successful 
one. He encouraged Lewis to pursue the negotiation 
which had been already commenced for a marriage be- 
tween his sister and the Prince of Wales. At the wish 
either of Lewis himself or of Richelieu the 

2 7- Mar- . . .... 

riage of marriage was hampered with conditions for 

MariT a tne religious liberty of the English Catholics, 

to which the prince, when he afterwards 

1624. Rise of Richchen. 75 

came to the throne as Charles I., was unwilling or un- 
able to give effect. These conditions were therefore the 
beginning of an ill feeling between the two crowns, 
which helped ultimately to bring about a state of war. 

Nor were other causes of dispute wanting. James and 
his son expected France to join them in an avowed 
league for the recovery of the Palatinate. , „ _ . 

J § 8. Foreign 

But to this Lewis and Richelieu refused to policy of Lewis 

T • 1 c .v r and Richelieu. 

consent. Lewis was proud 01 the name of 
Catholic, and he was unwilling to engage in open war 
with the declared champions of the Catholic cause. But 
he was also King of France, and he was ready to satisfy 
his conscience by refusing to join the league, though he 
had no scruple in sending money to the support of 
armies who were fighting for Protestantism. He agreed 
to pay large subsidies to the Dutch, and to join the King 
of England in promoting an expedition which was to 
march under Mansfeld through France to Alsace, with 
the object of attacking the Palatinate. At the same 
time he was ready to carry on war in Italy. The Span- 
iards had taken military possession of the Valtelline, a 
valley through which lay the only secure military road 
from their possessions in Italy to the Austrian lands in 
Germany. Before the. end of the year a French army 
entered the valley and drove out the Spaniards with ease. 
Mansfeld's expedition, on the other hand, never 
reached Alsace at all. Before the troops of which it was 
composed were ready to sail from England, Richelieu 
had found an excuse for diverting its course. Spinola 
had laid siege to Breda, and the Dutch were as anxiously 
seeking for means to succour it as they had sought for 
means to succour Bergen-op-Zoom when it 
was besieged in 1622. The French averred ^9 Mansfeld's 

° expedition. 

that Mansfeld would be far better employed 

J 6 Mansfeld and Christian in the North. 1625. 

at Breda than in Alsace. At all events, they now de- 
clined positively to allow him to pass through 

James grumbled and remonstrated in vain. At last, 
after long delays, Mansfeld was allowed to sail for the 
Dutch coast, with strict orders to march to 
{! icVaiiure. the Palatinate without going near Breda. 
tioi? 16 CXpe ' li " He had with him 12,000 English foot, and 
was to be accompanied by 2,000 French 
horse under Christian of Brunswick. No good came of 
the expedition. James had consented to conditions ap- 
pended to his son's marriage contract which he did not 
venture to submit to discussion in the House of Com- 
mons, and Parliament was not, therefore, allowed to 
meet. "Without help from Parliament the Exchequer 
was almost empty, and James was unable to send money 
with Mansfeld to pay his men. Upon their landing, the 
poor fellows, pressed a few weeks before, and utterly 
without military experience, found themselves destitute 
of everything in a hard frost. Before long they were 
dying like flies in winter. The help which they were at 
last permitted to give could not save Breda from sur- 
render, and the handful which remained were far too 
few to cross the frontier into Germany. 

Richelieu had hoped to signalize the year 1625 by a 
larger effort than that of 1624. He had mastered the 
Valtelline in alliance with Venice and Savoy, and 
French troops were to help the Duke of Savoy to take 
Genoa, a city which was in close friendship with Spain. 
There was further talk of driving the Spaniards out of 
the Duchy of Milan, and even intervention in Germany 
was desired by Richelieu, though no decision had been 
come to on the subject. In the midst of these thoughts 

1615. Rise of Richelieu. 77 

he was suddenly reminded that he was not 
completely master at home. The peace f n y' fthe 
made with the Huguenots in 1622 had not £™ cllHugue " 
been fairly kept : royal officials had en- 
croached upon their lands, and had failed to observe the 
terms of the treaty. On a sudden, Soubise, a powerful 
Huguenot nobleman with a fleet of his own, swooped 
down upon some of the king's ships lying at Blavet, in 
Brittany, and carried them off as his prize. Sailing to 
Rochelle, he persuaded that great commercial city to 
come to an understanding with him, and to declare for 
open resistance to the king's authority. 
- If Richelieu intended seriously to take part in the 
German war, this was cause enough for hesitation. 
Cleverly availing himself of the expecta- 
tions formed of the French alliance in Eng- mptionto^" 
[and and Holland, he contrived to borrow 51^ foHnter- 
ship's from both those countries, and before Y, ening in 

1 _ Ueriaany. 

the autumn was over Soubise was driven to 
take refuge in England. But Rochelle and the Hugue- 
nots on land were still unconquered, and Ferdinand was 
safe for the moment from any considerable participation 
of France in the German war. Whether Richelieu 
would at any time be able to take up again the thread 
of his plans depended in the first place upon his success 
in suppressing rebellion, but quite as much upon the use 
which he might make of victory if the event proved fa- 
vourable to him. A tolerant France might make war with 
some chances in its favour. A France composed of con- 
querors and conquered, in which each party regarded 
the other as evil-doers to be suppressed, not as erring 
brothers to be argued with, would weigh lightly enough 
in the scale of European politics. 



Section I. — Christian IV. and Gustavus Adolphus. 
Whilst France was thus temporarily hindered from 
taking part in German affairs, and whilst James and his 
son were promising more than their poverty 
mark and would allow them to perform, the rulers of 

Denmark and Sweden were watching with 
increasing interest the tide of war as it rolled north, 

Christian IV. of Denmark had every reason to look 
with anxiety upon the future. As Duke of Holstein, he 
\ 2 Chris- was a member of the Lower Saxon circle, 
nan IV. an( j ^ e jj a( j j on g been doing his best to ex- 

tend his influence over the coasts of the North Sea. By 
his new fortifications at Gluckstadt he aimed at inter- 
cepting the commerce of Hamburg, and his success in 
procuring for one of his sons the Bishopric of Verden 
and the coadjutorship and eventual succession to the 
archbishopric of Bremen was doubtless specially grate- 
ful to him on account of the position he thus acquired 
on the Elbe and the Weser. The question of the Pro- 
testant bishoprics was therefore a very important ques- 
tion to him personally, and he was well aware that a 
real national empire in Germany would make short work 
with his attempts to establish his dominion over the 
mouths of the German rivers. 

His attention was not now called for the first time to 

the progress of the war. Like all the Lutheran princes, 

he had thoroughly disapproved of Frede- 

t 3. His early ° * * , 

interest in the rick's Bohemian enterprise. But when 
Frederick was a fugitive he had seen that a 

1624. Christian IV. and Gustavus Adolphus. 79 

strong force was needed to stop the Emperor from a re- 
taliation which would be ruinous to the Protestants, and 
he had in the beginning of 1621 given a willing ear to 
James's proposal for a joint armament in defence of the 
Palatinate. Had the war been undertaken then, with 
the character of moderation which James and Christian 
would have been certain to impress upon it, the world 
might perhaps have been spared the spectacle of Mans- 
feld's plunderings, with their unhappy results. But 
James came too soon to the conclusion that it was un- 
necessary to arm till mediation had failed ; and Chris- 
tian, auguring no good from such a course, drew back 
and left the Palatinate to its fate. But the events which 
followed had increased his anxiety, and in 1624 his mind 
was distracted between his desire to check the growth 
of the imperial power and his hesitation to act with 
allies so vacillating and helpless as the Lower Saxon 
princes were proving themselves to be. In his own 
lands he had shown himself a good administrator and 
able ruler. Whether he was possessed of sufficient mili- 
tary capacity to cope with Tilly remained to be seen. 

Gustavus Adolphus, King of Sweden, was a man of a 
higher stamp. His is the one of the few names which 
relieve the continental Protestantism of the » 4 Gustavus 
seventeenth century from the charge of bar- Adolphus. 
renness. Possessed of a high and brilliant imagination, 
and of a temperament restless and indefatigable, to 
which inaction was the sorest of trials, he was never 
happier than when he was infusing his own glowing 
spirit into the comrades of some perilous enterprise. 
Christian of Brunswick was not more ready than he to 
lead a charge or to conduct a storm. But he had, too, 
that of which no thought ever entered the mind of Chris- 
tian for an instant — the power of seeing facts in their in* 

80 Intervention of the King of Denmark. 1 6 1 1 . 

finite variety as they really were, and the self-restraint 
vith which he curbed in his struggling spirit and his 
passionate longing for action whenever a calm survey of 
the conditions around showed him that action was inex- 
pedient. In all the pages of history there is probably no 
man who leaves such an impression of that energy un- 
der restraint, which is the truest mark of greatness in 
human character as it is the source of all that is sublime 
or lovely in nature or in art. 

Such a man was certain not to be a mere enthusiast 
embarking heedlessly in a Protestant crusade. Neither 
g 5. His con- would he be careful for mere temporal or 
land and political power, regardless of the higher in- 

Russia. terests of his time. His first duty, and he 

never forgot it, was to his country. When he came to 
the throne, in 161 1, Sweden was overrun by Danish 
armies, and in an almost desperate condition. In two 
years he had wrested a peace from the invaders, under 
conditions hard indeed, but which at least secured the 
independence of Sweden. His next effort, an effort which 
to the day of his death he never relaxed, was to bring into 
his own hands the dominion of the Baltic. He drove 
the Russians from its coasts. ' Now,' he said tri- 
umphantly in 1617, 'this enemy cannot, without our per- 
mission launch a single boat upon the Baltic' He had 
another enemy more dangerous than Russia. Sigis- 
mund, King of Poland, was his cousin, the son of his 
father's elder brother, who had been driven from the 
throne of Sweden for his attachment to the Catholic be- 
lief. And so Gustavus was involved in the great ques- 
tion which was agitating Europe. The bare legal right 
which gave the whole of the seventeen provinces of the 
Netherlands to Spain, which gave Bohemia to Ferdi- 
nand, and the Protestant bishoprics and the secularized 

j 617. Christian IV. and Gustavus Adolphus. 81 

lands to the Catholic clergy, gave also Sweden to Sigis- 
mund. Was it strange if Gustavus stood forth to com- 
bat this doctrine to the death, or if in his mind the 
growth of the two branches of the House of Austria, by 
whom this doctrine was maintained, became inextrica- 
bly blended with the creed which that doctrine was to 
favour ? Was it strange, too, if Protestantism and the 
national right of each separate country to go its own way 
untrammelled by such a doctrine appeared in his eyes, 
as in his days for the most part they really were, but 
two forms of the same spirit ? 

The peace concluded by Gustavus with Russia in 1617 
was accompanied by a fresh outbreak of the war with 
Poland ; and this renewal of the contest with 
the old rival of his house naturally drew the ^mlny. 5 * M 
king's attention to affairs in Germany ; for 
Ferdinand, now rising into power, was the brother-in- 
law of Sigismund, and likely to give him what aid he 
could in his Swedish enterprise. And Gustavus, too, was 
not quite a foreigner in Germany. Through his mother 
German blood ran in his veins, and when, in the summer 
of 1618, he visited Berlin in secret, he was won by the 
lovely face of the daughter of that energetic Elector of 
Brandenburg who after boxing the ears of the rival can- 
didate for the dukedom of Cleves had adopted the Cal- 
vinist creed and had entered the Union. The death of 
the Elector delayed the marriage, and it was not till 1620 
chat, on a second visit, Gustavus wrung a consent from 
the new Elector, George William, whose weakness and 
vacillation were to be a sore trial to the Swedish king in 
after years. In strict incognito, Gustavus travelled as 
far as Heidelberg, at a time when the Elector was far 
away, in the midst of his short-lived splendour at Prague, 
Gustavus learned something from that visit which 

82 Intervention of the King of Denmark. 1624. 

he never forgot. He saw the rich luxuriance of that fair 
Rhine valley, stretching away till the western hills are 
but dimly visible in the blue distance, and which, com- 
pared by Venetian travellers to the green Lombard 
plain, must have caused strange sensations of wonder in 
the wanderer from the cold and barren north. And he 
saw another sight, too, which he never forgot — the wealth 
and magnificence of the Rhenish prelates. ' If these 
priests were subjects to the king my master' (he spoke 
in the assumed character of a Swedish nobleman) 'he 
would long ago have taught them that modesty, humility, 
and obedience are the true characteristics of their pro- 

Plainly in this man there was something of Christian 

of Anhalt, something of the desire to overthrow existing 

institutions. But there was that in him 

V 7- His 

daring and which Christian of Anhalt was ignorant of — ■ 

the long and calm preparation for the crisis, 

and the power of establishing a new order, if his lite 

should be prolonged, to take the place of the old which 

was falling away. 

Gustavus returned to carry on the war with Poland 
• c-n, , with renewed vigour. In 1621 Riga surren- 

f 8. Renewed ° ° 

war with dered to him. The next year he concluded 

a truce which gave him leisure to look about 
The year 1624 brought with it fresh alarm. The 
empire, hostile to Sweden and the religion of Sweden, 
. . was growing terribly strong. Unlike Chris- 

terest in the tian of Denmark, Gustavus had sympathized 
with Frederick's Bohemian undertaking, al- 
though he had expected but little from an enterprise 
under Frederick's guidance. And now the tide of vic- 
tory was running northward. An empire with a firm 

1624. Christian IV. and Gustavus Adolphus. 83 

grasp on the shores of Mecklenburg and Pomerania 
would soon call in question the Swedish dominion of the 
Baltic. If this was to be the end, Gustavus had gained 
but little by his victories over Russia and Poland. 

It all sounds like mere selfishness, — Christian alarmed 
for his family bishoprics, and his hold upon the Elbe and 
the Weser ; Gustavus providing against an „ 

• , , § 10. Charac- 

attack upon his lordship in the Baltic. But ter of his 
it does not follow that with both of them, and po icy " 
especially with Gustavus, the defence of the persecuted 
Gospel was not a very real thing. Historians coolly 
dissect a man's thoughts as they please, and label them 
like specimens in a naturalist's cabinet. Such a thing, 
they argue, was done for mere personal aggrandize- 
ment; such a thing for national objects; such a thing 
from high religious motives. In real life we may be sure 
it was not so. As with Ferdinand and Maximilian, the 
love of law and orderly government was indissolubly 
blended with the desire to propagate the faith on which 
their own spiritual life was based ; so it was with Gus- 
tavus. To extend the power of Sweden, to support the 
princes of Germany against the Emperor's encroach- 
ments, to give a firm and unassailable standing ground 
to German Protestantism, were all to him parts of one 
great work, scarcely even in thought to be separated 
from one another. And, after all, let it never be for- 
gotten that the unity which he attacked was the unity of 
the Jesuit and the soldier. It had no national stand- 
ing ground at all. The Germany of a future day, the 
Germany of free intelligence and ordered discipline, 
would have far more in common with the destroyer than 
with the upholder of the hollow unity of the seven- 
teenth century. 

84 Intervention of the King of Denmark. 1624. 

Section II. — English Diplomacy. 
In August 1624 two English ambassadors, Sir Robert 
Anstruthei and Sir James Spens, set out from London ; 
1 1. English the first to the King of Denmark, the second 
Sweden and to the King of Sweden. The object of the 
Denmark. embassies was identical, to urge upon the 

two kings the necessity of stirring themselves up to 
take part in a war for the recovery of the Palatinate, and 
for the re-establishment of the old condition of things in 

Christian hesitated only so far as to wish to be quite 
sure that James was too much in earnest to turn back as 

he had turned back in 162 1. Anstruther was 
Danish to go round the circle of the princes of 

Lower Saxony, and as soon as a favorable 
report was received from them, and the impression made 
by that report was strengthened by the news of Mansfeld's 
preparations in England, Christian engaged to take part 
in the war. 

Gustavus was far more cautious. Never doubting for 
a moment that the task before him was one of enormous 

magnitude, he argued that it would not be 

I 3. Fore- & .' & 

sight of Gus- too much if all who had reason to complain 
of the House of Austria, from Bethlen 
Gabor in the east to Lewis of France in the west, were to 
join heart and soul in the great enterprise. With this 
view he was already in close communication with his 
brother-in-law, George William, the Elector of Branden- 
burg, who for once in his life was eager for war, perhaps 
because he had hardly reached to a full conception of 
all that such a war implied. 

Gustavus, too, had his own ideas about the way in 
which the war was to be carried on. In the first place 
there must be no divided command, and he himself 

1625. English Diplomacy. 85 

must have the whole military direction of the troops. 
A certain number of men must be actually levied, and 
a certain sum of money actually paid into » 4 jjis 
his hands. To the mere promises which answer - 
satisfied Christian he would not listen. And besides, two 
ports, one en the Baltic, the other on the North Sea, must 
be given over to him in order to secure his communica- 
tions. Perhaps, however, the part of his scheme which 
gives the greatest evidence of his prescience is that 
which relates to France. Avoiding the rock upon which 
the English government was splitting, he made no at- 
tempt to force a Catholic sovereign like Lewis into 
over-close union with the Protestant powers. Help from 
France he would most willingly have if he could get it ; 
but he argued that it would be better for the French 
forces to find a sphere of action for themselves in South 
Germany or Italy, far away from the regions in which 
Gustavus himself hoped to operate at the head of a purely 
Protestant army. 

In January 1625 the answers of the two kings were 
Known in England. Of the 50,000 men demanded by 
Gustavus, 17,000 were to be paid out of the 1625. 

English exchequer. Till four months' pay fJopts the " 
had been provided he would not stir. He, Damsh P lan - 
for his part, had no intention of being a second Mans/eld, 
.the leader of an army driven by sheer necessity to exist 
upon pillage. 

Christian's ideas were framed on a more moderate 
scale. He thought that 30,000 men would be sufficient al- 
together, and that 6,000 would be enough to 

r f, 11 r t- 1 , t ? 6 - Thinking 

fall to the share of England. Both James it easier to 
and Charles declared that if they must make tian\]ian " S " 
a choice they preferred the Danish plan. Gustavus - 
Even 6,000 men would cost them 30,000/. a month, and, 

86 Intervention of the King of Denmark. 1625. 

though the French marriage was settled, Parliament had 
not yet been summoned to vote the subsidies on which 
alone such an expenditure could be based. But they 
did not yet understand that a choice was necessary. 
They thought that Gustavus might still come in as an 
auxiliary to the Danish armament. To this suggestion, 
however, Gustavus turned a deaf ear. He had no con- 
fidence in Christian, or in allies who had taken so scant 
a measure of the difficulties before them. It was true, he 
replied to a remonstrance from the English ambassador, 
that he had asked for hard conditions. ' But,' he added, 
' if anyone thinks it easy to make war upon the most 
powerful potentate in Europe, and upon one, too, who 
has the support of Spain and of so many of the German 
princes, besides being supported, in a word, with the 
whole strength of the Roman Catholic alliance ; and if 
he also thinks it easy to bring into common action so 
many minds, each having in view their own separate 
object and to regain for their own masters so many lands 
out of the power of those who tenaciously hold them, we 
shall be quite willing to leave to him the glory of his 
achievement, and all its accompanying advantages.' 

With these words of bitter irony Gustavus turned away 
for a time from the German war to fight out his own 

quarrel with the King of Poland, a quarrel 
I 7. Gustavus ,.,, , , , I , , . 

attacks which he always held to be subservient to 

the general interests in so far as it hindered 
Sigismund from taking part in the larger conflict. 

Christian's more sanguine ideas were soon to be put 
Aj the test. In March James of England died, and two 
f8. Attempt months later Charles I. entered into an 
fulfil Ws" t0 engagement to supply the king of Denmark 
engagements. w j t h 30,000/. a m0 nth, and scraped together 
46,000/. to make a beginning. Mansfeld, it was ar- 

l62ij. Wallensteiri ' s Ar/nament. 87 

ranged, should abandon his hopeless attempt to reach 
the Palatinate along the Rhine, and should convey the 
remnants of his force by the sea to the assistance of 

After, all, however, the main point was the success or 
failure of the king to gain support in Germany itself. 
The circle of Lower Saxony, indeed, chose § 9 . Com- 
him for its military chief. But even then ™XfSSLh 
there was much division of opinion. With war - 
the commercial classes in the towns war against the 
Emperor was as yet decidedly unpopular. They were 
tolerably well assured that they would reap no benefit 
from any accession of strength to the princes, whilst the 
danger from the Emperor was still in the future. But 
they were not strong enough to carry the circle with them. 
A centre of resistance was formed, which must be broken 
down if the Emperor's pretensions were not to be abated. 
On July c8 Tilly crossed the Weser into Lower Saxony, 
and the Danish war began. 

Sectiqh III. — Wallensteiri $ Armament. 
Would Tilly's force be sufficient to overcome the King 
of Denmark and his foreign allies i Ferdinand and his 
ministers doubted it. In proportion as his , _. _ 

K r § t. The Em- 

power increased, the basis on which it rested peror's need 

grew narrower. Of his allies of 1620 the 
League alone supported him still. Spain, exhausted for 
the time with die siege of Breda, could do little for him, 
and contented herself with forming clever plans for ca- 
joling the Elector of Saxony, and with urging the Pope 
to flatter the Lutherans by declaring them to be far 
better than the Calvinists. Of all such schemes as this 
nothing satisfactory was likely to come. John George of 
Saxony, indeed, refused to joicriarthe'King of Denmark's 

88 Intervention of the King of Denmark. 1625. 

movement. He thought that the Lower Saxony princes 
ought to have been content with the agreement of Miihl- 
hausen, and that Frederick ought to have made his sub- 
mission to the Emperor. But even in the eyes of John 
George the Lower Saxon war was very different from the 
Bohemian war. The Emperor's refusal to confirm perma- 
nently the Protestant bishoprics had made it impossible for 
any Protestant to give him more than a passive support. 
And if the Emperor's friends were fewer, his enemies 
were more numerous. Christian IV. was more formidable 
than Frederick. Bethlen Gabor, who had 

i 2. His 

numerous made peace in 1622, was again threatening 

enemies. . ,, . , ,. , 

in the east ; and no one could say how soon 
France might be drawn into the strife in the west. Fer- 
dinand needed another army besides Tilly's. Yet his 
treasury was so empty that he could not afford to pay a 
single additional regiment. 

Suddenly, in the midst of his difficulties, one of his own 
subjects offered to take the burden on his shoulders. 
i 3. Waller*- Albert of Waldstein, commonly known as 
stem's offer. Walienstein, sprang from an impoverished 
branch of one of the greatest of the families of the Bohe- 
mian aristocracy. His parents were Lutheran, but 
when, at the age of twelve, he was left an orphan, he 
was placed under the care of an uncle, who attempted to 
educate him in the strict school of the Bohemian Brother- 
hood, a body better known in later times under the name 
of Moravians, and distinguished, as they are now, for 
their severe moral training. 

The discipline of the brethren seems to have had 
much the same influence upon the young nobleman that 
? 4 . His the long sermons of the Scotch Presbyte- 

carlyhfe. rians had upon Charles II. The boy found 

his way to the Jesuits at Olmiitz, and adopted their religion, 

1 62^. Wallensteiri 's Armament. 89 

so far as he adopted any religion at all. His real faith 
was in himself and in the revelations of astrology, that 
mystic science which told him how the bright rulers of 
the sky had marked him out for fame. For a young Pro- 
testant of ability without wealth there was no room in 
Bohemia under the shadow of the great houses. With 
Ferdinand, as yet ruler only of his three hereditary 
duchies, he found a soldier's welcome, and was not long 
in displaying a soldier's capacity for war. To Wallen- 
stein no path came amiss which led to fortune. A 
wealthy marriage made him the owner of large estates. 
When the revolution broke out he was colonel of one of 
the regiments in the service of the Estates of Moravia. 
The population and the soldiers were alike hostile to the 
Emperor. Seizing the cash-box of the estates he rode 
off, in spite of all opposition, to Vienna. Ferdinand re- 
fused to accept booty acquired after the fashion of a 
highwayman, and sent the money back to be used 
against himself. The Moravians said openly that Wal- 
lenstein was no gentleman. But the events which were 
hurrying on brought his name into prominence in con- 
nexion with more legitimate warfare, and he had become 
famous for many a deed of skill and daring before 
Frederick's banner sunk before the victors on the White 

Wallenstein was now in a position to profit by his 
master's victory. Ferdinand was not a man of business. 
In peace as in war he gladly left details to „ 

, j 1 1 1 ■ 1 • ,8S. Offers to 

others, and there were good pickings to be raise an 
had out of the ruin of the defeated aristoc- army- 
racy. Besides the lands which fell to Wallenstein's 
share as a reward for his merit, he contrived to purchase 
large estates at merely nominal prices. Before long he 
was the richest landowner in Bohemia. He became 

90 Intervention of the King of De?imark. 1625. 

Prince of Friedland. And now, when Ferdinand's diffi- 
culties were at their height, Wallenstein came forward 
offering to raise an army at his own cost. The Emperor 
needed not to trouble himself about its pay. Nor was it 
to be fed by mere casual plunder. Wherever it was 
cantoned the general would raise contributions from the 
constituted authorities. Discipline would thus be main- 
tained, and the evils upon which Mansfeld's projects had 
been wrecked would be easily avoided. 

Modern criticism has rejected the long accredited 
story of Wallenstein's assertion at this time that he 
. , r-. could find means to support an army of 

6. 1 he J 

larger the 50,000 men, but not an army of 20,000. It 

is certain that his original request was for 
only 20,000. But the idea was sure to occur to him 
sooner or later. Government by military force was the 
essence of his proposal, and for that purpose the larger 
the number of his army the better. 

The connexion between two men whose characters 

differed so widely as those of Ferdinand and Wallenstein 

,, , was from first to last of a nature to excite 

\ 7. Ferdi- 
nand cannot curiosity. Yet, after all, it was only the natu- 
ral result of Ferdinand's own methods of 
government. The ruler who knows nothing beyond the 
duty of putting the law in execution, whilst he shuts his 
eyes to the real requirements of those for whom the law 
ought to have been made, must in the end have recourse 
to the sword to maintain him and his legality from de- 

The substitution of contributions for pillage may have 

seemed to Ferdinand a mode of having recourse to a 

lesral, orderly way of making war. Unfortu- 

§8. Wallen- 6 ,' , . . . , . ., 

Ftein's sys- nately for him, it was not so. As the civil 
laws of the Empire gave him no right to raise 

1625. Wallenstein s Armament. 91 

a penny for military purposes without the assent of the 
Diet, and as, in the distracted condition of Germany, 
the Diet was no longer available for the purpose, no one 
was likely to regard money so raised as legal in any sense 
at all. In fact, it could only be justified as Charles I. 
justified the forced loan of 1626, as an act done out of 
the plenitude of power inherent in the Crown, authorizing 
him to provide in cases of emergency for the good of his 
subjects. Ferdinand, in truth, had brought himself into 
a position from which he could neither advance nor re- 
treat with honour. If he did not accept Wallenstein's 
services he would almost certainly be beaten. If he did 
accept them, he would almost certainly raise a feeling 
in Germany which would provoke a still stronger opposi- 
tion than that which he had for the present to deal with. 
For the contributions were to be raised by military 
authority, with no check or control whatever from civil 
officials. Even if the utmost moderation , . , 

$ g. Modera- 

was used there was something utterly exas- ticm impossible 

. •■ ,, . . to Wallenstein. 

perating to the peasant or the townsman in 
having to pay over a greater or less share of his hoard- 
ings to a colonel who had no civil authority to produce, 
and who had no limit to his demands excepting in his 
own conscience. Those who expected that moderation 
would be used must have formed a very sanguine idea 
of the influence of the events of the war upon ordinary 
military character. 

In point of fact, neither Wallenstein nor his soldiers 
thought of moderation. With him there was just enough 
of regularity to preserve the discipline he a IO Wailen- 
needed; just enough order to wring the ut- st«»sarmy. 
most possible amount of money out of the country, 
'God help the land to which these men come,' was the 
natural exclamation of a frightened official who watched 
the troops march past him. 

92 Intervention of the King of Denmark. 1625. 

How was it then, if Wallenstein's system was no better 
than Mansfeld's system more thoroughly organized, that 
\ 11. Ex- he did not meet with Mansfeld's misfor- 
?Va"lenstei°n's tunes ? The true explanation doubtless is 
success. that he was able to avoid the cause of Mans- 

feld's misfortunes. Mansfeld was a rolling stone from/ 
the beginning. With troops supporting themselves by 
plunder, he had to make head against armies in excellent 
condition, and commanded by such generals as Tilly and 
Cordova, before his own men had acquired the consist- 
ency of a disciplined army. Wallenstein made up his 
mind that it should not be so with him. He would lead 
his new troops where there was much to be gained and 
little to do. In due course of time they would learn to 
have confidence in him as their leader, and would be 
ready to march further under his orders. 

In the autumn, Wallenstein entered the dioceses of 
Magdeburg and Halberstadt, levying the means of sup- 
j? 12. Walien- port for his army upon rich and poor. Nor 
amuron of 6 were the requirements of himself and his 
l625, men like the modest requirements of Tilly. 

With him every man was more highly paid. Splendid 
equipments and magnificence of every kind were ne- 
cessaries of life to the general and his officers, and the 
example was quickly followed, so far as imitation was 
possible, in the lower ranks of the army. To Tilly's 
entreaties for aid Wallenstein turned a deaf ear, and left 
him to carry on the war against the Danes as best he 
could. He was doubtless wise in refusing to expose his 
recruits so early to the fierce trial of battle. With him 
everything was based on calculation. Even his luxury 
and splendour would serve to fix upon him the eyes of 
his soldiers, and to hold out to them another prospect 
than that of the endless hardships, varied by an occa- 

1 626. Wj.Uensteit{ s ArmamcnL 93 

sional debauch at the storming of a town, which was the 
lot of those who followed Tilly. Yet Wallenstein never 
allowed this luxury and splendour to stand in the way of 
higher objects. He was himself a strategist of no mean 
order. He had a keen eye for military capacity. He 
never troubled himself to inquire what a man's religion 
was if he thought he could render good service as a 
soldier. There were generals in his army whose an- 
cestry was as illustrious as that of any sovereign in 
Europe, and generals who had no other title to eminence 
than their skill and valour. High and low were equal 
before his military code. Honours and rewards were 
dispensed to the brave : his friendship was accorded to 
those who had been distinguished for special acts of 

It was a new power in Germany, a power which had no 
connexion with the princes of the Empire, scarcely more 
than a nominal connexion with the Em- . 

$ 13. Wallea- 

peror himself. And the man who wielded stein not a 
it was not even a German. By his birth he 
was a Bohemian, of Slavonian race. The foremost men 
of the war, Tilly, Wallenstein, Gustavus, were foreigners. 
Germany had failed to produce either a statesman or a 
warrior of the first rank. 

During the winter, negotiations for peace were opened 
at Brunswick. But they foundered on the old rock. The 
Emperor and the League would grant the re^, 

terms of Mfihlhausen and nothing more. It | f s i ea( ^. ail,!ire 
was against their consciences to grant a per- negotiation 
manent guarantee to the Protestant administrators, and 
to admit them to the full enjoyment of the privileges of 
princes of the Empire. With this the Lower Saxon 
princes refused to be contented. Amongst the means 
by which the chapters had secured their Protestant cha- 

94 Intervention of the King of Denmark. 1626. 

racter were some acts of formal and even of technical 
illegality. Such acts might easily be made use of by the 
Emperor and his council to effect an alteration in the 
character of those bodies. The Emperor and his coun- 
cil might possibly intend to be just, but somehow or an- 
other they always contrived to decide disputed questions 
in favour of their own partisans. Cm behalf of the reli- 
gious and political institutions of Protestant Germany, 
the King of Denmark and his allies refused to accept the 
terms which had been offered them, and demanded that 
Protestant territories should receive a legal and perma- 
nent confirmation of their right to continue Protestant. 

Section IV. — Defeat of ' Mans f eld and Christian IV. 

When the campaign opened, in the spring of 1626, the 
numbers at the disposal of the two belligerents were not 
f«. Campaign so very unequal. Wallenstein's forces had 
of 1626. been swelling far beyond his original reckon- 

ing. He and Tilly together, it is said could command 
the services of 70,000 men, whilst 60,000 were ready to 
march against them. On Christian's side were fighting 
Mansfeld and Christian of Brunswick, and a nobler than 
either, John Ernest of Saxe-Weimar, on whom, first of 
German men, the idea had dawned of composing the 
distractions of his fatherland by proclaiming a general 
toleration. Bethlen Gabor was once more threatening 
Vienna from the side of Hungary. Even the Protestant 
peasants in Lower Austria had risen in defence of their 
religion and their homes against the Bavarian garrisons 
which guarded the land till their master's expenses 
had been paid. 

In other respects than numbers, however, the condi- 
tions were most unequal. Tilly and Wallenstein both 

1626. Defeat of Mansfeld and Christian IV. 95 
quartered their troops on the enemy's . „ . '. 

n . . r . \ z - Christian 

country. In raising supplies they had no sus- IV. at a dis- 
ceptibilities to consult, no friendly princes van ge ' 
or cities to spare. Christian, on the other hand, was still 
amongst his allies, and was forced, on pain of driving 
them over to the Emperor, to show them every consid- 
eration. And in the midst of these difficulties one source 
of supply on which he had been justified in counting en- 
tirely failed him. 

Charles I. of England had engaged in the spring of 
1625 to pay over to the King of Denmark 30,000/. a 
month, reckoning that Parliament would enable him to 
fulfil his promise. Parliament met in May, but it had 
no confidence either in Charles or in his 1625. 

favourite and adviser, the Duke of Bucking- fj^,' English 
Ham. A war carried on in Germany with su PP lies - 
English money was most distasteful to the English feel- 
ing. The session came to an end after a vote of a bare 
140,000/., to meet a war expenditure scarcely, if at all, 
short of 1,000,000/. a year. Still Charles persisted. In 
the winter Buckingham went over to Holland and nego- 
tiated the Treaty of the Hague, by which the Dutch were 
to pay 5,000/. a month, and the English renewed their 
obligation to pay the 30,000/. already promised to Chris- 
tian IV. This time, it was thought, a fresh Parliament 
would be ready to take up the king's engagement. But 
the fresh Parliament proved more recalcitrant than its 
predecessor. The sum of 46,000/. which had been sent 
across the seas in May 1625 was the only representative 
of Charles' promised support. 

Christian of Denmark and his allies, therefore, were 
to some extent in the position in which 1626. 

Mansfeld had been in 1621 and 1622. If ^S 
not utterly without resource, they were sadly arm y- 

96 Intervention of the King of Denmark. 1626. 

straitened, and were obliged to govern their movements 
by the necessity of finding supplies rather than by mili- 
tary calculations. 

Mansfeld was the first to meet the enemy. For some 

time he had been quartered beyond the Elbe, making 

himself troublesome to the Liibeckers and 

2 5. Mans- 
feld in the the Elector of Brandenburg. But this could 

not go on for ever. Wallenstein was in 

front of him, and he must fight him, or leave him to join 

Tilly against the king. 

Wallenstein never, in his whole career, exposed his 

men to a battle in the open field if he could help it ; and 

least of all was he likely to do so whilst they were yet 

untried. He seized upon the bridge of Dessau over the 

Elbe, and, having fortified it strongly, waited for Mans- 

„ , , feld to do his work. On April 25 Mansfeld 

g6. Battle of . , , . . • 

the bridge of appeared. In vain he dashed his troops 
against the entrenchments, Then, watch- 
ing a favourable opportunity, Wallenstein ordered a 
charge. The enemy fled in confusion and the victory 
was gained. 

Not long after Mansfeld's defeat at the bridge of 
Dessau, Christian of Brunswick died. The remaining 
g 7. Mans- chiefs of the Danish party had a desperate 
towards" game to play. Mansfeld, reinforced by John 
Hungary. Ernest of Weimar, was dispatched through 

Silesia, to hold out a hand to Bethlen Gabor. Wallen- 
stein followed in pursuit, after sending some of his regi- 
ments to the assistance of Tilly. 

What could Christian do in the face of the danger ? 
The English subsidies did not come. To remain on the 

, „ _ defensive was to court starvation, with its 

\ 8 - The • • -i-i j 

battle of inevitable accompaniment, mutiny. Elated 

by a slight success over the enemy, he made 

£626. Defeat of Mansf eld and Christian IV. 97 

a dash at Thuringia, hoping to slip through into Bo- 
hemia, and to combine with Bethlen Gabor and Mans- 
feld in raising the old Protestant flag in the heart of the 
Emperor's hereditary dominions. But Tilly was on the 
watch. On August 27 he came up with the Danish army 
at Lutter. The fight was fiercely contested. But before 
it was decided a cry arose from some of the men in the 
Danish ranks that they would fight no longer without 
pay. Christian was driven from the field. In after days 
he complained bitterly that if the King of England had 
fulfilled his promises the battle would have ended other- 

The soldiers lent by Wallenstein to Tilly had borne 
them well in the fight. Wallenstein himself was far 
away. Mansfeld had been welcomed by the Protestants 
of Silesia, and when Wallenstein followed he found the 
principal towns garrisoned by the enemy. ^ „ M»ns- 
By the time he reached Hungary Mansfeld ' e ' ds death - 
had joined Bethlen Gabor. Once more Wallenstein 
pursued his old tactics. Taking up a strong position, he 
left his opponents to do what they could. The events 
showed that his calculations were well founded. Bethlen 
Gabor had counted on help from the Turks. But the 
Turks gave him no adequate assistance, and he did not 
venture to repeat unaided the operation of the bridge of 
Dessau, and to attack Wallenstein in his entrenchments. 
He preferred making a truce, one of the conditions of 
which was that Mansfeld should be expelled from Hun- 
gary. On his way to Venice the great adventurer was 
seized by a mortal disease. The unconquerable man, 
like an old northern warrior, refused to die in a bed. 
'Raise me up,' he said to his friends, ' I am dying now.' 
Propped up in an upright position in their arms, and gaz- 
ing out upon the dawn, which was lighting up the hill* 

9 8 Stralsund and Roche lie. 1626. 

with the first rays of morning, he passed away. ' Be 
united, united,' he murmured with his last breath ; ' hoM 
out like men.' His own absence from the scene would 
perhaps remove one of the chief difficulties in the way of 



Section I. — Fresh Successes of Wallenstein. 
Differences had already arisen between Wallenstein 
and the League. It was understood that the defeat of 
1626. the northern rebels would lead to confisca- 

tions in°the SCa " tions in the north, as the defeat of Frederick 
north. ^ad j ec i to confiscations in the south. To 

part at least of the land of one of the defeated princes 
the Elector of Mentz laid claim. Wallenstein wished to 
have it all for George of Luneburg, who, Lutheran as he 
was, had held high command in the imperial army. 

The quarrel was more than a mere personal dispute. 

The League wished to pursue the old policy of pushing 

forward the interests of the Catholic clergy 

I 2. Wallen- , OJ 

stein ad- under cover of legality. Wallenstein wished 

religious Catholic and Protestant, already united in 

equality. n j s arrri y > to b e equally united in the Em- 

pire. Rebellion would then be the only punishable 
crime ; loyalty, and especially the loyalty of his own of- 
ficers, the only virtue to be rewarded. 

Another question between the two powers reached 
almost as deeply. The League demanded that Wallen- 
j! 3. Comes stein should support his army upon supplies 
triththe' 51 taken from the Protestants alone. Wallen- 

>^ague. stein asserted his right, as the Emperor'* 

r62G. Fresh Successes of Wallenstein. 99 

general, to quarter his men where he would, and to levy 
contributions for their maintenance even on the terri- 
tories of the League. 

For the first time for many a long year, a friendly voice 
had been heard urging the Emperor in the only wise 
direction. Ferdinand, turning aside from the \ 4. Walien- 

,- r iv t t- stein could 

promotion of a sectional policy, was, 11 he not found 
would listen to Wallenstein, to place the unity umt y- 
of the Empire above the interests of the princes, by rest- 
ing it on the basis of religious equality. Unhappily that 
advice was tendered to him by a man who could not 
offer him security for the realization of so wise a policy. 
To stand above parties it is necessary to obtain the con- 
fidence of a nation, and how could men have confidence 
in Wallenstein ? Durable institutions may be guarded by 
the sword. They cannot be founded by the sword. All 
that was known of Wallenstein in Germany was that he 
was master of an army more numerous and more oppres- 
sive than that of Tilly. German unity, coming in the 
shape of boundless contributions and extortions, and en« 
forced by the example of starving peasants and burning 
villages, was not likely to prove very attractive. 

It is strange that the better part of Wallenstein's pro- 
gramme did not repel Ferdinand at once. But Ferdi- 
nand never made up his mind in a hurry \ 5. Wallen- 
when there were difficulties on both sides, ference'with 
and he was accustomed to defer to the opi- Eggenberg. 
nion of his chief minister, Eggenberg. In November 
Wallenstein held a conference with that minister. He 
unfolded all his scheme. He would increase his army, 
if it were necessary, to 70,000 men. With such a force 
he would be able to avoid a pitched battle, always dan- 
gerous to troops not thoroughly inured to campaigning. 
By the occupation of superior strategical points, he would 

I oo Stralsund and Roche lie. 1 6 2 7. 

be able to out-manoeuvre the enemy. And then Fer- 
dinand would be master in Germany. The whole of the 
Empire would be brought under contribution. There 
would be submission at home, and abroad no power 
would be strong enough to lay a finger upon the re-esta- 
blished Empire. 

Eggenberg was easily persuaded, and when Eggenberg 
was won, Ferdinand was won. In January, Wallenstein 

was created Duke of Friedland, a higher 
I 6. Ferdi- title than that of Prince of Friedland, which 

ports Wal- ne already bore, in token of the Emperor's 
lenstein. approbation. If only Wallenstein could 

have shown Ferdinand the way to win the hearts of 
Germans as readily as he showed him the way to over- 
power their resistance, the history of Germany and of 
Europe would have been changed. 

The resistance of the Protestants to the institutions 

of the Empire had hitherto failed. They had been weak 

because there had been something revolu- 

j? 7. Prepon- , 

derance of tionary in all their proceedings. And now 
those institutions, which up to this time had 
been working harmoniously, were giving signs of break- 
ing-up. There was a little rift in them which might any 
day become wider. " Is the Emperor," asked Wallen- 
stein, " to be a mere image which is never to move?" 
"It is not only the Empire," answered the representa- 
tives of the League, " which is bound to the Emperor. 
The Emperor is also bound to the Empire." There was 
nothing to reconcile the opposing theories. The Em- 
peror who claimed to be something had been the tool 
of a few bishops; he would be, if Wallenstein had his 
way, the tool of a successful general. The Empire, in 
the mouth of the representatives of the League, meant 
riot the populations of Germany, not even the true inter- 

1627. Fresh Successes of Wallenstein. 101 

est of the princes, but simply the interest of the bishops 
and their Church. 

The time had not yet come for an open quarrel. The 
enemy, though weakened, was still powerful. 
Charles I., by dint of a forced loan, which campaign of 
every Englishman except himself and his * 7 ' 
courtiers declared to be in violation of all constitutional 
precedents, contrived to get some money into his exche- 
quer, and Sir Charles Morgan was sent over to the King 
of Denmark's aid with an army nominally of 6,000 men, 
but which in reality never reached two-thirds of that 
number. Thurn, the old hero of the revolution at Prague, 
and the Margrave of Baden-Durlach, brought their ex- 
perience, such as it was, to Christian's aid, and a younger 
brother of John Ernest's, soon to be known to fame as 
Bernhard of Weimar, was also to be found fighting under 
his banners. Strong towns — Wolfenbiittel, Nordheim, 
and Nienburg — -still held out on his side, and peasants 
and citizens were eager to free the land from the oppres- 
sions of the soldiery and the yoke of the priests. 

Once more the Protestants of the north looked anx- 
iously to the east. But Bethlen Gabor did not stir. 
Without Turkish help he could do nothing, . _ , . 

{S9. Submis- 

and the Turks, involved in a war with Per- sionofBeth- 
sia, resolved to negotiate a peace with the 
Emperor. When peace was agreed upon in September 
Bethlen Gabor was powerless. 

Wallenstein's hands were freed as soon as these nego- 
tiations were opened. John Ernest of Weimar had died 
the year before, but his lieutenants were still , „, , 

# 10. Wal- 

in possession of Silesia. In May, Wallen- lenstein in 
stein sent Duke George of Liineburg to cut 
off their retreat. In July, he was in Silesia himself. His 
men were three to one of the enemy. Place after plac© 

to2 Stralswid and Rochelk. 1627. 

surrendered. Only once did lie meet with an attempt at 
resistance in the open field. Before the end of August 
the whole of Silesia was in his hands. Fifty-five 
standards were sent in triumph to Vienna. The Silesian 
towns were set to ransom, and the money of the citi- 
zens went to swell the military chest of the Emperor's 

When Silesia was lost Christian sought to avert de- 
struction by offering terms of peace. But the two generals 
would accept nothing less than the surrender of Holstein, 
and to that Christian refused to accede. Wallenstein 
„ , and Tilly joined their forces to drive him 

g ii. Combat J J 

of HeiHgen- northwards before them. By this move- 
ment the Margrave of Baden was cut off 
from the rest of the Danish army. Making his way to 
the coast near Wismar, he had long to wait before trans- 
ports arrived to carry him across the sea to join the King 
of Denmark. Scarcely had he landed at Heiligenhafen 
when a large body of imperialist troops arrived, and at 
once commenced the attack. He himself and a few of 
his principal officers escaped on ship-board. His men, 
seeing themselves deserted, took service under Wallen- 
stein, and seven of the best regiments in the Danish 
army were lost to Christian. 

Tilly found occupation for his men in the seige of the 

strong places in Lower Saxony. Wallenstein 

quest of"" undertook to follow up the King of Den- 

Schleswig mark. Before the end of the year all 

and Jutland. » 

Schleswig and Jutland, with the exception 
of two or three fortified towns, were in Wallenstein's 

A few sieges, and all, it seemed, would be over. Wal- 
lenstein had begun to cherish the wildest plans. Whes 

1627. Resistance to Wallenstein. 103 

resistance had been put down in Germany, 

1 iii 1 • 1 r i 1 1 r $ lr *- Wailen- 

ne would place himself at the head of stein's 
100,000 men and drive the Turks out of sc emes ' 
Constantinople. Such dreams, however, were to remain 
dreams. If Denmark had been beaten down, Tilly was 
still there, and Tilly represented forces with which the 
new military Empire was certain sooner or later to be 
brought into collision. 

Section II. — Resistance to Wallenstein in the Empire. 

In October, the electors in person, or by deputy, met 
at Miihlhausen to take into consideration the condition 
of the Empire. The Ecclesiastical electors „ „,, 

■ g I. The 

urged that the engagement given in 1620 to Assembly of 
the Protestant administrators was no longer 
valid. They had been told that they would not be dis- 
possessed by force if they acted as loyal subjects. But 
they had not been loyal subjects. They had joined the 
King of Denmark in a war in which, with the aid of 
foreign powers, he had attempted to dismember the Em- 
pire. It was now time for justice to prevail, and for the 
Church, so far as the Peace of Augsburg allowed, to come 
by its own. To this reasoning the new Elector of Bava- 
ria gave the whole weight of his authority, and even the 
two Protestant electors did not venture to meet the argu- 
ment by an open denial. The circle of Lower Saxony 
had entered upon the war against the advice of John 
George, and he held that the administrators were only 
reaping the consequences of neglecting his counsel. 

The Catholic electors felt themselves within reach of 
the settlement which they had long proclaimed as the 
object of their desires. They then pro- . _ 

? 2. The 

ceeded to kick away the ladder by which Catholic 

they had climbed so high. It is not dero- complain of 

gating from the merits of Tilly and his vete- Wallenstein - 

104 Stralsund and Roche lie. 1627. 

rans to say that without Wallenstein they would have 
been unable to cope with the forces opposed to them. 
Wallenstein's army had driven Mansfeld back, had 
hemmed in Bethlen Gabor, had recovered Silesia, had 
contributed to the victory of Lutter. And yet that army 
threatened to establish itself upon the ruins of the au- 
thority of the princes and electors, and to set up a mili- 
tary despotism of the most intolerable kind. Every- 
where Wallenstein's recruiting officers were beating their 
drums. Quiet episcopal cities in the south of Germany, 
which hoped to have seen the last of their troubles when 
Mansfeld vanished westward out of Alsace in 1622, found 
themselves suddenly selected as a trysting-place for 
some new regiment. Rough men poured in from every 
direction to be armed, clothed, lodged, and fed at their 
expense. The alarming doctrine that the army was to 
support itself, that men were to be raised for the purpose 
not of fighting the enemy, but of pressing contributions 
out of friends caused universal consternation. Wallen- 
stein's officers, too, had been heard to talk with military 
frankness about pulling down princes and electors, and 
making a real sovereign of the Emperor. 

The voice of complaint swelled loudly. But those 

who raised it did not see that their own policy was at 

fault; that but for their refusal to yield on 

3 3. Yet they 

cannot do the question of the bishoprics, there would 

wit ou im. nave been no need for Wallenstein's army 
at all. What they were doing required the aid of over- 
powering military force, and they were startled when he 
who wielded the sword insisted on being their master. 
For the present, therefore, the electors did not venture 
on anything more than a gentle remonstrance with Wal- 
lenstein, and a petition to the Emperor to remove the 
abuses which, as they well knew, were radically con- 
nected with the new system. 

1 62S. Resistance to Wallenstein. 105 

The dislike of the rule of the sword which was felt 
amongst those for whom that sword had been drawn was 
sure to be felt far more strongly in the Pro- 
testant cities of North Germany. Up to ?4. The 

, TT „ . , ^, . 1 commercial 

Wallenstein s appearance the commercial towns of the 
oligarchies by which those cities were go- north- 
verned, had shown themselves at the best but lukewarm 
in the Protestant cause. The towns of the south had 
been the first to desert the Union. The towns of the 
north had been dragged half against their will into the 
Danish war. To them the imperial sway was connected 
by a tradition of centuries with support against the en- 
croachments of the princes. But they had no traditions 
in favour of an army living at free quarters amongst 
them, of bullying colonels and hectoring soldiers. Mag- 
deburg braved all the terrors of Wallenstein's anger 
rather than admit a single company within its walls. 
Hamburg declared itself ready to submit to the Emperor's 
authority, but closed its gates against his army. And 
though Magdeburg might be besieged when there was 
leisure, Hamburg and the other maritime towns were less 
easily to be gained. All-powerful on land, Wallenstein's 
authority ended at low-water mark. The King of Den- 
mark had fled to his islands. The King of Sweden was 
master of the Baltic. If it was doubtful whether they could 
set an army in battle array in Germany, at least they could 
throw provisions and munitions of war into a besieged 
seaport town. If the Empire was to be secured, these sea- 
ports must be brought under the Emperor's authority. 

Here, therefore, in the midst of the danger 
Wallenstein determined to plant himself g s Wallen- 
firmly, with the instinctive conviction that the stein in p? s " 

' session ot 

post of danger is the post of power. The the Duchy 

of Mecklen* 

two Dukes of Mecklenburg had steadily sup- burg. 

io6 Stralsund and Rochelle. 1628 

ported the King of Denmark in his struggle against the Em- 
peror. In 1627, when most of the other states ceased to pay 
any contributions towards the war, they had continued 
to fulfil their engagements, and though they now pro- 
fessed their readiness to make their submission, it was 
Wallenstein's interest to make the most of their treason, 
and the least of their repentance. In February, 1628, 
the Emperor, using the rights which he had claimed in 
the case of the Elector Palatine, declared them to have 
forfeited their lands and dignities, and placed the Duchies 
in Wallenstein's hands as a pledge for the payment of 
military expenses which still remained to be liquidated. 
It was significant of the change of feeling in Germany 
that the ecclesiastical electors, who had seen nothing 
amiss in the deprivation of Frederick, had not a good 
word to say for this concession to Wallenstein. 

In Mecklenburg the imperial general had gained a 

footing on the Baltic coast. But more than that was 

needed if he was to be safe from attack. All 

$ ft. Negotia- . . 

tion with the through the winter negotiations had been 

Hanse Towns. . >j. »l ti f *.-l 

gomg on with the Hanse Towns, the man- 
time cities of the old commercial league, which had 
once taken up a dominant position in the north, and 
which, though shorn of its ancient glory, was still worth 
courting by a power which aspired to rule in Germany. 
Reasons were not wanting to induce the Hanse Towns 
to accept the Emperor's offers. There was something 

very tempting in the notion of having the 

I 7. Wallen- y , , . . . . , ,, , , 

stein's offers power of the imperial armies to tail back 
tempting. U p n in their conflicts with foreign states. 

Hamburg especially had been the object of the jealousy 
of these states, as the mart from whence the western 
nations supplied themselves with the materials used in 
ship-building. The King of Denmark had built Gliick- 

1628. Resistance to Wallenstein. 


stadt, lower down the Elbe, in the hope of intercepting 
so lucrative a trade. The King of England had block- 
aded the river, and carried off Hamburg vessels which 
he suspected of being freighted with timber and hemp 
for the use of his enemies in Spain. 

From the growth of a national authority in Germany, 
therefore, the Hanse Towns would have had 

. . § 8. But they 

everything to gain. But Ferdinand was are repelled 
not, could not be really national. What he understand 
had to offer was a special agreement with hls plan- 
Spain, which would have given them the monopoly of 
the trade between Germany and the Spanish dominions. 
Such a trade could only be supported by war. It was a 
privilege which would bring with it a deadly conflict 
with England and Holland, perhaps with Denmark and 
Sweden as well. And the prospect was none the more 
alluring because Wallenstein was to play the principal 
part in the design. The general of the imperial forces 
was appointed Admiral of the Baltic, and the Hanse 
Towns were expected to find him a fleet. 

What a prospect for a body of calculating traders. 
The Spanish monopoly, under such circumstances, was 
hardly to be recommended as a prudent in- 
vestment. The Emperor's overtures were decline to 
politely declined. Wallenstein, when he acce P thls 

r * ' proposal. 

heard of their answer, rated them soundly. 
He had means, he said, to shut up their trade by land, 
and to seize goods which they might import either from 
England or the Netherlands. He would deal with them, 
in short, as Napoleon was to deal with them two centu- 
ries later. 

Wallenstein's thoughts, however, were more imme- 
diately directed to the towns on the Baltic. He had 

1 08 Stralsund and Rochelle. 1627. 

I *?■ Walien- Ion? been alarmed at the danger whicn 

Jtein and the ° . ° 

Baltic towns. threatened him from Sweden. In Novem- 
ber, 1627, he had entered into negotiations 
with an adventurer who offered to set fire to the ships 
in the Swedish harbours. But as the project had 
broken down there was nothing for it but to gain posses- 
sion of the port towns on the Baltic coast, and to bar 
them against the enemy. For no man could expect that 
Gustavus would look on quietly, whilst a great military 
power was forming on the southern coast of the Baltic. 

Wismar was soon in Wallenstein's hands. The har- 
bour of Rostock was blocked up by a line of sunken 
ships. Though Boguslav, the Duke of Pomerania, pro- 
mised to keep his long line of coast safe from attack, he 
1 11. Growth was compelled to admit a strong imperialist 
o is power. f orce w ithin his territory. Everything 
seemed to be succeeding as Wallenstein wished. 

Section III. — The Siege of Stralsund. 
One town alone held out. Stralsund was not a free 
city of the Empire. But though it was nominally depen- 
„ , dent on the Duke of Pomerania it was prac- 

{ 1. Stral- . . K 

»und holds tically its own mistress. The citizens had 
no wish to put themselves forward in oppo- 
sition to the Emperor, far less to assist a foreign power to 
gain a footing in Germany. But they would never admit a 
garrison of such troops as Wallenstein's within their walls. 
Wallenstein would have all or nothing. He ordered 
his commander in those parts, the Lutheran Arnim, to 
enforce submission. " I will never," he 
orders die wrote, " allow them to keep anything back 

siege to be from me, lest others should be encouraged 

commenced. ° 

to do the like." Arnim, already master of 
Rugen, seized Danholm, a smaller island commanding 

'628. The Siege of Stralsitnd. 109 

*«e mouth of the harbour. In February hostilities were 
commenced. In March the citizens attacked the impe- 
rialists in Danholm, and drove them out of the island. 

It was Wallenstein's first check, and desperately did 
he struggle to wipe out the disgrace. Every day the 
spirit of the citizens was rising. There were „ 

1 . ? 3- Wallen- 

old soldiers there, fugitives from the Danish stein's first 
war, and peasants who had fled from their 
desolated homes, and who had terrible tales to tell of 
the wretchedness which followed in the track of Wal- 
lenstein's soldiers. In April, all within the town bound 
themselves by a solemn oath to defend their religion 
and their liberty to the last drop of their blood, and to 
admit no garrison within their walls. In the midst of 
their resistance they still kept up some recollection of 
their nationality, so far as any tie of nationality could still 
be said to exist. The name of the Emperor was care- 
fully avoided, but they professed attachment to the Em- 
pire and its laws. 

Practically, however, the shape in which the Empire 
presented itself to them was that of Wallenstein's army, 

and if they were to resist that army, the 

? 4- Succour 
Stralsunders must, whether they liked it or from Denmark 

1 vi. ,i i and Sweden. 

not, make common cause with those who 
were hostile to the Empire. In May a Danish embassy 
appeared amongst them, and the King of Sweden sent a 
present of gunpowder. When the siege was formally 
opened, these overtures were followed by a succour of 
armed men. Sweden and Denmark were working to- 
gether to break up the new military Empire, and their 
forlorn hope was thrown into Stralsund. 

Wallenstein saw that the case was serious, and came 
in person to the help of his lieutenant. According 
to a doubtful story, he exclaimed, 'I will have 

no Stralsttnd and RotJi elle. 1 6 2 8 . 

J 5. Wallen- Stralsund, even if it be fastened by chains 

stein aoandons . ' 

the siege. to heaven.' It is certain that when a depu- 

tation from the citizens pleaded with him that he would 
abandon his demand that they should admit a garrison 
within their walls, he drew his hand along the surface of 
a table before him, and answered sternly, 'Your town 
shall be made as flat as this.' But the problem of over- 
coming the resistance of a fortress open to unlimited suc- 
cours by sea is one of the most difficult in the whole art 
of war. Still, however, there were fearful odds in favour 
of the besiegers. Without the walls Wallenstein had no 
enemy to fear. He was himself Duke of Mecklenburg. 
With the Elector of Brandenburg and the Duke of Po* 
merania he was on friendly terms, and he had received 
the support of the latter in his attempts upon the town. 
Within the walls there was no certainty of ultimate suc- 
cess. Those who had anything to lose placed their 
property on shipboard. Many sent their wives and 
daughters to seek a safe refuge in Sweden. But what- 
ever doubts might arise the defenders of the town fought 
sturdily on. Week after week passed away, and Stral- 
sund was still untaken. Wallenstein lowered his terms. 
He ceased to demand entrance for a garrison of his own 
men. It would be enough, he now said, if the citizens 
would entrust their walls to troops of their own ruler, the 
Duke of Pomerania, and would in this manner tear them- 
selves away from the connexion with foreign powers hos- 
tile to the Emperor. And to this offer the governing 
council of the town was ready to assent. But the gene- 
ral body of the citizens rejected it utterly. They delibe- 
rately preferred the alliance of the two foreign kings to 
submission, however indirect, to the Emperor's authority. 
Before this resolution, Wallenstein, with all his armies, 
was powerless. On August 3 he raised the siege. 

£6zS. The Siege of Rochellc. m 

Wallenstein's failure was an event of incalculable im- 
portance in the history of Germany. It was much that 
one, and that not one of the first, towns of 

' {> o. Lnarac- 

the Empire should have beaten back the terofthe 
tide of conquest. But it was more that the 
resistance should have been attempted in a case which 
sooner or later would be the cause of the great majority 
of Germans. Ferdinand had floated to power because 
he personified order as opposed to anarchy. The Stral- 
sunders fought for the Protestant religion and freedom 
from the presence of a garrison. Ferdinand's order 
meant the rule of the priest, and the rule of the soldiers. 
Slowly and unwillingly the citizens of Stralsund declared 
for the presence of foreigners as better than such order 
as this. 

Section IV. — The Siege of Rochelle. 

The tide was on the turn in Germany. But the tide 
was not on the turn in France. There, too, a maritime 
city, greater and wealthier than Stralsund, „ 

3 & ' § i. Stral- 

and supported by fleets and armies from sund and 
beyond the sea, was defending the cause of 
Protestantism against the central government. Mainly 
because in France the central government represented 
something more than' the rule of the priest and the 
soldier, the resistance which was successful in Germany- 
was overpowered in France. 

During the year 1625 the coolness between England 
and France had been on the increase. The persecution 
of the English Catholics by Charles, in con- 
travention of his promises, had greatly ex- ? 1. Englana 
asperated Lewis, and the seizure by the an rance - 
English cruisers of numerous French vessels charged 
with carrying on a contraband traffic with the Spanish 

t i * Stralsund and Rochelle. 1626. 

Netherlands had not contributed to calm his indignation, 
Charles, on the other hand, regarded himself as the 
natural protector of the French Protestants, and made 
demands in their favour which only served to make 
Lewis more resolved to refuse every concession. 

Richelieu had therefore a hard part to play. He knew 
perfectly well that the government had violated its en- 
l Riche- gagements with the Huguenots, especially in 
lieu would keeping up the fortifications of Fort Louis, a 

have made . ,. 

peace with work commanding the entrance to the har- 
ness if'he 6 " hour of Rochelle, which it had long ago 
could. promised to pull down. If Richelieu had 

had his way he would have pulled down the fort, and by 
generous concessions to the Huguenots would have car- 
ried them with him to the support of his foreign policy. 
But such a policy, in appearance so rash, in reality so 
wise, was not likely to be palatable to Lewis, and Riche- 
lieu had to steer his way between the danger of offending 
the king and the danger of lighting up still more vividly 
the flames of civil war. In the course of the winter all 
that could be done he did. Deputies of the Huguenot 
towns appeared to negotiate a peace, with the support of 
two English ambassadors. But they were instructed to 
demand the demolition of the fort, and to this the king 
steadily refused his consent. 

The priests and the friends of the priests were 
delighted at the prospect of another civil war. The 
1626. assembled clergy commissioned one of their 

agreement number to offer to the king a considerable 

effected. sum f mone y f or the suppression of rebel- 

lion. The time was appointed for his audience, but 
Richelieu contrived to put it off for a few hours longer, 
and, by a representation of the dangers of the situation, 
induced the Huguenot deputies, with the support of the 

1627. The Siege of Roehette. 113 

English ambassadors, to be satisfied with a loose verbal 
promise from the king. When the clerical train swept 
into the royal presence it was too late. The king had 
already promised the Huguenot deputies that if they be- 
haved as good subjects he would do for them more than 
they could possibly expect. His ministers had already 
assured them that these words pointed to the demolition 
of the fort. 

If a peace thus made was to be enduring, it would be 
necessary to keep up for a long time the appearance of 

its being a submission and not a peace. . 

& * ? 5. Inter- 

Unhappily, the intervention of the King of vention of 

England was not likely to help to keep up 
appearances. He urged Lewis to engage in the war in 
Germany in the exact way and to the exact extent that 
suited the English government, and he put himself osten- 
tatiously forward as the protector of the Huguenots. 

Such conduct awoke once more the susceptibilities of 
Lewis. It was bad enough to be bearded by his own 
subjects. But it was worse to be bearded ^ Lewis 
by'a foreign sovereign. A group of Hugue- indl s nant - 
not communities in the south of France supported in 
practical independence by England would be as insup- 
portable to him as the resistance of the Hanse Towns 
was two years later to Wallenstein. 

Fort Louis, therefore, was not demolished. A peace 

was patched up between France and Spain. Charles 

grew more and more angry with Lewis for 


deserting the common cause. Fresh seiz- ? 7. War 
ures of French ships by English cruisers France and 
came to exasperate the quarrel, and in the En & land - 
early months of 1627 war existed between the two na- 
tions, in reality if not in name. In July a great English 
fleet, with a land army on board, appeared off Rochelle, 

r 1 4 Stralsund and Rochells. 1627. 

under the command of Charles' favourite, Buckingham. 
A landing was effected on the Isle of Rhe, and siege was 
laid to the principal fort of the island. At last the gar- 
rison was almost starved out, and the commander offered 
to come the next morning into the English quarters to 
treat for terms of surrender. That night a stiff easterly 
breeze sprung up, and a French flotilla, heavily laden 
with provisions, put off from the main land. Some of 
the boats were taken, but most of them made their way 
safely through the English guardships, and delivered 
their precious store under the guns of the fort. Buck- 
ingham lingered for some weeks longer. Every day the 
besiegers swept the horizon in vain with theii glasses, 
looking for succour from England. But Charles, vithout 
parliamentary support, was too poor to send off skv.-tm.-s 
hurriedly, and when they were at last ready a long con- 
tinuance of westerly winds prevented them from leaviug 
the Channel. Before they could put to sea, a French 
force was landed on the island, and Buckingham, to save 
himself from defeat, was forced to break up the siege and 
to return home discomfited. 

Richelieu and the king were now thoroughly of one 
mind. The French city which could enter into an under- 
l s Siese of standing with the foreigner must be reduced 
Kochelle. to submission. An army of thirty thousand 

men gathered round the walls, and on the land side the 
town was as hopelessly blocked up as Stralsund. The 
only question was whether it would be possible to cut off 
the entrance of English supplies by sea. By the end of 
November a commencement was made of the mole which 
was to shut off Rochelle from all external help. Piles 
were driven in with stones between them. Heavily laden 
vessels were scuttled and sunk. Richelieu himself di- 
rected the operations, this time with the full support of 

1628. The Siege of Rochelle. 115 

the clergy, who poured their money lavishly into the 
royal treasury. In May, 1628, the work, in spite of the 
storms of winter, was almost completed. An English 
fleet, which came up to the succour of the town, retired 
without accomplishing anything. 

Inside the town distress was rapidly growing unendur- 
able. The mayor, Jean Guiton, was still the soul of the 
resistance. But he had to struggle against g 9 . in- 
an increasing number who counselled sur- spondencyln 
render. He did not venture to appear in the town - 
the streets without a pistol in his hand and half-a-dozen 
stout guardians around him, 

The only hope for Rochelle lay in the great armament 
which was known to be prepared in England, and which 
was to be conducted by Buckingham in g 10. Failure 

t'i. tt c f -L j of the English 

person. The House of Commons had pur- atte mptto 
chased the Petition of Right with large sub- succourit - 
sidies, and Charles, for the first time in his reign, was 
enabled to make an effort worthy of his dignity. But 
the -popular hatred found a representative in the mur- 
derer Felton, and a knife struck home to the favourite's 
heart put an end to his projects for ever. The dissatis- 
faction which arrayed the English people against its 
government had found its way into the naval service. 
When the fleet arrived in September, under a new com- 
mander, all was disorganization and confusion. It 
returned to England without accomplishing a single 
object for which it had been sent forth. 

The surrender of Rochelle followed as a matter of 
necessity. On November 1 the king entered . 
the conquered town in triumph. The inde- render of 
pendence of French cities was at an end. 

The different success of the two great sieges of the 
year may partly be accounted for by the difference ol 

1 1 6 Siralsund and Roche lie. 1 6 2 3. 

vigour in the powers to which the threatened towns looked 
for succour. Charles was very far from 

f> 12. Cause . . * 

of Richelieu's being a Christian IV., much less a Gus- 
tavus Adolphus; and if England at unity 
with itself was stronger than Sweden, England distracted 
by civil broils was weaker than Sweden. But there were 
more serious reasons than these for Richelieu's victory 
and Wallenstein's failure. Richelieu represented what 
Wallenstein did not — the authority of the state. His 
armies were under the control of discipline ; and, even 
if the taxation needed to support them pressed hardly 
upon the poor, the pressure of the hardest taxation was 
easy to be borne in comparison with a far lighter con- 
tribution exacted at random by a hungry and rapacious 
soldiery. If Richelieu had thus an advantage over 
Wallenstein, he had a still greater advantage over Fer- 
dinand and Maximilian. He had been able to isolate the 
Rochellese by making it clear to their fellow Huguenots 
in the rest of France that no question of religion was at 
stake. The Stralsunders fought with the knowledge that 
their cause was the cause of the whole of Protestant 
Germany. The Rochellese knew that their resistance 
had been tacitly repudiated by the whole of Protestant 

When Lewis appeared within the walls of Rochelle 

he cancelled the privileges of the town, ordered its walls 

_ ,. . to be pulled down and its churches to be 

i 13. Religious 

liberty of the given over to the Catholic worship. But 
under Richelieu's guidance he announced 
his resolution to assure the Protestants a continuance of 
the religious liberties granted by his father. No towns in 
France should be garrisoned by troops other than the 
king's. No authorities in France should give orders 
independently of the king. But wherever a religion 

1628. Oppression of the Protestants. 117 

which was not that of the king had succeeded in esta- 
blishing its power over men's minds no attempt should 
be made to effect a change by force. Armed with such 
a principle as this, France would soon be far stronger 
than her neighbours. If Catholic and Huguenot could 
come to regard one another as Frenchmen and nothing 
else, what chance had foreign powers of resisting her? 
She had already beaten back the attack of a divided 
England. Would she not soon acquire a preponder- 
ance over a divided Germany ? It is time for us now to 
ask what steps were being taken in Germany to meet or 
to increase the danger. 



Section I. — Oppression of the Protestants. 

It was not at Stralsund only that Wallenstein learned 

that he could be successfully resisted. Stade had sur« 

rendered with its English garrison to Tilly in 

° ' . 1628. 

April, but Gliickstadt still held out. In vain a 1. Siege of 

Wallenstein came in person to Tilly's aid. 
The Danish cruisers kept the sea open. Wallenstein 
was obliged to retire. In January, 1629, the works of the 
besiegers were destroyed by a sally of the garrison. 

Wallenstein, the great calculator, saw that peace with 
Denmark was necessary. The Swedes and the Danes 
were beginning to act together, and resist- 
ance to one nation, if there must be re- ^ 2 ' ¥he 
sistance, would be easier than resistance to Lub e e c £ f 
two. Much to his satisfaction he found 
Christian not unwilling to listen to the voice of hia 
charming. Just as the eagle eye of Gustavus descried 

n8 7 he Edict of Restitution. 1629. 

the first feeble beams of light on the horizon, the King 
of Denmark, weary of misfortune and vexed at the pros- 
pect of having to crave help from his old competitor of 
Sweden, laid down his arms. On May 22, 1629, a treaty 
of peace was signed at Lubeck. Christian received back 
the whole of his hereditary possessions. In return he 
resigned all claim to the bishoprics held by his family in 
the Empire, and engaged to meddle no further with the 
territorial arrangements of Lower Saxony. 

If the Peace of Lubeck was really to be a source of 

strength to Ferdinand it must be accompanied by some 

such measures as those with which Richelieu 

\ 3. Neces- 
sity of heal- was accompanying his victory at Rochelle. 

ing measures. Ti , , . , r 

It was not enough to have got rid of a 
foreign enemy. Some means must be found to allay the 
fears of the Germans themselves, which had found ex- 
pression in the resistance of Stralsund. 

That there was much to be done in this direction was 

openly acknowledged by almost all who had been con- 

^ . cerned in the imperialist successes. Maxi- 

f 4. Opposite 

views as to milian and the League held that it was above 

what measures ,, ,,. . . ., 

are needed. all things necessary to restrain the excesses 

of Wallenstein and his soldiers. Wallenstein 
held that it was above all things necessary to restrain 
the excessive demands of Maximilian and the clergy. 
Ferdinand, the man in whose hands fortune had placed 
the decision of the great question, probably stood alone 
in thinking that it was possible to satisfy both the sol- 
diers and the priests without weakening his hold on the 

The first act of Ferdinand after the signature of the 
treaty was to invest Wallenstein formally with the Duchy 
of Mecklenburg. Offence was thus given to those who 
believed that the rights of territorial sovereignty had 

1629. Opprex iio?i of tfie Protestants. 119 

been unduly invaded, and who were jealous of the right 
claimed by the Emperor to supersede by his own au- 
thority a prince of the Empire in favour of a successful 

On the other side offence was given still more widely 
co those who wished to maintain the rights of Protestant- 
ism. Without wishing to enter upon a eene- . 

f 5 l 5. HI treai- 

ral persecution, Ferdinand was resolved to meat of the 
allow no rights against his church to those 
who could not conclusively prove to his own satisfaction 
that those rights were under the guarantee of unassaila- 
ble law. He had begun in his own hereditary dominions. 
It is true that in Bohemia and Austria no tortures were 
inflicted, no martyrs suffered either at the stake or on the 
scaffold. But it was found that the stern, relentless pres- 
sure of daily annoyance was sufficient for the purpose 
of producing at least external conformity. By 1627 the 
desired result had been obtained, and Protestantism 
existed only as A -proscribed religion. Then came the 
turn of the Palatinate. For a. time there had been no 
open persecution. In 1625 Maximilian had written to 
the governor of Heidelberg not to let any opportunity 
slip, if he could find an excuse for turning out a Pro- 
testant minister from his parish and replacing him by a 
Catholic priest, in February, 1628, the Jesuits were able 
to report that they had made 400 converts in Heidelberg 
itself, and 1,200 in the neighbouring country districts. 
Then came a further change. In March an agreement 
was drawn up between Maximilian and Ferdinand. The 
Emperor received back Upper Austria, and made over 
to the Elector of Bavaria, in its stead, the Upper Palati- 
nate and that part of the Lower Palatinate which lies on 
the right bank of the Rhine. Maximilian held that by 
this transfer he had acquired the full rights of a territo- 

lao 7ke Edict of Restitution. 1629. 

rial prince, and that amongst these rights tras mat of dis- 
posing of the religion of his new subjects. In June all 
noblemen residing in the country were told that they 
must either change their religion within two months or 
go into exile. In September the order was extended to 
the inhabitants generally. 

The year 1628 was a year of alarm over all Protestant 
, South Germany. There at least Ferdinand 

cities of South was ready to carry out the wishes expressed 
by the Catholic electors at Muhlhausen the 
year before. Whilst Maximilian was threatening th« 
Palr.tinate, imperial commissioners were passing through 
the other territories and cities, taking account of churches 
and church property which had come into Protestant 
possession dice the Convention of Passau. To the 
wishco of the populations not the slightest attention was 
paid. In Nordlingen, for instance, not a single Catholic 
was to be found. Every church in the place was none 
the less marked down for re-dclivery to the Catholic 
clergy. In some places to which the commissioners 
came, Shylock-like, to claim their pound of flesh, they 
demanded more even than the strict letter of the law 
allowed them,, Not content with restoring to the Catholic 
worship churches which had with general consent been 
in the hands of Protestants for half a century, they pro 
ceeded to compel the inhabitants of the towns to attend 
the mass. 

The success of these outrageous measures in the south 

encouraged Ferdinand to pursue the same course in the 

_ north. There he had to deal not merely 

i 7. The * 

Edict of with scattered towns, or a few abbeys, but 

with the great lay bishoprics, many of which 

were extensive enough to form the domain of a duke 01 

a landgrave. On March 29, 1629, before the Peace of 

tbzg. French Intervention in Italy. \2\ 

Liibeck was actually signed, he issued the fatal Edict of 
Restitution. With a stroke of his pen, the two arch- 
bishoprics of Magdeburg and Bremen, the twelve bishop- 
rics of Minden, Verden, Halberstadt, Liibeck, Ratze- 
burg, Misnia, Merseburg, Naumburg, Brandenburg, 
Havelberg, Lebus, and Camin, with about a hundred and 
twenty smaller ecclesiastical foundations, were restored 
to the Catholic clergy. 

The wheel had come full circle round since the day 
when Christian of Anhalt had planned the great uprising 
to sweep away the Catholic bishops and the 
Hcuse oi Austria. The House of Austria was weakness of 
firmer in its seat than ever. The Catholic e mperc> 
bishops were triumphant. But in the midst of their 
triumph the enemies of the Empire were watching them 
keenly, and judging that both they and the Emperor 
were all the weaker for this grand vindication of legality. 

Section II. — French Intervention in Italy, 
In the north Gustavus had an eye not likely to be 
deceived for the joints of Ferdinand's harness. In the 
west Richelieu was preparing for the day g T Gustavus 
when he too might aid in the overthrow of the a - nd Rlclieheu - 
Colossus. It is true that his first thought was of Spain 
and not of Germany. But he could hardly be brought 
into collision with one branch of the House of Austria 
without having sooner or later to deal with the other. 

In Italy, the death of the Duke of Mantua and Mont- 
ferrat without near heirs had given rise to war. "Tie 
next heir was a very distant relation, the . m , 

?. 2 - The 

Duke of Nevers, whose family had long Maimum 
been naturalized in France. To Spain the 
presence of a dependent of France so near her posses 
sions in the Milanese was in the highest decree undesi- 

122 The Edict of Restitution. 1629. 

rable, and she called upon Ferdinand to sequester the 
territory till another way of disposing it could be found. 
If in Germany before Ferdinand's election the rights of 
the Emperors had been but a shadow, those which they 
possessed in the old kingdom of Italy were but the 
shadow of a shade. But whatever they were, Ferdinand 
was the man to put them forth, and whilst Richelieu was 
engaged at Rochellc, Spanish troops had overrun Man- 
tua, and in conjunction with the Duke of Savoy, ready 
now to seek his own interests by fighting for Spain, as in 
earlier days to seek his own interests by fighting against 
her, were besieging the Duke of Nevers in Casale, the 
only fortress which remained to him. 

This intervention of the Spaniards in the Emperor's 

name caused even greater indignation in Italy than their 

intervention in the Palatinate had caused in Germany. 

For in Germany the Emperor's name was in 

i 3. Italian . J \ 

feeling against 1 62 1 still connected with the ideas of law 
mperor. an( j order. In Italy it reminded men of 
nothing but foreign domination, a memory which was 
none the less vivid when the Emperor used his au- 
thority, whatever it might be, to support the real foreign 
domination of the immediate present, the Spanish domi- 
nation in Milan. The Italian princes took alarm. Venice 
and the pope summoned France to their aid, and in 
March, 1629, Richelieu, taking Lewis with him across 
the snowy passes of the Alps, reduced the Duke of Savoy 
to submission, and forced the Spaniards to raise the 
siege of Casale. 

Casale was the Stralsund of Italy. A power which 
g 4. Check had ventured to clothe itself in the attributes 
him by °" of a national authority , with even less reason 
Richelieu. t } ian ; n Germany, had found its limits. 
Richelieu had the general feeling on his side. 

1629. French Intervention in Italy. 123 

He did not venture to do more in Italy. The Duke 
of Rohan, the brother of that Soubise who had begun the 
war of Rochelle in 1625, had roused the , _, , 

? S. The last 

Huguenots of Languedoc and the Cevennes Huguenot 
to* a fresh attempt at resistance, half Pro- 
testant, half aristocratic. As if the Rochellese had not 
sufficiently suffered for the mistake of calling in foreign 
aid, Rohan followed their example, and was foolish 
enough to ask for help from Spain. But the Spanish 
troops came not to his aid. Richelieu hurried back from 
Italy, made peace with England, and pitilessly crushed 
the rebellion in the south. Once more the victory was 
attended by the confirmation of the religious liberties of 
the Huguenots. They might worship as they pleased, but 
political independence they were not to have. 

The French monarchy was stronger for external en- 
terprise than ever. By crushing all resistance, it had no 
longer to fear occupation for its energies at 
home, and by its tolerance of religion it had of Fran^f* 
rendered itself capable of accepting the ser- 
vice of all its subjects, and it could offer its alliance to 
Protestant states without fear of suffering a rebuff. 

Richelieu was again able to turn his attention to Italy. 
In the summer of 1629 an imperialist force of 20,000 
men descended from the Alps and laid siege „ 

■ ? 7- Riche- 

to Mantua. Ferdinand, having established lieu and the 
peace in Germany, fancied that he could & Fuly. S 
take up again in Italy the work which had 
been too great for Barbarossa. Spinola came to his aid 
with an army of equal force, and recommenced the attack 
upon Casale. In the spring of 1630 Richelieu was once 
more in Italy. Cardinal as he was, he was placed in 
command of the army. But instead of marching against 
the Spaniards, he turned first upon the Duke of Savoy- 

124 The Edict of Restitution. 1630. 

Seizing Pignerol and Saluces, he gained possession of 
the Alpine passes. Then, with Piedmont at his feet, he 
passed on to relieve Casale, and forced the Spanish be- 
siegers to retreat. But Richelieu was prudent as well as 
daring, and he left Mantua for the present in the hands 
of Spain and the Emperor. 

It was a hard thing to attack the united forces of 
Spain and the Empire face to face. It might be easier to 
3 8 State of support their enemies abroad, and to favour 
Germany. dissensions at home. In the Netherlands, 

the Dutch, encouraged by the diversion of the Italian 
war, were at last taking the offensive, and entering upon 
that aggressive warfare which ended by bringing the 
whole of North Brabant under their authority. In the 
north, Gustavus had concluded a peace with Poland, and 
was making preparations for actual intervention in Ger- 
many. In all this Richelieu was deeply interested. An 
ambassador of Lewis was engaged in arranging with 
Gustavus the terms on which France should assist him 
in the attack upon the Empire which he already con- 

Not that even Richelieu foresaw the possibility of the 

magnificent results which were to follow from that enter- 

, R . , prise. In 1630, as in 1624 and 1625, he would 

fieu's expec- have preferred that a Protestant power 

should not be too successful. He would 

rather conquer with Sweden than not at all. But he 

would rather conquer with the help of the League than 

with the help of Sweden. Gustavus might be pushed on 

to do his best. He would effect a diversion, and that 

would be enough. 

Section III. — Wallenstein deprived of his Command. 

The long expected breach between the League and 

the Emperor's general had come at last. Instead of re* 

1630. Wallenstein deprived of Command. 125 

ducing his forces after the Peace of Lubeck, 2 1 -. Strong 

position of 

Wallenstein had increased them. He was WaUeastein. 
now at the head of 100,000 men. From a 
military point of view no one could say it was too much. 
He had Mantua to defend, the coasts of the North Sea 
to watch, perhaps France to guard against, and that too 
with all the princes and peoples of Germany exasperated 
against him. Some efforts he made to curb the vio- 
lence of his soldiers. But to restrain the monster he had 
created was beyond his power. And if his soldiers bore 
hard upon burgher and peasant, he himself treated 
the princes with contemptuous scom. He asked why 
the electors and the other princes should not be treated 
as the Bohemian nobles had been treated. The Estates 
of the Empire had no more right to independence than 
the Estates of the kingdom. It was time for the Empe- 
ror to make himself master of Germany, as the kings of 
France and Spain were masters of their own dominions. 
All this made the electors above measure indignant. 
"A new domination," they told Ferdinand, "has arisen 
for the complete overthrow of the old and praiseworthy 
constitution of the Empire." 

A reconstruction of that old rotten edifice would have 
done no harm. But its overthrow bv military „ „„ 
violence was another matter. A new torra could he 
of government, to be exercised by a soldier 
with the help of soldiers, could never be found in justice, 

For always formidable was the league 
And partnership of free power and free will. 
The way of ancient ordinances, though it winds, 
Is yet no devious path. Straight forward goes 
The lightning's path, and straight the fearful path 
Of the cannon-ball. Direct it flies, and rapid, 
Shattering that it may reach, and shattering what it reaches. 
Schiller'^ PiccoXemitu, act i. scene 4. 

126 The Edict of Restitution. 163a 

Even whilst he was defending the universality of op- 
pression on the principle that it was but fair that all 
estates should contribute to the common 
partiality. defence, he was exhibiting in his own case an 

extraordinary instance of partiality. Whilst 
all Germany was subjected to contributions and ex- 
actions, not a soldier was allowed to set foot on Wallen- 
stein's own duchy of Mecklenburg. 

And if the Catholic electors had good reason to com- 
plain of Wallenstein, Wallenstein had also good reason 
to complain of the electors. The process of 
Edict of carrying out the Edict of Restitution was 

Restitution . .. , f , . . ,.m, 

carried out. increasing the number of his enemies. The 
Emperor," he said, " needed recruits, not 
reforms." Ferdinand did not think so. He had per- 
suaded the chapter of Halberstadt to elect a younger 
son of his own as their bishop. He induced the chapter 
of Magdeburg to depose their administrator, on the 
ground that he had taken part in the Danish war. But, 
in spite of the Edict of Restitution, the chapter of Magde- 
burg refused to choose a Catholic bishop in his place, 
and preferred a son of the Elector of Saxony. John 
George was thereby brought by his family interests into 
collision with the Edict of Restitution. 

The city of Magdeburg had not been on good terms 

with the chapter. Wallenstein offered to support its re- 

,.. , sistance with the help of a garrison. But the 

i 5. Magdc- , . . 

burg refuses city refused, and Wallenstein, in the face ol 
the growing opposition, did not venture to 
force it to accept his offer. 

Of the fact of the growing opposition no one could be 
doubtful. As to its causes there was much difference of 
I 6. Growing opinion. The priests ascribed it to the bar- 
WattaMeia. barities. of the soldiers. Wallenstein ascribed 

1630. Wallenstein deprived of Command. 127 

it to the violence of the priests, and especial!/ to the 
vigour with which they were attempting to reconvert the 
inhabitants of the archbishopric of Bremen, which they 
had recovered in virtue of the Edict of Restitution. 

On every side the priests and their schemes were in 
the way of Wallenstein's dazzling visions of a grand im- 
perialist restoration. The Pope, as an Italian , 

* , r j) 7. He talks 

prince, had sympathized with France. "It of attacking 
is a hundred years," said Wallenstein, 
" since Rome has been plundered, and it is richer now 
than ever." 

On July 3, 1630, Ferdinand assembled round him the 
princes and electors at Ratisbon, in the hope of inducirg 
them to elect his son, the King of Hungary, 
as King of the Romans, and therefore as his \# Ration/ 
successor in the Empire. But to this project 
the electors refused even to listen. All who attended 
the assembly came with their minds full of the excesses 
of Wallenstein's soldiery. The commissioners of that 
very Duke of Pomerania who had served the imperial 
cause so well in the siege of Stralsund, had a tale of dis- 
tress to pour out before the princes. His master's sub- 
jects, he said, had been driven to feed upon grass and 
the leaves of trees. Cases had occurred in which starv- 
ing wretches had maintained life by devouring human 
flesh. A woman had even been known to feed upon her 
own child. 

Other tales were told, bad enough, if not quite so bad 
as this, and the misery of the populations \ 9 . The 
gave support to the political grievances of J waHenstein 
their rulers. Ferdinand was plainly told dem * nded - 
that the electors did not mean to be subjected to mili- 
tary despotism. He must choose between them and 

128 The Edict of Restitution. 1630. 

Behind the Catholic Electors was Richelieu himself. 

Together with the recognized French ambassadors, the 

_. , Capuchin Father Joseph, Richelieu's trusted 

i 10. Richc- r 1 1 J 

fieu'sin- confidant, had come to Ratisbon, encoura- 

ging the opposition to Wallenstein, and urg- 
ing the electors to demand the neutrality of the Empire, 
if a war broke out between France and Spain. 

Unhappily for Germany, the policy of the electors was 

purely conservative. There was nothing constructive 

even in Maximilian, the greatest of them 

p it. Policy 

6f the all. The old loose relationship between the 

princes and the Emperor was to be restored 
whether it was adequate to the emergency or not. At the 
very moment when he had every need of conciliating 
opposition, he and his brother electors were refusing the 
petition of the deputies of the Duke of Pomcrania that 
their masters might be allowed to keep possession of the 
bishopric of Camin. 

1 12. Landing At the moment when the offence was 
of Gustavus. given, it was known at Ratisbon that Gus- 
tavus Adolphus had landed on the coast of Pomerania. 
Five years before Gustavus had refused to stir against 
the Emperor without the aid of a powerful coalition. He 
_ now ventured to throw himself alone into 

( 13. Gus- 
tavus comes the midst of Germany. He had no certainty 

without allies. r r* » ■ j r™ t- , , 

even of French aid. The French ambassa- 
dor had offered him money, but had accompanied the 
offer by conditions. Gustavus thrust aside both the money 
and the conditions. If he went at all, he would go on 
his own terms. 

He knew well enough that the task before him, appa- 
rently far harder than in 1625, was in reality far easier. 
He saw that between the ecclesiastical Elec- 
bopofulncss. tors on the one hand, and Wallenstein on 

#630. Wallenstein deprived of Command. 129 

the other, the Protestant princes must cling to him for 
safety. To one who suggested that even if he were vic- 
torious the princes would seek to profit by his victory, he 
answered, with the assurance of genius, ' If I am victo- 
rious, they will be my prey.' 

Events were working for him at Ratisbon. Before the 
persistent demand of the electors for Wallenstein's dis- 
missal Ferdinand was powerless. Even ■ _. 

1 § 15. Dis- 

Wallenstein would not have been strong missal of 
enough to contend against the League, 
backed by France, with a whole Protestant north burst- 
ing into insurrection in his rear. But, in truth, neither 
Ferdinand nor Wallenstein thought of resistance. The 
general, strong as his position was, at the head of the 
mos\ numerous and well-appointed army in Europe, 
retired into private life without a murmur. He may, 
perh tps, have calculated that it would not be long be- 
fore he would be again needed. 

That Ferdinand felt the blow keenly it is impossible 
to doubt. He thought much of the main- ,,_,,. 

. $ l6 - Ferdi- 

tenance of the imperial dignity, and the up- nand's 
rising of the electors was in some sort an posi '" 
uprising against himself. But the system which had 
fallen was the system of Wallenstein rather than his own. 
He had sanctioned the contributions and exactions, feebly 
hoping that they were not so bad as they seemed, or that 
if anything was wrong a little more energy on Wallen- 
stein's part would set things straight. As to Wallen- 
stein's idea of a revolutionary empire founded on the 
ruins of the princes, Ferdinand would have been the 
first to regard it with horror. His policy was in the main 
far more in accordance with that of Maximilian than 
with that of Wallenstein. 
Wallenstein's dismissal was not the only sacrifice to 

130 The Edict of Restitution. 1630. 

I 17. Conces- which Ferdinand was obliged to consent. 

sions of perch- . 

nand in Italy. He agreed to invest the Duke of Nevers with 
the Duchy of Mantua, hoping in return to se- 
cure the neutrality of France in his conflict with Sweden. 
The result of that conflict depended mainly on the 
attitude taken by the Protestants of the north, whom 
? 18. Tilly Ferdinand, in combination with the Catholic 
in command. electors, was doing his best to alienate. 
Tilly was placed in command of the army which had 
lately been Wallenstein's, as well as of his own. The 
variety of habits and of feeling in the two armies did not 
promise well for the future. But, numerically, Tilly was 
far superior to Gustavus. 

Section IV. — The Swedes establish themselves on 
the Coast of the Baltic 

Gustavus, on the other hand, commanded a force in- 
ferior only in numbers. Thoroughly disciplined, it was 
a 1. The instinct with the spirit of its commander. It 

Swedish army. s h are d hj s religious enthusiasm and his 
devotion to the interests of his country. It had followed 
him in many a hardly-won fight, and had never known 
defeat under his orders. It believed with justice that his 
genius for war was far greater than that of any comman- 
der who was likely to be sent against him. 

The first attempt of Gustavus to win over a prince of 
the Empire to his side was made before Stettin, the capital 
1 1. The Duke of the Duke of Pomerania. He insisted on 
submits to"* a personal interview with the aged Boguslav, 
Gustavus. the last of the old Wendish line. Boguslav 

had ever been on good terms with the Emperor. He 
had helped Wallenstein at Stialsund. But his deputies 
had pleaded in vain at Ratisbon for his right to retain 

1630. The Swedes on the Baltic Coast. 131 

the bishopric of Camin and for some amelioration of the 
misery of his subjects. He now pleaded in person with 
Gustavus to be allowed to remain neutral. Gustavus, 
like Tilly in 1623, would hear nothing of neutrality. The 
old man could hold out no longer. " Be it as you 
wish, in God's name," he said. He begged the king to 
be a father to him. " Nay," replied Gustavus, " I would 
rather be your son." The inheritance of the childless 
man would make an excellent bulwark for the defence 
of the Baltic. 

For some time longer Gustavus was busy in securing a 
basis of operations along the coast by clearing Pomerania 
and Mecklenburg of imperialist garrisons. 
But, as yet, the northern princes were un- Elector of 
willing to support him. In vain Gustavus prefe^neu- 8 
reasoned with the ambassador of his brother- trallt y- 
in-law, the Elector of Brandenburg, who had come to 
announce his master's neutrality. " It is time," he said, 
"for his highness to open his eyes, and to rouse himself 
from his ease, that his highness may no longer be in his 
own land a lieutenant of the Emperor, nay, rather of the 
Emperor's servant. He who makes a sheep of himself 
is eaten by the wolf. His highness must be my friend 
or enemy, when I come to his frontier. He must be hot 
or cold. No third course will be allowed, be you sure of 
that." The words were thrown away for the present. 
There may have been something of mere cowardice in 
the Elector's resistance to the overtures made to him. 
Frederick had failed, and Christian had failed, and why 
not Gustavus ? But there was something, too, of the old 
German feeling remaining, of unwillingness to join with 
the foreigner against the Empire. "To do so," said the 
Brandenburg ambassador, " would be both dishonoura- 
ble and disloyal." 

132 The Edict of Restitution. 1631. 

Gustavus had but to wait till Ferdinand's repeated 
blunders made loyalty impossible even with the much- 
enduring George William. Fortunately for 
tiationslje- Gustavus, he was now in a position in which 
twcen Sweden ^ e was ab i e to wait a little. An attempt had 

and trance. r 

been made in France to overthrow Riche- 
lieu, in which the queen mother, Mary of Medici, hnd 
taken a leading part. Richelieu, she warned her son, 
was leading him to slight the interests of the Church. 
But Lewis was unconvinced, and Mary of Medici found 
that all political authority was in Richelieu's hands. 

The complete success of the princes opposed to Wal- 
lenstein had perhaps exceeded Richelieu's expectations. 

,6 3T A balance of power between Wallenstein 

Treat T1 ^f anc ^ t ^ ie League would have served his pur- 

Birwaide. pose better. But if Ferdinand was to be 

strong, it did not matter to France whether the army 
which gave him strength was commanded by Wallen- 
stein or by Tilly. Richelieu, therefore, made up his mind 
to grant subsidies to Gustavus without asking for the 
conditions which had been refused in the preceding 
spring. On January 23 the Treaty of Barwalde was 
signed between France and Sweden. A large payment 
of money was assured to Gustavus for five years. Gus- 
tavus, on his part, engaged to respect the constitutions 
of the Empire as they were before Ferdinand's victories, 
and to leave untouched the Catholic religion wherever 
he found it established. Out of the co-operation of Catho- 
lic and Protestant states, a milder way of treating reli- 
gious differences was already arising, just as the final 
establishment of toleration in England grew out of the 
co-operation between the Episcopal Church and tha 

1631. The Fall of Magdeburg. 133 

Section V. — The Fall oj Magdeburg. 
Further successes marked the early months of 1631. 
But till {he two Protestant Electors could make up their 
minds to throw in their lot with Gustavus, „ „ . 

ji I. Hesita- 

nothing serious could be effected. John uonofthe 
George felt that something ought to be done. Saxony.° 
All over North Germany the Protestants 
were appealing to him to place himself at their head. 
To say that he was vacillating and irresolute, born to 
watch events rather than to control them, is only to say 
that he had not changed his nature. But it must never 
be forgotten that the decision before him was a very hard 
one. In no sense could it be regarded otherwise than as 
a choice between two evils. On the one side lay the pre- 
ponderance of a hostile religion. On the other side lay 
the abandonment of all hope of German unity, a unity 
which was nothing to Giistavus, but which a German 
Elector could not venture to disregard. It might be, 
indeed, that a new and better system would arise on the 
ruins of the old. But if Saxony were victorious with the 
aid of Sweden, the destruction of the existing order was 
certain, the establishment of a new one was problematical. 
A great Protestant assembly held at Leipzig in March, 
determined to make one more appeal to the Emperor. 
If only he would withdraw that fatal Edict . _ 

. . ? 2. The As- 

of Restitution, the Protestants of the north sembiyat 
would willingly take their places as obedient Lip2Ug - 
estates of the Empire. No foreign king should win them 
from their allegiance, or induce them to break asunder 
the last ties which bound them together to their head. 
But this time the appeal was accompanied by a step in 
the direction of active resistance. The Protestant estates 
represented at Leipzig agreed to levy soldiers, in orde* 
to be prepared for whatever might happen. 

»34 Ike Edict of Restitution. 1631. 

Time was pressing. The Treaty of Barwalde had 
opened the eyes of Maximilian and the League to the 
danger of procrastination. If they had en- 
fn 3 the Lorth. tertained any hope that France would leave 
them to contend with Gustavus alone, that 
hope was now at an end. Tilly was despatched into the 
north to combat the Swedish king. 

Ferdinand had despised the danger from Gustavus. 
" We have got a new little enemy," he said, laughing, 
„ „.„ , when he heard of the disembarkation of the 

g 4. Tilly s 

advmce and Swedes. Tilly knew better. He pressed 
rapidly forward, hoping to thrust himself 
between Gustavus in Pomerania and his lieutenant, 
Horn, in Mecklenburg. If he succeeded, the invading 
army would be cut in two, and liable to be defeated 
in detail. Success at first attended his effort. On March 
29, whilst the princes were debating at Leipzig, he took 
New Brandenburg, cutting down the whole Swedish 
garrison of 2,000 men. But Gustavus was too rapid for 
him. Uniting his forces with those of Horn, he pre- 
sented a bold front to the enemy. Tilly was driven back 
upon the Elbe. The remaining fortresses on the Baltic, 
and the important post of Frankfort on the Oder, gar- 
risoned with eight imperialist regiments, fell into the 
power of the conqueror. 

A greater and more important city than Frankfort was 
at stake. The citizens of Magdeburg had raised the 
t - Maede- standard of independence without waiting 
° ur z- for leave from John George of Saxony. Gus- 

tavus had sent a Swedish officer to conduct their defence. 
But without the support of the Electors of Saxony and 
Brandenburg, he durst not bring his army to their as- 

The imperialists were gathering thickly round Mag- 

1 63 1 . The Fall of Magdeburg. 135 

deburg. On April 26 a treaty was signed at Cherasco, 
between France and the Empire, which re- 
stored peace in Italy, and set free the Em- °f cherasoo. 
peror's troops beyond the Alps fur service 
in Germany. If Tilly saw matters still in a gloomy light, 
his fiery lieutenant, Pappenheim, thought there was no 
reason to despair. "This summer," he wrote, "we 
can sweep our enemies before us. God give us grace 

As the siege went on, Gustavus, writing under his 
enforced inaction, pleaded hard with the two Electors. 
From the Elector of Brandenburg he de- 
manded the right to occupy the two for- f; 7 n w i°hlhe" 
tresses of Kiistrin and Spandau. Hopes Braudenbanj 
were held out to him of the surrender of 
Kiistrin, but he was assured that Spandau should never 
be his. Accompanied by a picked body of troops, he 
marched straight upon Berlin. On May 13, outside the 
city gates, he held a long conference with his brother-in- 
law, the Elector. He argued in vain. To one of the 
Dukes of Mecklenburg, who had accompanied him, he 
spoke in bitter words. " I am marching," he said, 
" upon Magdeburg, to deliver the city. If no one will 
assist me, I will retreat at once. I will offer peace to 
the Emperor, and go home to Stockholm. I know that 
the Emperor will agree to my terms. But you Pro- 
testants will have to answer at the day of judgment that 
you would do nothing for the cause of God. In this 
world, too, you will be punished. Magdeburg will be 
taken, and, if I retire, you will have to look to your- 
selves." The next day the conference was resumed. 
P'rom early morning till nine at night the Elector per- 
sisted in his refusal. But the armed men who stood 
behind Gustavus were the most powerful of arguments. 

136 7he Edict of Restitution. 1631. 

At last the Swedish king had his way. On the 15th the 
gates of Spandau were thrown open to his troops. 

But, if the Elector of Brandenburg had given way. the 
Elector of Saxony was not to be moved. He had not 
yet received an answer to his appeal to the 
anceofthe* Emperor ; and till that arrived he would 
Saxon 1 ° f enter into no alliance with a foreigner. Fur- 
ther advance was impossible. Cut to the 
heart by the refusal, Gustavus withdrew, leaving Mag- 
deburg to its fate. 

That fate was not long in coming. The city was 

hardly in a state to make a desperate resistance. The 

council had levied men to fight their battle. 

I 9. Storm- ° 

mg of Mag- But amongst the body of the townsmen there 
were some who counselled submission, and 
others who preferred taking their ease whilst the hired 
soldiers were manning the walls. On May 20, Pappen- 
heim stormed the city. In those days the sack of a town 
taken by storm was claimed as a right by the soldiers, as 
firmly by those of Gustavus as by those of Tilly and 
Wallenstein. But a few weeks before, the Protestant 
population of Frankfort had been exposed to the violence 
and greed of the Swedish army, simply because they had 
been unable to prevent the imperialists from defending 
the place. But the sack of Magdeburg was accompanied 
by circumstances of peculiar horror. Scarcely had the 
first rush taken place over the walls when, either inten- 
tionally or by accident, some of the houses were set on 
fire. In the exeitement of plunder or of terror no one 
thought of stopping the progress of the flames. The 
conquerors, angered by the thought that their booty was 
being snatched away from before their eyes by an enemy 
more irresistible than themselves, were inflamed almost 
to madness. Few could meet that infuriated soldiery 

1 63 1 . The Fall of Magdeburg. 137 

and live. Whilst every form of death, and of outrage 
worse than death, was encountered in the streets, the 
shrieks of the wretched victims were overpowered by the 
roaring of the flames. In a few hours the great city, the 
virgin fortress which had resisted Charles V. and Wallen- 
stein, with the exception of the Cathedral and a few 
houses around it, was reduced to a blackened ruin, be- 
neath which lay the calcined bones of men, of tender 
women, and of innocent babes. 

For the horrors of that day Tilly was not personally 
responsible. He would have hindered the storm if he 
had been able. The tales which carried , _. • 

§ IO - Tilly s 

through all Protestant Germany the evil part in the 
deeds of the old warrior, and represented 
him as hounding on his men to the wretched work, were 
pure inventions. He had nothing to gain by the de- 
struction of Magdeburg. He had everything to gain by 
saving it as a basis of operations for his army. 

But if Tilly was not responsible for the consequences 
of the siege, he and his masters were responsible for the 
policy which had made the siege possible. 
That cathedral standing out from amidst the policy which 
ruins of Magdeburg was but too apt a sym- j^^y 
bol of the work which he and the League 
had set themselves to do. That the rights of the clergy 
and the church might be maintained, all the homes and 
dwellings of men in Germany were to be laid waste, all 
the social and political arrangements to which they had 
attached themselves were to be dashed into ruin. 

Even now Ferdinand was preparing his answer to the 
last appeal of the faithful Protestant estates. 
The Edict of Restitution he would maintain ? I2 ; Fe , rdi - 

nand refuses 

to the uttermost. Of the armament of the to cancel the 

, r Edict of 

princes he spoke in terms of contemptuous Restitution. 

l$8 Victories of Gustavus Adolphus. 1631. 

arrogance. Let John George and his companions in ill- 
doing dismiss their soldiers, and not presume to dictate 
terms by force to the head of the Empire. Ferdinand 
had declared the law as it was, and by the law he meant 
to abide. 



Section I. — Alliance between the Swedes and the Saxons. 
A great fear fell upon the minds of all Protestant men. 
The cities of the south, Augsburg and Nuremberg, which 

had begun to protest against the execution 
2 1. The camp of the edict, fell back into silence. In the 

north, Gustavus, using terror to counteract 
terror, planted his cannon before the walls of Berlin, and 
wrung from his reluctant brother-in-law the renunciation 
of his neutrality. But such friendship could last no 
longer than the force which imposed it, and John George 
could not be won so easily. William of Hesse Cassel 
was the first of the German princes to come voluntarily 
into the camp of Gustavus. Bernhard of Saxe-Weimar 
came too, young as he was, full of military experience, 
and full too of memories of his forefathers, the heroes of 
that old Saxon line which had forfeited the Saxon Elec- 
torate for the sake of the Gospel. But neither William 
nor Bernhard could bring much more than their own 
swords. Gustavus dared not take the offensive. Throw- 
ing up an entrenched camp at Werben, where the Havel 
joins the Elbe, he waited for Tilly, and repulsed an 
attack made upon him. But what was such a victory 
worth ? Hardships and disease were thinning his ranks, 
and unless aid came, the end would be very near. 

1631. Alliance between Sweden and Saxony. 139 

The aid which he needed was brought to him by the 
blindness of Ferdinand. At last the results of the treaty 
of Cherasco were making themselves felt, g 2 Til iy 
The troops from Italy had reached the north, reinforced. 
and, in August, Tilly was at the head of 40,000 men. 
With the reinforcements came orders from the Emperor. 
The tame deflection of John George from the line of strict 
obedience was no longer to be borne. Tilly must com- 
pel him to lay down his arms, or to join in the war 
against the foreign invasion. 

These orders reached Tilly on August 18. On the 
24th he sent a message to the Elector, ask- \ 3. Sum- • 
ing him by what right he was in arms against George "to" 
the laws of the Empire. John George had dlsarm - 
some difficulty in finding an answer, but he refused to 
dismiss his troops. 

If Tilly had only let the Elector alone, he would pro- 
bably have had nothing to fear from him for some time 
to come. But Tilly knew no policy beyond * 4 Attacks 
the letter of his instructions. He at once Saxon y- 
crossed the Saxon frontier. Pappenheim seized Merse- 
burg. Tilly reduced Leipzig to surrender by the threat 
that he would deal with the city worse than with Magde- 
burg. The Elector, so long unwilling to draw the sword, 
was beyond measure angry. He sent speedy couriers to 
Gustavus, offering his alliance on any terms. 

Gustavus did not wait for a second bidding. The wish 
of his heart was at last accomplished. He put his forces 
at once in motion, bringing the Elector of §5. Union of 
Brandenburg with him. The Saxon com- andtheT eS 
mander was the Lutheran Arnim, the very Saxons - 
man who had led Wallenstein's troops to the siege of 
Stralsund. The Edict of Restitution had taught him that 
Wallenstein's idea of a Germany united without respect 

£4° Victories of Gustavus Adolphus. 1631. 

for differences o.* .•eligion was not to be realized under 
Ferdinand. He had thrown up his post, and had sought 
service with Jonn George. Without being in any way 
a man of commanding ability, he had much experience 
in war. 

The Saxon soldiers were a splendid sight. New 
clothed and new armed, they nad with them all the pomp 
J 6. The an d circumstance of glorious war. But they 

baxon troops. ha( j ^ad no experience of fighting. They 
were as raw as Wallenstein's troops had been when he 
first entered the diocese of Halberstadt in 1625. 

The Swedes were a rabble rout to look upon, at least 

in the eyes of the inexperienced Saxons. Their new 

m , allies lausdied heartily at their uniforms, rasr- 

2 7- The . ° } ' s 

Swedish ged with long service and soiled with the 

troops. ^ ust q £ t k e cam p an( j j.jjg bivouac. But the 

war-worn men had confidence in their general, and their 
general had confidence in them. 

Such confidence was based on even better grounds 

than the confidence of the veterans of the League in 

Tilly. Tilly was simply an excellent com- 

tavusasa mander of the old Spanish school. He had 

comman er. won ^. g battles ^y j^g p 0wer f vvaiting till 

he was superior in numbers. When the battles came they 
were what are generally called soldiers' battles. The 
close-packed columns won their way to victory by sheer 
push of pike. But Gustavus, like all great commanders, 
was an innovator in the art of war. To the heavy 
masses of the enemy he opposed lightness and flexibility. 
His cannon were more easily moved, his muskets more 
easily handled. In rapidity of fire he was as superior to 
the enemy as Frederick the Great with his iron ramrods 
at Mollwitz, or Moltke with his needle-guns at Sadowa. 
He had, too, a new method of drill. His troops were 

1631. The Battle of Breitenfeld. 141 

drawn up three deep, and were capable of maneuvering 
with a precision which might be looked for in vain from 
the solid columns of the imperialists. 

Section II. — The Battle of Breitenfeld. 

On the morning of September 17 Swede and Saxon 
were drawn up opposite Tilly's army, close to the village 
of Breitenfeld, some five miles distant from 
Leipzig. Gustavus had Reed of all his skill. B r eitenfeid° 
Before long the mocking Saxons were flying 
in headlong rout. The victors, unlike Rupert at Marston 
Moor, checked themselves to take the Swedes in the 
flanks. Then Gustavus coolly drew back two brigades 
and presented a second front to the enemy. Outnum- 
bered though he was, the result was never for a moment 
doubtful. Cannon shot and musket ball tore asunder 
the dense ranks of the imperialist army. Tilly's own 
guns were wrenched from him and turned upon his in- 
fantry. The unwieldy host staggered before the deft 
blows of a more active antagonist. Leaving six thousand 
of their number dying or dead upon the field, Tilly's 
veterans, gathering round their aged leader, retreated 
slowly from their first defeat, extorting the admiration 
of their opponents by their steadiness and intrepidity. 

The victory of Breitenfeld, or Leipzig — the battle bears 
both names — was no common victory. It was the grave 
of the Edict of Restitution, and of an effort 
to establish a sectarian domination in the ^a"; m p & l rt- 
guise of national unity. The bow, stretched *? ce of tiie 

' victory. 

beyond endurance, had broken at last. 
Since the battle on the White Hill, the Emperor, the 
Imperial Council, the Imperial Diet, had declared them- 
selves the only accredited organs of the national life. 
Then had come a coolness between the Emperor and 

142 Victories of Gustavus A Jolphus. 1631, 

the leaders of the Diet. A good understanding had been 
re-established by the dismissal of Wallenstein. But 
neither Emperor nor Diet had seen fit to take account 
of the feelings or wants of more than half the nation. 
They, and they alone, represented legal authority. The 
falsehood had now been dashed to the ground by Gus- 
tavus. Breitenfeld was the Naseby of Germany. 

Like Naseby, too, Breitenfeld had in it something of 
more universal import. Naseby was the victory of dis- 
ciplined intelligence over disorderly bravery. 
of 3 intel'n- 0ry Breitenfeld was the victory of disciplined 
gcnc.e over intelligence over the stiff routine of the 

routine. ° 

Spanish tactics. Those tactics were, after 
all, but the military expression of the religious and 
political system in defence of which they were used. 
Those solid columns just defeated were the types of what 
human nature was to become under the Jesuit organiza- 
tion. The individual was swallowed up in the mass. As 
Tilly had borne down by the sheer weight of his veterans 
adventurers like Mansfeld and Christian of Brunswick, 
so the renewed Catholic discipline had borne down the 
wrangling theologians who had stepped into the places 
of Luther and Melanchthon. But now an army had 
arisen to prove that order and obedience were weak 
unless they were supported by individual intelligence. 
The success of the principle upon which its operations 
were based could not be confined to mere fighting. It 
would make its way in morals and politics, in literature 
and science. 

Great was the joy in Protestant Germany when the 
news was told. The cities of the south prepared once 
. w .. more to resist their oppressors. All that wns 

stein's in- noblest in France hailed the tidings with 

Gustavus. acclamation. English Eliot, writing from 

1631. The Battle of Breitenfeld. 143 

his prison in the Tower, could speak of Gustavus 
as that person whom fortune and virtue had re- 
served for the wonder of the world ! Even Wallenstein, 
from his Bohemian retreat, uttered a cry of satisfaction. 
For Wallenstein was already in communication with 
Gustavus, who, Protestant as he was, was avenging him 
upon the League which had assailed him and the Em- 
peror who had abandoned him. He had offered to do 
great things, if he could be trusted with a Swedish force 
of 12,000 men. He was well pleased to hear of Tilly's 
defeat. " If such a thing had happened to me," he said 
to an emissary of Gustavus, " I would kill myself. But 
it is a good thing for us." If only the King of Sweden 
would trust him with men, he would soon bring together 
the officers of his old army. He would divide the goods 
of the Jesuits and their followers amongst the soldiers. 
The greatest folly the Bohemians had committed, he 
said, had been to throw Martinitz and Slawata out of 
window instead of thrusting a sword through their bodies. 
If his plan were accepted he would chase the Emperor 
and the House of Austria over the Alps. But he hoped 
Gustavus would not allow himself to be entangled too 
far in the French alliances. 

Wallenstein's whole character was expressed in these 
proposals, whether they were meant seriously or not. 
Cut off from German ideas by his Bohemian 
birth, he had no roots in Germany. The Sesigns'. S 
reverence which others felt for religious or 
political institutions had no echo in his mind. As he 
had been ready to overthrow princes and electors in the 
Emperor's name, so he was now ready to overthrow the 
Emperor in the name of the King of Sweden. Yet there 
was withal a greatness about him which raised him 
above such mere advenatrers as Mansfcld. At the head 

144 Victories of Gusta vus A dolphus. 1 6 3 1 . 

of soldiers as uprooted as himself from all ties oi home 
or nationality, he alone, amongst the leaders of the war, 
had embraced the two ideas which, if they had been 
welcomed by the statesmen of the Empire, would have 
saved Germany from intolerable evil. He wished for 
union and strength against foreign invasion, and he 
wished to found that union upon religious liberty. He 
would have kept out Gustavus if he could. But if that 
could not be done, he would join Gustavus in keeping 
out the French. 

Yet between Wallenstein and Gustavus it was im- 
possible that there should be anything really in common. 
Wallenstein was large-minded because he 
sibility of an was far removed from the ordinary preju- 

"ng between dices of men - He was no more affected by 
Wallenstein tne i r habits and thoughts than the course of 

and (justavus. 

a balloon is affected by the precipices and 
rivers below. Gustavus trod firmly upon his mother 
earth. His Swedish country, his Lutheran religion, his 
opposition to the House of Austria, were all very real to 
him. His greatness was the greatness which rules the 
world, the greatness of a man who, sharing the thoughts 
and feelings of men, rises above them just far enough 
to direct them, not too far to carry their sympathies with 

Such a man was not likely to be content with mere 

military success. The vision of a soldier sovereignty to 

be shared with Wallenstein had no charms 

\ 7. Politi- 
cal plans of for him. If the Empire had fallen, it must 

be replaced not by an army but by fresh in- 
stitutions; and those institutions, if they were to endure 
at all, must be based as far as posssible on institutions 
already existing. Protestant Germany must be freed 
from oppression. It must be organized apart sufficiently 

1 03 1. , T7ie Battle of Br eitenf eld. 145 

for its own defence. Such an organization, the Corpus 
Eva7igelicorum t as he called it, like the North German 
Confederation of 1866, might or might not spread into a 
greater Germany of the future. It would need the sup- 
port of Sweden and of France. It would not, indeed, 
satisfy Wallenstein's military ambition, or the more 
legitimate national longings of German patriots. But it 
had the advantage of being attainable if anything was 
attainable. It would form a certain bulwark against the 
aggression of the Catholic states without necessitating 
any violent change in the existing territorial institutions. 
If these were the views of Gustavus — and though he 
never formally announced them to the world his whole 
subsequent conduct gives reason to believe 

$ 8. Mis 

that he had already entertained them — it military 
becomes not so very hard to understand 
why he decided upon marching upon the Rhine, and 
despatching the Elector of Saxony to rouse Bohemia. 
It is true that Oxenstjerna, the prudent Chancellor of 
Sweden, wise after the event, used to declare that his 
master had made a mistake, and later military historians, 
fancying that Vienna was in the days of Gustavus what 
it was in the days of Napoleon, have held that a march 
upon Ferdinand's capital would have been as decisive 
as a march upon the same capital in 1805 or 1809. But 
the opinion of Gustavus is at least as good as that of 
Oxenstjerna, and it is certain that in 1631 Vienna was 
not, in the modern sense of the word, a capital city. If 
<ve are to seek for a parallel at all, it was rather like 
Madrid in the Peninsular War. The King had resided 
at Madrid. The Emperor had resided at Vienna. But 
neither Madrid in 1808 nor Vienna in 1631 formed the 
centre of force. No administrative threads controlling 
the military system stretched out from either. In the 

146 Victories of Gustavus Adolfthus. 1631. 

nineteenth century Napoleon or Wellington might be in 
possession of Madrid and have no real hold of Spain. 
In the seventeenth century, Ferdinand and Gustavus 
might be in possession of Vienna and have no real hold 
on Austria or Bohemia. Where an army was, there was 
power; and there would be an army wherever Wallen- 
stein, or some imitator of Wallenstein, might choose to 
beat his drums. If Gustavus had penetrated to Vienna, 
there was nothing to prevent a fresh army springing up 
in his rear. 

The real danger to be coped with was the military 

system which Wallenstein had carried to perfection. 

And, in turning to the Rhine, Gustavus 

g 9. Neces- ° 

sity of find- showed his resolution not to imitate Wallen- 

i.ig a basis . . , . T . , 

for his opera- stem s example. His army was to be an- 
tl0ns- chored firmly to the enthusiasm of the Pro- 

testant populations. There lay the Palatinate, to be 
freed from the oppressor. There lay the commercial 
cities Augsburg, Nuremberg, Ulm, and Strassburg, ready 
to welcome enthusiastically the liberator who had set his 
foot upon the Edict of Restitution ; and if in Bohemia 
too there were Protestants to set free, they were not 
Protestants on whom much dependence could be placed. 
If past experience was to be trusted, the chances of or- 
ganizing resistance would be greater amongst Germans 
on the Rhine than amongst Slavonians on the Moldau. 
For purposes of offence, too, there was much to induce 
Gustavus to prefer the westward march. Thither Tilly 
had retreated with only the semblance of an 
resoives^o army still in the field. There, too, were the 
march to the long string of ecclesiastical territories, the 

south-west. ° ° 

Priest's Lane, as men called it, Wiirzburg, 
Bamberg, Fulda, Cologne, Treves, Mentz, Worms, 
Spires, the richest district in Germany, which had fur- 

1 63 1. Gustavus in South Germany. 147 

nished men and money to the armies of the League, and 
which were now to furnish at least money to Gustavus. 
There Spain, with its garrisons on the left bank of the 
Rhine, was to be driven back, and France to be con- 
ciliated, whilst the foundations were laid of a policy 
which would-provide for order in Protestant Germany, so 
as to enable Gustavus to fulfil in a new and better spirit 
the work left undone by Christian of Anhalt. Was it 
strange if the Swedish king thought that such work as 
this would be better in his own hands than in those of 
John George of Saxony ? 

Section III. — March of Gustavus into South Certnany. 

The march of the victorious army was a triumphal 
progress. On October 2, Gustavus was at Erfurt. On 
the loth he entered Wiirzburg : eight days a T . March 
later, the castle on its height beyond the ° f ^ n U the VU * 
Main was stormed after a fierce defence. Rhine. 
Through all the north the priests were expelled from the 
districts which had been assigned them by the Edict of 
Restitution. Gustavus was bent upon carrying on repri- 
sals upon them in their own homes. On December 16, 
Oppenheim was stormed and its Spanish garrison put to 
the sword. The Priest's Lane was defenceless. Gus- 
tavus kept his Christmas at Mentz. His men, fresh from 
the rough fare and hard quarters of the north, revelled 
in the luxuries of the southern land, and drank deep 
draughts of Rhenish wine from their helmets. 

There is always a difficulty in conjecturing the inten- 
tions of Gustavus. He did not, like Ferdinand, form 

plans which were never to be changed. He . 

v ° . g 2. Gus- 

did not, like Wallenstein, form plans which tavus at 

he was ready to give up at a moment's no- 
tice for others entirely different. The essence of his 

148 Victories of Gustavus Adolphus. 1631. 

policy was doubtless the formation, under his own leader^ 
ship, of the Corpus Ev angelic or um. What was to be 
done with the ecclesiastical territories which broke up the 
territorial continuity of South German Protestantism he 
had, perhaps, not definitely decided. But everything 
points to the conclusion that he wished to deal with them 
as Wallenstein would have dealt with them, to parcel 
them out amongst his officers and amongst the German 
princes who had followed his banner. In doing so, he 
would have given every security to the Catholic popula- 
tion. Gustavus, at least in Germany, meddled with no 
man's religion. In Sweden it was otherwise. There, 
according to the popular saying, there was one king, one 
religion, and one physician. 

He placed the conquered territories in sure hands. 
Mentz itself was committed to the Chancellor Oxenst- 
? 3. The jerna. French ambassadors remonstrated 

startled at with him roundly. Richelieu had hoped that, 

his victories. jf t i ie House of Austria were humbled, thj; 
German ecclesiastics would have been left to enjoy their 
dignities. The sudden uprising of a new power in Eu- 
rope had taken the French politicians as completely by 
surprise as the Prussian victories took their successors by 
surprise in 1866. "It is high time," said Lewis, " to 
place a limit to the progress of this Goth." Gustavus, 
unable to refuse the French demands directly, laid down 
conditions of peace with the League which made nego- 
tiation hopeless. But the doubtful attitude of France 
made it all the more necessary that he should place him- 
self in even a stronger position than he was in already. 

On March 31 he entered Nuremberg. As he rode 
through the streets he was greeted with heartfelt acclama- 
\ 4. Cam- tions. Tears of joy streamed down the 
Germany cheeks of bearded men as they welcomed 

1 63 1. ' Gustavus in South Germany. i4g 

the deliverer from the north, whose ready jest and 
beaming smile would have gone straight to the po- 
pular heart even if his deserts had been less. The 
picture of Gustavus was soon in every house, and a 
learned citizen set to work at once to compose a pedigree 
by which he proved to his own satisfaction that the 
Swedish king was descended from the old hereditary 
Burggraves of the town. In all that dreary war, Gus- 
tavus was the one man who had reached the heart of the 
nation, who had shown a capacity for giving them that 
for which they looked to their Emperor and their princes, 
their clergy and their soldiers, in vain. 

Gustavus did not tarry long with his enthusiastic hosts. 
On April 5 he was before Donauworth. Af- „ 

. . ,. ? 5- Gus 

ter a stout resistance the imperialists were tavus at Do- 
driven out. Once more a Protestant Easter nauwor 
was kept within the walls, and the ancient wrong was re- 

On the 14th the Swedes found the passage of the Lech 
guarded by Tilly. Every advantage appeared to be on 
the side of the defenders. But Gustavus , , _ 

(So. 1 he pas 

knew how to sweep their positions with a sage of the 
terrible fire of artillery, and to cross the death of 
river in the very teeth of the enemy. In the Tllly " 
course of the battle Tilly was struck down, wounded 
by a cannon shot above the knee. His friends mourn- 
fully carried him away to Ingolstadt to die. His life's 
work was at an end. If simplicity of character and readi- 
ness to sacrifice his own personal interests be a title to 
esteem, that esteem is but Tilly's due. To the higher 
capacity of a statesman he laid no claim. Nor has he 
any place amongst the masters of the art of war. He 
was an excellent officer, knowing no other rule than the 
orders of constituted authorities, no virtue higher than 

150 Victories of Gustavus Adolphus. 1631. 

obedience. The order which he reverenced was an im- 
possible one, and there was nothing left him but to die 
for it. 

The conqueror pushed on. In Augsburg he found a 
city which had suffered much from the Commissions of 
Resumption which had, in the south, preceded the Edict 
1 7. Gus- of Restitution. The Lutheran clergy had 
Augsburg been driven from their pulpits ; the Lutheran 

and Mumch. councillors had been expelled from the town 
hall. In the midst of the jubilant throng Gustavus felt 
himself more strongly seated in the saddle. Hitherto he 
had asked the magistrates of the recovered cities to swear 
fidelity to him as long as the war lasted. At Augsburg 
he demanded the oath of obedience as from subjects to a 
sovereign. Gustavus was beginning to fancy that he 
could do without France. 

Then came the turn of Bavaria. As Gustavus rode 
into Munich, Frederick, the exiled Elector Palatine, was 
by his side, triumphing over the flight of his old enemy. 
It was not the fault of Gustavus if Frederick was not 
again ruling at Heidelberg. Gustavus had offered him 
his ancestral territories on the condition that he would 
allow Swedish garrisons to occupy his fortresses during 
the war, and would give equal liberty to the Lutheran 
and the Calvinist forms of worship. Against this latter 
demand Frederick's narrow-hearted Calvinism steeled 
itself, and when, not many months later, he was carried 
off by a fever at Bacharach, he was still, through his own 
fault, a homeless wanderer on the face of the earth. 

At Munich Gustavus demanded a high contribution. 
Discovering that Maximilian had buried a large number 
I 8. Gustavus °f guns i n the arsenal, he had them dug up 
at Mumch. again by the Bavarian peasants, who were 
glad enough to earn the money with which the foreign 

1 631. Waitenstetn* s Restoration to Command. 151 

invader paid them for their labours. When this process 
was over — waking up the dead, he merrily called it — he 
prepared to leave the city with his booty. During his 
stay he had kept good discipline, and took especial care 
to prohibit any insult to the religion of the inhabitants. 
If, as may well have been the case, he was looking 
beyond the Corpus Evangelicorum to the Empire itself, if 
he thought it possible that the golden crown of Ferdinand 
might rest next upon a Lutheran head, he was resolved 
that religious liberty, not narroxv orthodoxy, should be 
the corner-stone on which that Empire should be built. 

All Germany, except the hereditary dominions of the 
House of Austria, was at his feet. And he . 

\ 4$. Strong 

knew well that, as far as those dominions position of 
were concerned, there was no strength to 
resist him. Ferdinand had done enough to repress the 
manifestation of feeling, nothing to organize it. He 
would have been even more helpless to resist a serious 
attack than he had been in 1619, and this time Bavaria 
was as helpless as himself. Even John George, who had 
fled hastily from the field of Breitenfeld, marched 
through Bohemia without finding the slightest resistance. 
His army entered Prague amidst almost universal en- 

Section IV. — Wa liens fein' s Restoration to Command. 
Unless Ferdinand could find help elsewhere than in 
his own subjects he was lost. Abroad he 3 r Ftrdi- 
could look to Spain. But Spain could not "^nd looks 

r r about for 

do very much under the eyes of Richelieu. help- 
Some amount of money it could send, and some advice. 
But that was all. 

What that advice would be could hardly be doubted. 
The dismissal of Wallenstein had been a check for 

152 Victories of Gustazms Adolpkus. 1631. 

l6 Th Spain. He had been willing to join Spain 

Spaniards in a war with France. The electors had pre 

the recall of vailed against him with French support, and 
Walienstein. the ^q^ f Cherasco, by which the Ger- 
man troops had been withdrawn from fight- 
ing in support of the Spanish domination in Italy, had 
been the result. Even before the battle of Breitenfeld 
had been fought, the Spanish government had recom- 
mended the reinstatement of Walienstein, and the 
Spaniards found a support in Eggenberg, Walienstein' s 
old protector at court. 

Soon after the battle of Breitenfeld, Walienstein broke 

off his intercourse with Gustavus. By that time it was 

evident that in any alliance which Gustavus 

stein as the°" might make he meant to occupy the first 

rival of place himself. Even if this had been other- 

Gustavus. « 

wise, the moral character and the political 
instincts of the two men were too diverse to make co- 
operation possible between them. Gustavus was a king 
as well as a soldier, and he hoped to base his military 
power upon the political reconstruction of Protestant 
Germany, perhaps even of the whole Empire. Walien- 
stein owed everything to the sword, and he wished to 
bring all Germany under the empire of the sword. 

The arrival of the Saxons in Bohemia inspired Wal- 
ienstein with the hope of a new combination, which 

would place the destinies of Germany in his 
Sft£«eS hands. The reluctance with which John 
ation with George had abandoned the Emperor was 

John George. ° * 

well known. If only Ferdinand, taught by 
experience, could be induced to sacrifice the Edict of 
Restitution, might not the Saxons be won over from their 
new allies? Wallenstein's former plans would be re- 
alized, and united Germany, nominally under Ferdinand, 

1631. Walk 'tisteiri 's Restoration to Command. 153 

in reality under his general, would rise to expel the 
foreigner and to bar the door against the Frenchman 
and the Swede. 

In November, 1631, Wallenstein met his old lieute- 
nant, Arnim, now the Saxon commander, to discuss the 
chances of the future. In December, just as , TT . 

2 5- He is 

Gustavus was approaching the Rhine, he reinstated in 

. . . , „ , -, the command. 

received a visit from Eggenberg, at Znaim. 
Eggenberg had come expressly to persuade him to ac* 
cept the command once more. Wallenstein gave his 
consent, on condition that the ecclesiastical lands should 
be left as they were before the Edict of Restitution. And 
besides this he was to wield an authority such as no 
general had ever claimed before. No army could be in- 
troduced into the Empire excepting under his command. 
To him alone was to belong the right of confiscation and 
of pardon. As Gustavus was proposing to deal with the 
ecclesiastical territories, so would Wallenstein deal with 
the princes who refused to renounce their alliance with 
the Swede. A new class of princes would arise, owing 
their existence to him alone. As for his own claims, if 
Mecklenburg could not be recovered, a princely territory 
was to be found for him elsewhere. 

After all it was not upon written documents that 
Wallenstein's power was founded. The army which he 
gathered round him was no Austrian army 
in any real sense of the word. It was the Vein's army" 
army of Wallenstein — of the Duke of Fried- 
land, as the soldiers loved to call him, thinking perhaps 
that his duchy of Mecklenburg would prove but a transi- 
tory possession. Its first expenses were met with the' 
help of Spanish subsidies. But after that it had to de- 
pend on itself. Nor was it more than an accident that 
it was levied and equipped in Bohemia. If Gustavus 

154 Victories of Gustavus Adolphus. 1631. 

had been at Vienna instead of at Munich, the thousands 
of stalwart men who trooped in at Wallenstein's bare 
word would have gathered to any place where he had 
set up his standards. Gustavus had to face the old evil 
of the war, which had grown worse and worse from the 
days of Mansfeld to those of Wallen stein, the evil of a 
military force existing by itself and for itself. From far 
distant shores men practised in arms came eagerly to the 
summons ; from sunny Italy, from hardy Scotland, from 
every German land between the Baltic and the Alps. 
Protestant and Catholic were alike welcome there. The 
great German poet has breathed the spirit of this hetero- 
geneous force into one of its officers, himself a wanderer 
from distant Ireland, ever prodigal of her blood in the 
quarrels of others. "This vast and mighty host," he 
says (Schiller, The Piccolomini, act i. sc. 2), 

is all obedient 
To Friedland's captains ; and its brave commanders. 
Bred in one school, and nurtured with one milk, 
Are all excited by one heart and soul. 
They are strangers on the soil they tread. 
The service is their only house and home. 
No zeal inspires them for their country's cause, 
For thousands like myself, were born abroad ; 
Nor care they for the Emperor, for one half, 
Deserting other service, fled to ours, 
Indifferent what their banner, whether 'twere 
The Double Eagle, Lily, or the Lion;* 
Yet one sole man can rein this fiery host, 
By equal rule, by equal love and fear, 
Blending the many-nationed whole in one. 

Was it, forsooth, the Emperor's majesty 
That gave the army ready to his hand, 

* That is to say, the standard of the Emperor, of France, or oi 
S veden. 

1632. Wallensteiri ' s Restoration to Command. 155 

And only sought a leader for it? No ! 
The army then had no existence. He, 
Friedland, it was who called it into being, 
And gave it to his sovereign — but receiving 
No army at his hand ; — nor did the Emperor 
Give Wallenstein to us as General. No, 
It was from Wallenstein we first received 
The Emperor as our master and our sovereign ; 
And he, he only, binds us to our banner. 

Wallenstein at first accepted the command for three 
months only. In April it was permanently 1632. 

conferred on him. The Emperor was prac- cJves fulf" 
tically set aside in favour of a dictator. powers. 

Wallenstein turned first upon the Saxons. In one 

hand he held the olive branch, in the other the sword. 

On May 21st his emissary was offering peace 

on the terms of the retractation of the Edict gaxons driven 

of Restitution. On the 22d Wallenstein ? ut ° f Bo- 

himself fell upon the Saxon garrison of 

Prague, and forced it to surrender. It was a plain hint 

to John George to make his mind up quickly. Before 

long the Saxons had been driven out of the whole of 


John George loved peace dearly, and he had joined 
Sweden sorely against his will. But he was ? 9. But John 
a man of his word, and he had promised noTS-l?! 1 
Gustavus not to come to terms with the alonc - 
enemy without his consent. He forwarded Wallenstein's 
propositions to Gustavus. 

No man was so ready as Gustavus to change his 
plans in all matters of secondary importance, as cir- 
cumstances might require. In the face of , ^ 
Wallenstein's armament and of the hesita- mands of 
tions of the Saxon court, he at once aban- 

t$6 Victories of Gustavus Adotyhus. 1632. 

doned all thought of asking that the Rhine bishoprics 
should remain in his hands. He was ready to assent to 
the solution of religious questions which satisfied Wal- 
lenstein and John George. For himself, he expected the 
cession of at least part of Pomerania, in order to protect 
himself from a future naval attack proceeding from the 
Baltic ports. The Elector of Brandenburg had claims 
upon Pomerania ; but he might be satisfied with some 
of the bishoprics which it had been agreed to leave in 
Protestant hands. 

Such terms would probably have met with opposition. 

But the real point of difference lay elsewhere. Wallen- 

stein would have restored the old unity of 

HibiUtyT 35 " the Empire, of which he hoped to be the 

reconciling inspiring genius. Gustavus pressed for the 

Gustavus and . v . s s . _ r , . , 

Wailenstein. formation of a separate Protestant league, if 
not under his own guidance, at least in close 
alliance with Sweden. Wailenstein asked for confidence 
in himself and the Emperor. Gustavus had no confi- 
dence in either. 

John George wavered between the two. He, too, dis- 
trusted Wailenstein. But he did not see that he must 
either accept the Empire, or help on its dis- 

3 12. Hesita- , . r , , .,,,,,- 

tion of John solution, unless he wished to leave the future 
George. ^ Q ermanv to c hance. The imperial unity 

of Wailenstein was something. The Corpus Evangeli- 
corum of Gustavus was something. The Protestant states, 
loosely combined, were doomed to defeat and ruin. 

Section V. — The Struggle between Gustavus and 

Long before John George's answer could reach Gus- 
tavus the war had blazed out afresh. The Swedish king 

i63 2 '- Gustavus and Wallenstein.. 157 

did not yet know how little reliaiice he could 
place on the Elector for the realization of proposes 1 * 1 " 1 * 
his grand plan, when Wallenstein broke up *"6 ue of 
from Bohemia, and directed his whole force 
upon Nuremberg. Gustavus threw himself into the 
town to defend it. Here, too, his head was busy with 
the Carpus Evangelic or wm. Whilst he was offering to 
Saxony to abandon the ecclesiastical territories, he pro- 
posed to the citieens of Nuremberg to lay the foundations 
of a league in which the citizens alone should ally 
themselves with him, leaving the princes to come in 
afterwards if they would, whilst the ecclesiastical terri- 
tories should remain in. his own hands. There is nothing 
really discrepant in the two schemes. The one was a 
plan to be adopted only on condition of a final and per- 
manent peace. The other was a plan for use as a weapon 
of war. The noticeable thing is the persistent way in 
which Gustavus returned again and again to the idea 
of founding a political union as the basis oif military 

He was no more successful with the citixens of Nu- 
remberg than with the Elector q{ Saxony. They replied 

that a matter of such importance should be , 

. j> 2. His pro- 

treated m common by all the cities and posal mnac- 

princes interested. " In that ease," he re- cepta 
plied, bitterly, " the Elector of Saxony will dispute for 
half a year in whose name the summons to the meeting 
ought to be issued. When the cities, too, send deputies, 
they usually separate as they meet, discovering that 
there is a defect in their instructions, and so refer every- 
thing home again for further consideration, without 
coming to any conclusion whatever." Can it be doubted 
that the political incompetence of the Germans, caused 
by their internal divisions and their long disuse of such 

158 Victories of Gustavus Adolphus. 1632. 

institutions as would have enabled them to act in com- 
mon, was a thorn in the side of Gustavus, felt by him 
more deeply than the appearance in the field, however 
unexpected, of Wallenstein and his army ? 

That army, however, must be met. Wallenstein had 
60,000 men with him ; Gustavus but a third of the num- 
l 3. Gustavus ber. The war had blazed up along the 
stein at en Rhine from Alsace to Coblentz. Pappen- 
Nuremberg. heim was fighting there, and the Spaniards 
had sent troops of their own, and had summoned tne 
Duke of Lorraine to their aid. By-and-by it was seen 
how rightly Gustavus had judged that France could not 
afford to quarrel with him. Though he had dashed aside 
Richelieu's favourite scheme of leaving the ecclesiastical 
territories untouched, and had refused to single out the 
House of Austria as the sole object of the war, Richelieu 
could not fail to support him against Spanish troops. In 
a few weeks the danger in his rear was at an end, and 
the scattered detachments of the Swedish army were 
hurrying to join their king at Nuremberg. 

Gustavus was now ready for a battle. But a battle he 
could not have. Wallenstein fell back upon his old 
?4 ; Wallen- tactics of refusing battle, except when he 
trenches \ia& a manifest superiority of numbers. He 

himself. entrenched himself near Fiirth, to the north 

of Nuremberg, on a commanding eminence overlooking 
the whole plain around. For twelve miles his works 
protected his newly-levied army. House, villages, ad- 
vantages of the ground were everywhere utilized for 

In the meanwhile, scarcity and pestilence were doing 
their terrible work at Nuremberg. The country people 
had flocked in for refuge, and the population was too 
great to be easily supplied with food. Even in the army 

1632. t Gustavus and Wallenstein. 15a 

want began to be felt. And with want came 

. 2 5. Wants 

the relaxation of that discipline upon which of the Swedish 
Gustavus prided himself. He had large army- 
numbers of German troops in his army now, and a long 
evil experience had taught Germans the habits of marau- 

Gustavus was deeply irritated. Sending for the chief 
Germans in his service, he rated them 
soundly. " His Majesty," says one who de- remonstrates"' 
scribed the scene, "was never before seen 
in such a rage." 

"You princes, counts, lords, and noblemen," he said, 

" you are showing your disloyalty and wickedness on 

your own fatherland, which you are ruining. 

; J & ? 7. His 

You colonels, and officers from the highest speech to the 

to the lowest, it is you who steal and rob 
every one, without making any exceptions. You plunder 
your own brothers in the faith. You make me disgusted 
with you ; and God my Creator be my witness that my 
heart is filled with gall when I see any one of you be- 
having so villanously. For you cause men to say openly, 
' The king, our friend, does us more harm than our 
enemies.' If you were real Christians you would con* 
sider what I am doing for you, how I am spending my 
life in your service. I have given up the treasures of my 
crown for your sake, and have not had from your German 
Empire enough to buy myself a bad suit of clothes with." 
After this strain he went on : " Enter into your hearts," 
he said, " and think how sad you are making me, so that 
the tears stand in my eyes. You treat me . 

. ? S- Com- 

lll with your evil discipline ; I do not say plains bitterly 
with your evil fighting, for in that you have . 
behaved like honourable gentlemen, and for that I am 
much obliged to you. I am so grieved for you that I am 

rfjo Victories of Gustavus Adolphns. 1632. 

vexed that I ever had anything to do with so stiff-necked 
a nation. Well, then, take my warning to heart ; we will 
soon show our enemies that we are honest men and 
honourable gentlemen." 

One day the king caught a corporal stealing cows. 
, Punishes " ^ son >" ne sa -id, as he delivered him over 
plunderers. to the provost marshal, " it is better that I 
should punish you, than that God should punish not only 
you, but me and all of us for your sake." 

Such a state of things could not last long. On Sep- 
tember 3 Gustavus led his army to the shores of Wallen- 
stein's entrenchments; but though he made 

g 10. Fails to ... 

storm Wallen- some impression, the lines were too skilful- 
ly drawn, and too well defended, to be bro- 
ken through. On the other hand, Gustavus was not a 
Mansfeld, and Wallenstein did not venture, as at the 
Bridge of Dessau, to follow up his successful defence by 
an offensive movement. 

Want of supplies made it impossible for Gustavus to 
remain longer at Nuremberg. For the first time since he 

landed in Germany he had failed in securing 
g n. Is obliged . J . & 

to march a victory, With drums beating and banners 

dWd> flying, he marched away past Wallenstein's 

encampment ; but the wary man was not to be enticed 

to a combat. As soon as he was gone, Wallenstein 

broke up his camp. But he knew too well where his 

opponent's weakness lay to go in pursuit of Gustavus. 

Throwing himself northwards, he established himself 

firmly in Saxony, plundering and burning on every side. 

If only he could work ruin enough, he might hope to 

detach the Elector from his alliance with the Swedes. 

I n. Wailen- Gustavus could not choose but follow. 

tavus in Sax" S ' Wallenstein had hoped to establish himself 

on Y- as firmly in Saxony as he had established 

r63 2 - The Battle of Liitzen. 161 

himself at Ftirth. He would seize Torgau and Halle, to 
make himself master of the passages over the Elbe and 
Saale, whilst Erfurt and Naumburg would complete the 
strength of his position. Gustavus might dash his head 
against it as he pleased. Like Wellington at Torres 
Vedras, or Gustavus himself at Werben, he would meet 
the attack of the enemy by establishing himself in a 
carefully selected position of defence. 

Section VI. — The Battle of Liitzen. 

Wallenstein had succeeded at Nuremberg, but he was 
not to succeed in Saxony. Gustavus was upon him be- 
fore he had gained the positions he needed. » t Gustavus 
Erfurt was saved from the imperialists, in Saxony. 
Gustavus entered Naumburg to be adored as a saviour 
by men flying from Wallenstein's barbarities. As he 
passed through the streets the poor fugitives bent down 
to kiss the hem of his garments. He would have resist- 
ed them if he could. He feared lest God should punish 
him for receiving honour above that which befitted a 
mortal man. 

The Saxon army was at Torgau, and that important 
post was still guarded. Wallenstein lay at Liitzen. Even 
there, shorn as he was of his expected , 

r j 2, Wallen- 

strength, he threw up entrenchments, and stein believes 
believed himself safe from attack. It was 
now November, and he fancied that Gustavus, satisfied 
with his success, would go, after the fashion of the time, 
into winter quarters. 

In Wallenstein's army, Pappenheim's dashing bravery 
made him the idol of the soldiers, and gave z p apP en- 
him an almost independent position. He [jF im leaves 
begged to be allowed to attempt a diversion 
on the Rhenish bishoprics. Wallenstein gave the re« 

1 62 Victories of Gusi ivus Adolphus. 1632. 

quired permission, ordering him to seize Kalle on the 

It was a serious blunder to divide an army under the 
eyes of Gustavus. Early on the morning of November 

16 the Swedish king was in front of Wallen- 
of the stein's position at L>>tzen. He knew well 

Gustavus that, if there was to be a battle at all, he 

battTe. the must be the assailant. Wallenstein would 

not stir. Behind ditche - *- and entrenchments, 
ready armed, his heavy squares lay immovably, waiting 
for the enemy, like the Russians «** the Alma or the 
English at Waterloo. A fog lay thick upon the ground. 
The Swedish army gathered early to their morning 
prayer, summoned by the sounds of Luther's hymn 
tune, " God is a strong tower," floating on the heavy air 
from the brazen lips of a trumpet. The king himself 
joined in the morning hymn, " Fear not, little flock." 
Then, as if with forebodings of the coming slaughter, 
others sung of " Jesus the Saviour, who was the con- 
queror of death." Gustavus thrust aside the armour 
which was offered him. Since he had received a wound, 
not long before, he felt uncomfortable in it. Unpro- 
tected, he mounted on his horse, and rode about the 
ranks encouraging the men. 

At eleven the mist cleared away, and the sun shone 
out. The king gave his last orders to his generals. 

Then, looking to heaven, " Now," he said, 

Y, 5* AttZlCK „ 

of the " in God s name, Jesus, give us to-day to 

a *d cs ' fight for the honour of thy holy name." 

king hofthe Then, waving his sword over his head, he 
cried out, " Forwards !" The whole line 
advanced, Gustavus riding at the head of the calvary at 
the right. After a fierce struggle, the enemy's lines were 
broken through everywhere. But Wallenstein was nol 

1632. i The Battle of Lutzen. 163 

yet mastered. Bringing up his reserves, he drove back 
the Swedish infantry in the centre. Gustavus, when he 
heard the news, flew to the rescue. In all other affairs 
of life he knew better than most men how to temper 
daring with discretion. In the battle-field he flung pru- 
dence to the winds. The horsemen, whom he had or- 
dered to follow him, struggled in vain to keep up with 
the long strides of their master's horse. The fog came 
down thickly once more, and the king, left almost alone 
in the darkness, dashed unawares into a regiment of the 
enemy's cuirassiers. One shot passed through his 
horse's neck. A second shattered his left arm. Turn- 
ing round to ask one of those who still followed him to 
help him out of the fight, a third shot struck him in the 
back, and he fell heavily to the ground. A youth of 
eighteen, who alone was left by his side, strove to lift 
him up and to bear him off. But the wounded man 
was too heavy for him. The cuirassiers rode up and 
asked who was there. " I was the King of Sweden," 
murmured the king, as the young man returned no 
answer, and the horseman shot him through the head, 
and put an end to his pain. 

Bernard of Weimar took up the command. On the 
other side Pappenheim, having received orders to return, 
hurried back from Halle. But he brought , , _, . , 

2 6. Defeat of 

only his cavalry with him. It would be Wailenstein. 
many hours before his foot could retrace their weary 
steps. The Swedes, when they heard that their beloved 
king had fallen, burnt with ardour to revenge him. A 
terrible struggle ensued. Hour after hour the batrie 
swayed backwards and forwards. In one of the Swedish 
regiments only one man out of six left the fight unhurt, 
Pappenheim, the dashing and the brave, whose word 
was ever for fight, the Bliicher of the seventeenth c.en* 

164 Victories of Gustavus AJolphus. 1632. 

tury, was struck down. At the battle of the White Hill 
he had lain long upon the field senseless from his 
wounds, and had told those who were around him when 
he awakened that he had come back from Purgatory 
This time there was no awakening for him. The infantry 
which in his lifetime he had commanded so gallantly, 
came up as the winter sun was setting. But they came 
too late to retrieve the fight. Wallenstein, defeated at 
last, gave orders for retreat. 

The hand which alone could gather the results of 
victory was lying powerless. The work of destruction 
was practically complete. The Edict of Res- 
of Gustavus titution was dead, and the Protestant ad- 
rrepara . ministrators were again ruling in the north- 
ern bishoprics. The Empire was practically dead, and 
the princes and people of Germany, if they were looking 
for order at all, must seek it under other forms than 
those which had been imposed upon them in conse- 
quence of the victories of Tilly and Wallenstein. It is 
in vain to speculate whether Gustavus could have done 
anything towards the work of reconstruction. Like 
Cromwell, to whom, in many respects, he bore a close 
resemblance, he had begun to discover that it was 
harder to build than to destroy, and that it was easier to 
keep sheep than to govern men. Perhaps even to him 
the difficulties would have been insuperable. The 
centrifugal force was too strong amongst the German 
princes to make it easy to bind them together. He had 
experienced this in Saxony. He had experienced it at 
Nuremberg. To build up a Corpus Evangelicoruvi was 
like weaving ropes of sand. 

And Gustavus was not even more than half a German 
by birth ; politically he was not a German at all. In nis 
own mind he could not help thinking first of Sweden. In 

1632. The Battle of Liitzen. 163 

the minds of others the suspicion that he 
was so thinking was certain to arise. He were his 
clung firmly to his demand for Pomerania as purpuSf 5 
a bulwark for Sweden's interests in the Baltic. Next to 
that came the Corpus Evangelicorum, the league of 
German Protestant cities and princes to stand up against 
the renewal of the overpowering tyranny of the Emperor. 
If his scheme had been carried out Gustavus would have 
been a nobler Napoleon, with a confederation, not ot the 
Rhine, but of the Baltic, around him. For, stranger as 
he was, he was bound by his religious sympathies to his 
Protestant brethren in Germany. The words which he 
spoke at Nuremberg to the princes, telling them how 
well off he might be at home, were conceived in the 
very spirit of the Homeric Achilles, when the hardness 
of the work he had undertaken and the ingratitude of 
men revealed itself to him. Like Achilles, he dearly 
loved war, with its excitement and danger, for its own 
sake. But he desired more than the glory of a con- 
queror. The establishment of Protestantism in Europe 
as a power safe from attack by reason of its own strength 
was the cause for which be found it worth while to live, 
and for which, besides and beyond the greatness of his 
own Swedish nation, he was ready to die. It may be 
that, after all, he was " happy in the opportunity of his 



Section I. — French Influence in Germany. 

In Germany, after the death of Gustavus at Liitzen, it 
was ab it was in Greece after the death of Epaminondas 

at Mantinea. " There was more disturb- 
j i. Bemhard ance and more dispute after the battle than 
ofSaxeWei. before it." In Sweden, Christina, the infant 

daughter of Gustavus, succeeded peaceably 
to her father's throne, and authority was exercised with- 
out contradiction by the Chancellor Oxenstjerna. But, 
wise and prudent as Oxenstjerna was, it was not in the 
nature of things that he should be listened to as Gusta- 
vus had been listened to, The chiefs of the army, no 
longer held in by a soldier's hand, threatened to assume 
an almost independent position. Foremost of these was 
the young Bernhard of Weimar, demanding, like Wal^ 
lenstein, a place among' the princely houses of Ger- 
many. In his person he hoped the glories of the elder 
branch of the Saxon House would revive, and the dis- 
grace inflicted upon it by Charles V. for its attachment 
to the Protestant cause would be repaired. He claimed 
the rewards of victory for those whose swords had 
gained it, and payment for the soldiers, who during the 
winter months following the victory at Liitzen had re- 
ceived little or nothing. His own share was to be a new 
1 66 

1631. ) French Influence in Germany. 167 

duchy of Franconia, formed out of the united bishoprics 
of Wiirzburg and Bamberg. Oxenstjerna was com- 
pelled to admit his pretensions, and to confirm him in 
his duchy. 

The step was thus taken which Gustavus had un- 
doubtedly contemplated, but which he had prudently 
refrained from carrying into action. The , _ 

. . g a. 1 he 

seizure of ecclesiastical lands in which the League of 

, . _, . .. . Heilbrona. 

population was Catholic was as great a bar- 
rier to peace on the one side as the seizure of the Pro- 
testant bishoprics in the north had been on the other. 
There was, therefore, all the more necessity to be ready 
for war. If a complete junction of all the Protestant 
forces was not to be had, something at least was attaina- 
ble. On April 23, 1633, the League of Heilbronn was 
signed. The four circles of Svvabia, Franconia, and the 
Upper and Lower Rhine formed a union with Sweden 
for mutual support. 

It is not difficult to explain the defection of the Elec- 
tor of Saxony. The seizure of a territory by military 
violence had always been most obnoxious „ ^ r 

tii 1 • • 2 3- Defec- 

to him. He had resisted it openly in the tionof 
case of Frederick in Bohemia. He had re- axon y- 
sisted it, as far as he dared, in the case of Wallenstein 
in Mecklenburg. He was not inclined to put up with it 
in the case of Bernhard in Franconia. Nor could he 
fail to see that with the prolongation of the war, the 
chances of French intervention were considerably in- 

In 1 63 1 there had been a great effervescence of the 
French feudal aristocracy against the royal authority. 

But Richelieu stood firm. In March the 

king's brother, Gaston Duke of Orleans, 1 4. French 

fled from the country. In July his mother, *° mcs ' 


1 68 Wattensteiri 's Deaih : Treaty of Prague. 1632. 

Mary of Medici, followed his example. But they had 
no intention of abandoning their position. From their 
exile in the Spanish Netherlands they formed a close 
alliance with Spain, and carried on a thousand intrigues 
with the nobility at home. The Cardinal smote right 
and left with a heavy hand. Amongst his enemies were 
the noblest names in France. The Duke of Guise shrank 
from the conflict and retired to Italy to die far from 
his native land. The keeper of the seals died in prison. 
His kinsman, a marshal of France, perished on the 
scaffold. In the summer of the year 1632, whilst Gusta- 
vus was conducting his last campaign, there was a great 
rising in the south of France. Gaston himself came to 
share in the glory or the disgrace of the rebellion. The 
Duke of Montmorenci was the real leader of the enter- 
prise. He was a bold and vigorous commander, the 
Rupert of the French cavaliers. But his gay horsemen 
dashed in vain against the serried ranks of the royal in- 
fantry, and he expiated his fault upon the scaffold. 
Gaston, helpless and low-minded as he was, could live 
on, secure under an ignominious pardon. 

It was not the highest form of political life which 
Richelieu was establishing. For the free expression of 
opinion, as a foundation of government, 
lieu did for France, in that day, was not prepared. But 
that could be within the limits of possibility, Richelieu's 
<io " e • method of ruling was a magnificent spec- 

tacle. He struck down a hundred petty despotisms 
that he might exalt a single despotism in their place. 
And if the despotism of the Crown was subject to all the 
dangers and weaknesses by which sooner or later the 
strength of all despotisms is eaten away, Richelieu suc- 
ceeded for the time in gaining the co-operation of those 
classes whose good will was worth conciliating. Under 

T632. French Influence in Germany. 169 

him commerce and industry lifted up their heads, know- 
ledge and literature smiled at last. Whilst Corneille 
was creating the French drama, Descartes was seizing 
the sceptre of the world of science. The first play of 
the former appeared on the stage in 1629. Year by year 
he rose in excellence, till in 1636 he produced the ' Cid ; ' 
and from that time one masterpiece followed another in 
rapid succession. Descartes published his first work in 
Holland in 1637, in which he laid down those principles 
of metaphysics which were to make his name famous 
in Europe. 

All this, however welcome to France, boded no good 
to Germany. In the old struggles of the sixteenth cen- 
tury, Catholic and Protestant each believed , , _. , ,. 

' go. Richelieu 

himself to be doing the best, not merely for and Ger- 
his own country, but for the world in gene- 
ral. Alva, with his countless executions in the Nether- 
lands, honestly believed that the Netherlands as well as 
Spain would be the better for the rude surgery. The 
English volunteers, who charged home on a hundred 
battle-fields in Europe, believed that they were benefit- 
ing Europe, not England alone. It was time that all 
this should cease, and that the long religious strife 
should have its end. It was well that Richelieu should 
stand forth to teach the world that there were objects 
for a Catholic state to pursue better than slaughtering 
Protestants. But the world was a long way, in the seven- 
teenth century, from the knowledge that the good of one 
nation is the good of all, and in putting off its religious 
partisanship France became terribly hard and selfish in 
its foreign policy. Gustavus had been half a German, 
and had sympathized deeply with Protestant Germany. 
Richelieu had no sympathy with Protestantism, no sym- 
pathy with German nationality. He doubtless had a 

» 70 Wallensteiri s Death ; Treaty of Prague. 1632, 

general belief that the predominance of the House of 
Austria was a common evil for all, but he cared chiefly 
to see Germany too weak to support Spain. He accepted 
the alliance of the League of Heilbronn, but he would 
have been equally ready to accept the alliance of the 
Elector of Bavaria if it would have served him as well 
in his purpose of dividing Germany. 

The plan of Gustavus might seem unsatisfactory to a 

patriotic German, but it was undoubtedly conceived with 

the intention of benefiting Germany. Riche- 

? 7: H i? , lieu had no thought of constituting any new 

policy French. ° ° J 

not European, organization in Germany. He was already 
aiming at the left bank of the Rhine. The 
Elector of Treves, fearing Gustavus, and doubtful of the 
power of Spain to protect him, had called in the French, 
and had established them in his new fortress of Ehren- 
breitstein, which looked down from its height upon the 
low-lying buildings of Coblentz, and guarded the junction 
of the Rhine and the Moselle. The Duke of Lorraine 
had joined Spain, and had intrigued with Gaston. In 
the summer of 1632 he had been compelled by a French 
army to make his submission. The next year he moved 
again, and the French again interfered, and wrested from 
him his capital of Nancy. Richelieu treated the old 
German frontier-land as having no rights against the 
King of France. 

Section II. — Wallensteiri 's Attempt to dictate Peace. 

Already, before the League of Heilbronn was signed, 

the Elector of Saxony was in negotiation with Wallen- 

stein. In June peace was all but concluded 

negotiations between them. The Edict of Restitution 

with Walkn- was to be cancelled. A few places on the 

Item. r 

Baltic coast were to be ceded to Sweden, 

1633- Wallensteiri 's Attempt to dictate Peace. 171 

and a portion at least of the Palatinate was to be restored 
to the son of the Elector Frederick, whose death in the 
preceding winter had removed one of the difficulties in 
the way of an agreement. The precise form in which 
the restitution should take place, however, still remained 
to be settled. 

Such a peace would doubtless have been highly disa- 
greeable to adventurers like Bernhard of Weimar, but it 
would have given the Protestants of Germany all that they 
could reasonably expect to gain, and would have given the 
House of Austria one last chance of taking up the cham- 
pionship of national interests against foreign aggression. 

Such last chances, in real life, are seldom taken hold 
of for any useful purpose. If Ferdinand had had it in 
him to rise up in the position of a national , n 

$ 2. Opposi- 

ruler, he would have been in that position tion to Wai- 
long before. His confessor, Father Lamor- 
main, declared against the concessions which Wallen- 
stein advised, and the word of Father Lamormain had 
always great weight with Ferdinand. 

Even if Wallenstein had been single-minded he would 
have had difficulty in meeting such opposition. But 
Wallenstein was not single-minded. He 
proposed to meet the difficulties which were disapproval 
made to the restitution of the Palatinate by tl0n of ]^ ls 

J proceedings. 

giving the Palatinate, largely increased by 
neighbouring territories, to himself. He would thus have 
a fair recompense for the loss of Mecklenburg, which he 
could no longer hope to regain. He fancied that the solu- 
tion would satisfy everybody. In fact, it displeased 
everybody. Even the Spaniards, who had been on his 
side in 1632 were ahenated by it. They were especially 
jealous of the rise of any strong power near the line of 
march between Italy and the Spanish Netherlands- 

172 Wallensteiri 's Death. Treaty of Prague. 1633. 

The greater the difficulties in Wallenstein's way the 

more determined he was to overcome them. Regarding 

himself, with some justification, as a power 

3 . Wallen- 

stein and the in Germany, he fancied himself able to act 
at the head of his army as if he were himself 
the ruler of an independent state. If the Emperor 
listened to Spain and his confessor in 1633 as he had 
listened to Maximilian and his confessor in 1630, Wal- 
lenstein might step forward and force upon him a wiser 
policy. Before the end of August he had opened a com- 
munication with Oxenstjerna, asking for his assistance 
in effecting a reasonable compromise, whether the Em- 
peror liked it or not. But he had forgotten that such a 
proposal as this can only be accepted where there is 
confidence in him who makes it. In Wallenstein — the 
man of many schemes and many intrigues — no man had 
any confidence whatever. Oxenstjerna cautiously re- 
plied that if Wallenstein meant to join him against the 
Emperor he had better be the first to begin the at- 

Whether Wallenstein seriously meant at this time to 

move against the emperor it is impossible to say. He 

? 5. Was he in loved to enter upon plots in every direction 

without binding himself to any; but he was 

plainly in a dangerous position. How could he impose 

peace upon all parties when no single party trusted him ? 

If he was not trusted, however, he might still make 

himself feared. Throwing himself vigorously 

|ii Heattacks U p n Silesia, he forced the Swedish garri- 

the Saxons. * ° 

sons to surrender, and, presenting himself 
upon the frontiers of Saxony, again offered peace to 
the two northern electors. 

But Wallenstein could not be everywhere. Whilst 
the electors were still hesitating, Bernhard made a dash 

1633- Wallensteiri s Attempt to dictate Peace. 173 

at Ratisbon, and firmly established himself ? 7. Bernhardt 
in the city, within a little distance of the 
Austrian frontier. Wallenstein, turning sharply south- 
ward, stood in the way of his further advance, but he 
did nothing to recover the ground which had been lost. 
He was himself weary of the war. In his first command 
he had aimed at crushing out all opposition in the name 
of the imperial authority. His judgment was too clear 
to allow him to run the old course. He saw plainly 
that strength was now to be gained only by allowing 
each of the opposing forces their full weight. ' If the 
Emperor,' he said, ' were to gain ten victories it would 
do him no good. A single defeat would ruin him.' In 
December he was back again in Bohemia. 

It was a strange, Cassandra-like position, to be wiser 
than all the world, and to be listened to by „ „ ,„ „ 

3 ? 8 Wallen- 

no one ; to suffer the fate of supreme intel- stein's difficul- 
ligence which touches no moral chord and 
awakens no human sympathy. For many months the 
hostile influences had been gaining strength at Vienna. 
There were War-Office officials whose wishes Wallen- 
stein systematically disregarded : Jesuits who objected 
to peace with heretics at all ; friends of the Bavarian 
Maximilian who thought that the country round Ratisbon 
should have been better defended against the enemy ; 
and Spaniards who were tired of hearing that all matters 
of importance were to be settled by Wallenstein alone. 
The Spanish opposition was growing daily. Spain 
now looked to the German branch of the House 01 
Austria to make a fitting return for the 
aid which she had rendered in 1620. i?Spa.m SlU ° a 
Richelieu, having mastered Lorraine, was 
pushing on towards Alsace, and if Spain had good rea- 
sons for objecting to see Wallenstein established in the 

174 Wallensteiri s Death : Treaty of Prague. 1C33. 

Palatinate, she had far better reasons for objecting to 
see France established in Alsace. Yet for all these spe- 
cial Spanish interests Wallenstein cared nothing. His 
aim was to place himself at the head of a German na- 
tional force, and to regard all questions simply from his 
own point of view. If he wished to see the French out 
of Alsace and Lorraine, he wished to see the Spaniards 
out of Alsace and Lorraine as well. 

And, as was often the case with Wallenstein, a per- 
sonal difference arose by the side of the political differ- 
ence. The Emperor's eldest son, Ferdinand, the King 
, _» of Hungary, was married to a Spanish In- 

g 10. The . 

Cardinal fanta, the sister of Philip IV., who had once 

been the promised bride of Charles I. ol 
England. Her brother, another Ferdinand, usually 
known from his rank in Church and State as the Cardi- 
nal-Infant, had recently been appointed Governor of 
the Spanish Netherlands, and was waiting in Italy for 
assistance to enable him to conduct an army through 
Germany to Brussels. That assistance Wallenstein re- 
fused to give. The military reasons which he alleged 
for his refusal may have been good enough, but they 
had a dubious sound in Spanish ears. It looked as if 
he was simply jealous of Spanish influence in Western 

Such were the influences which were brought to bear 

upon the Emperor after Wallenstein's return from Ratis- 

m bon in December. Ferdinand, as usual, 

l 11. The 

Emperor's was distracted between the two courses pro- 
posed. Was he to make the enormous con- 
cessions to the Protestants involved in the plan of 
Wallenstein ; or was he to fight it out with France and 
the Protestants together according to the plan of Spain ? 
To Wallenstein by this time the Emperor's resolutions 

stein and the 

1634. Resistance to Wallenstein' s Plans. 175 

had become almost a matter of indifference. He had 
resolved to force a reasonable peace upon Germany, 
with the Emperor, if it might be so ; without him, if he 
refused his support. 

Wallenstein was well aware that his whole plan de- 
pended on his hold over the army. In January he re- 
ceived assurances from three of his princi- 
pal generals, Piccolomini, Gallas, and Al- g !2. 3 Walle 
dringer, that they were ready to follow him 
wheresoever he might lead them, and he 
was sanguine enough to take these assurances for faf 
more than they were worth. Neither they nor he him- 
self were aware to what lengths he would go in the end. 
For the present it was a mere question of putting 
pressure upon the Emperor to induce him to accept a 
wise and beneficent peace. 

Section III. — Resistance to Wallenstein' s Plans. 
The Spanish ambassador, Ofiate, was ill at ease. 
Wallenstein, he was convinced, was planning something 
desperate. What it was he could hardly , ,.„ , 

r J \ 1. Onate s 

guess; but he was sure that it was some- movements, 
thing most prejudicial to the Catholic religion and the 
united House of Austria. The worst was that Ferdi- 
nand could not be persuaded that there was cause for 
suspicion. " The sick man," said Ofiate, speaking of 
the Emperor, " will die in my arms without my being 
able to help him." 

Such was Onate's feelings toward the end of January. 
Then came information that the case was worse than 
even he had deemed possible. Wallenstein, . „ , „ 

. 2 2- Belief at 

he learned, had been intriguing with the Vienna that 
Bohemian exiles, who had offered, with w ^ I traitor. 
Richelieu's consent, to place upon his head 

176 Wallenstein' s Death : Treaty of Prague. 1634. 

the crown of Bohemia, which had fourteen years before 
been snatched from the unhappy Frederick. In all 
this there was much exaggeration. Though Wallenstein 
had listened to these overtures, it is almost certain that 
he had not accepted them. But neither had he revealed 
them to the government. It was his way to keep in. his 
hands the threads of many intrigues to be used or not to 
be used as occasion might serve. 

Oiiate, naturally enough, believed the worst. And for 

him the worst was the best. He went triumphantly to 

„ Esrgenbere with his news, and then to Fer- 

? 3. OBate . , 

informs Ferdi- dinand. Coming alone, this statement 
might perhaps have been received with 
suspicion. Coming, as it did, after so many evidences 
that the general had been acting in complete indepen- 
dence of the government, it carried conviction with it. 

Ferdinand had long been tossed backwards and for- 
wards by opposing influences. He had given no answer 
j 4. Decision to Wallenstein's communication of the terms 
against mper ° r °f peace arranged with Saxony. The neces- 
Wallenstein. g^y f deciding, he said, would not allow 
him to sleep. It was in his thoughts when he lay down 
and when he arose. Prayers to God to enlighten the 
mind of the Emperor had been offered in the churches of 

All this hesitation was now at an end. Ferdinand 
resolved to continue the war in alliance with Spain, and, 
\ 5. Deter- as a necessary preliminary, to remove Wal- 
displace"' lenstein from his generalship. But it was 
Wailenstem. more easily said than done. A declaration 
was drawn up releasing the army from its obedience to 
Wallenstein, and provisionally appointing Gallas, who 
had by this time given assurances of loyalty, to the chief 
command. It was intended, if circumstances proved 

1634- Resistance to Wallenstein' s Plans- 177 

favourable, to intrust the command ultimately to the 
young King of Hungary. 

The declaration was kept secret for many days. To 
publish it would only be to provoke the rebellion which 
was feared. The first thing- to be done was . m 

§6. The 

to gain over the principal generals. In the Generals 
beginning of February Piccolomini and Aid- game 
ringer expressed their readiness to obey the Emperor 
rather than Wallenstein. Commanders of a secondary 
rank would doubtless find their position more indepen- 
dent under an inexperienced young man like the King 
of Hungary than under the first living strategist. These 
two generals agreed to make themselves masters of Wal- 
lenstein's person and to bring him to Vienna to answer 
the accusations of treason against him. 

For Onate this was not enough. It would be easier, 
he said, to kill the general than to carry him off. The 
event proved that he was right. On Feb- „ 

, . . 2 7- Attempt 

ruary 7, Aldnnger and Piccolomini set off to seize 
for Pilsen with the intention of capturing 
Wallenstein. But they found the garrison faithful to its 
general, and they did not even venture to make the 

Wallenstein's success depended on his chance of 
carrying with him the lower ranks of the army. On the 
loth he summoned the colonels round him . 

j . . . . , . ? 8. Wallen- 

and assured them that he would stand se- stein at 
curity for money which they had advanced 
in raising their regiments, the repayment of which had 
been called in question. Having thus won them to a 
favourable mood, he told them that it had been falsely 
stated that he wished to change his religion and attack 
the Emperor. On the contrary, he was anxious to con- 
clude a peace which would benefit the Emperor and all 

178 Wallenstein 's Death : Treaty of Prague. 1634. 

who were concerned. As, however, certain persons at 
Court had objected to it, he wished to ask the opinion of 
the army on its terms. But he must first of all know 
whether they were ready to support him, as he knew that 
there was an intention to put a disgrace upon him. 

It was not the first time that Wallenstein had appealed 
to the colonels. A month before, when the news had 
. „, . come of the alienation of the Court, he had 

( 9. The colo- 
nels engage to induced them to sign an acknowledgment 

! that they would stand by him, from which 

all reference to the possibility of his dismissal was ex- 
pressly excluded. They now, on February 20, signed a 
fresh agreement, in which they engaged to defend him 
against the machinations of his enemies, upon his pro- 
mising to undertake nothing against the Emperor or the 
Catholic religion. 

Section IV. — Assassination of Wallenstein. 

Wallenstein thus hoped, with the help of the army, to 

force the Emperor's hand, and to obtain his signature to 

„, the peace. Of the co-operation of the Elec- 
ts 1. The gar- 
rison of Prague tor of Saxony he was was already secure ; 
abandons him. .. .... - — , i_ij 

and since the beginning of February he had 
been pressing Oxenstjerna and Bernhard to come to his 
aid. If all the armies in the field declared for peace, 
Ferdinand would be compelled to abandon the Spaniards 
and to accept the offered terms. Without some such 
hazardous venture, Wallenstein would be checkmated by 
Oiiate. The Spaniard had been unceasingly busy dur- 
ing these weeks of intrigue. Spanish gold was provided 
to content the colonels for their advances, and hopes of 
promotion were scattered broadcast amongst them. 
Two other of the principal generals had gone over to the 
Court, and on February 18, the day before the meeting 

1634- Assassination of Wallenstein. 179 

at Pilsen, a second declaration had been issued accusing 
Wallenstein of treason, and formally depriving him of 
the command. Wallenstein, before this declaration 
reached him, had already appointed a meeting of large 
masses of troops to take place on the White Hill before 
Prague on the 21st, where he hoped to make his inten- 
tions more generally known. But he had miscalculated 
the devotion of the army to his person. The garrison 
of Prague refused to obey his orders. Soldiers and citi- 
zens alike declared for the Emperor. He was obliged 
to retrace his steps. " I had peace in my hands," he 
said. Then he added, " God is righteous," as if still 
counting on the aid of Heaven in so good a work. 

He did not yet despair. He ordered the colonels to 
meet him at Eger, assuring them that all that he was 
doing was for the Emperor's good. He had now at last 
hopes of other assistance. Oxenstjerna, indeed, ever 
cautious, still refused to do anything for him till he had 
positively declared against the Emperor. 
Bernhard, equally prudent for some time, standing with 
had been carried away by the news, which 
reached him on the 21st, of the meeting at Pilsen, and 
the Emperor's denouncement of the general. Though 
he was still suspicious, he moved in the direction of 

On the 24th Wallenstein entered Eger. In what pre- 
cise way he meant to escape from the labyrinth in which 
he was, or whether he had still any clear . 

. ? 3- His 

conception of the course before him, it is arrival at 
impossible to say. But Arnim was ex- ger " 
pected at Eger, as well as Bernhard, and it may be that 
Wallenstein fancied still that he could gather all the 
armies of Germany into his hands, to defend the peace 
which he was ready to make. The great scheme, how- 

180 Wallensteiii 's Death : Treaty of Prague. 1C34. 

ever, whatever it was, was doomed to failure. Amongst 
the officers who accompanied him was a Colonel Butler, 
an Irish Catholic, who had no fancy for such dealings 
with Swedish and Saxon heretics. Already he had re- 
ceived orders from Piccolomini to bring in Wallensteiii 
dead or alive No official instructions had been given 
to Piccolomini. But the thought was certain to arise in 
the minds of all who retained their loyalty to the Em- 
peror. A general who attempts to force his sovereign to 
a certain political course with the help of the enemy is 
placed, by that very fact, beyond the pale of law. 

The actual decision did not lie with Butler. The for- 
tress was in the hands of two Scotch officers, Leslie and 
Gordon. As Protestants, they might have 

§ 4. Wallen- « 

stein's assassi- been expected to feel some sympathy with 
Wallenstein. But the sentiment of military 
honour prevailed. On the morning of the 25th they 
were called upon by one of the general's confederates 
to take orders from Wallenstein alone. " I have sworn 
to obey the Emperor," answered Gordon, at last, "and 
who shall release me from my oath?' " You, gentle- 
men," was the reply, " are strangers in the Empire. 
What have you to do with the Empire?" Such argu- 
ments were addressed to deaf ears. That afternoon 
Butler, Leslie, and Gordon consulted together. Leslie, 
usually a silent, reserved man, was the first to speak. 
" Let us kill the traitors," he said. That evening Wallen- 
stein's chief supporters were butchered at a banquet. 
Then there was a short and sharp discussion whether 
Wallenstcin's life should be spared. Bernhard's troops 
were known to be approaching, and the conspirators 
dared not leave a chance of escape open. An Irish 
captain, Devereux by name, was selected to do the deed. 
Followed by a few soldiers, he burst into the room *,vhere 

1634- Assassination of Wallenstein. 181 

Wallenstein was preparing for rest. " Scoundrel and 
traitor," were the words which he flung at Devereux as 
he entered. Then, stretching out his arms, he received 
the fatal blow in his breast. The busy brain of the 
great calculator was still forever. 

The attempt to snatch at a wise and beneficent peace 
by mingled force and intrigue had failed. Other generals 
— Caesar, Cromwell, Napoleon — have sue- , 

. \ 5- Rea- 

ceeded to supreme power with the support son of his 
of an armed force. But they did so by 
placing themselves at the head of the civil institutions of 
their respective countries, and by making themselves 
the organs of a strong national policy. Wallenstein 
stood alone in attempting to guide the political destinies 
of a people, while remaining a soldier and nothing 
more. The plan was doomed to failure, and is only ex- 
cusable on the ground that there were no national in- 
stitutions at the head of which Wallenstein could place 
himself; not even a chance of creating such institutions 

In spite of all his faults, Germany turns ever to Wal- 
lenstein as she turns to no other amongst the leaders of 
the Thirty Years' War. From amidst the 
divisions and weaknesses of his native parison 
country, a great poet enshrined his memory Gustavus 
in a succession of noble dramas. Such a "4 Wallen - 


faithfulness is not without a reason. Gus- 
tavus's was a higher nature than Wallenstein's. Some 
of his work, at least the rescue of German Protestantism 
from oppression, remained imperishable, whilst Wallen- 
stein's military and political success vanished into noth- 
ingness. But Gustavus was a hero not of Germany as a 
nation, but of European Protestantism. His Corpus 
Evangelicorum was at the, best a choice of evils to a 

1 82 Wdllcnstcui 's Death : Treaty of Prague. 1634. 

German. Wallenstein's wildest schemes, impossible of 
execution as they were by military violence, were always 
built upon the foundation of German unity. In the way 
in which he walked that unity was doubtless unattain- 
able. To combine devotion to Ferdinand with religious 
liberty was as hopeless a conception as it was to burst 
all bonds of political authority on the chance that a new 
and better world would spring into being out of the dis- 
cipline of the camp. But during the long dreary years 
of confusion which were to follow, it was something to 
think of the last supremely able man whose life had 
been spent in battling against the great evils of the land, 
against the spirit of religious intolerance, and the spirit 
of division. 

Section V. — Imperialist Victories and the Treaty of 
For the moment, the House of Austria seemed to have 
gained everything by the execution or the murder of Wal 
lenstein, whichever we may choose to call it. The 
army was reorganized and placed under the command 
of the Emperor's son, the King of Hungary. The Car- 
dinal-Infant, now eagerly welcomed, was preparing to 
join him through Tyrol. And while on the 
paign of one side there was union and resolution, 

there was division and hesitation on the 
other. The Elector of Saxony stood aloof from the 
League of Heilbronn, weakly hoping that the terms of 
peace which had been offered him by Wallenstein would 
be confirmed by the Emperor now that Wallenstein was 
gone. Even amongst those who remained under arms 
there was no unity of purpose. Bernhard, the daring 
and impetuous, was not of one mind with the cautious 
Horn, who commanded the Swedish forces, and both 

1634- Imperialist Victories : Treaty of Prague. 183 

agreed in thinking Oxenstjerna remiss because he did 
not supply them with more money than he was able to 

As might have been expected under these circum- 
stances, the imperials made rapid progress. Ratisbon, 
the prize of Bernhard the year before, sur- . ^ 
rendered to the king of Hungary in July. Battle of 
Then Donauwcirth was stormed, and siege r logeffi " 
was laid to Nordlingen. On September 2 the Cardinal- 
Infant came up with 15,000 men. The enemy watched 
the siege with a force far inferior in numbers. Bernhard 
was eager to put all to the test of battle. Horn recom- 
mended caution in vain. Against his better judgment 
he consented to fight. On September 6 the attack was 
made. By the end of the day Horn was a prisoner, 
and Bernhard was in full retreat, leaving 10,000 of his 
men dead upon the field, and 6,ooo prisoners in the 
hands of the enemy, whilst the imperialists lost only 
1,200 men. 

Since the day of Breitenfeld, three years before, there 
had been no such battle fought as this of Nordlingen. 
As Breitenfeld had recovered the Protestant bishoprics 
of the north, Nordlingen recovered the Catholic bishop- 
rics of the south. Bernhardt Duchy of Franconia dis- 
appeared in a moment under the blow. Before the spring 
of 1635 came, the whole of South Germany, 

, ? 3- Impot- 

with the exception of one or two fortified ant results 
costs, was in the hands of the imperial com- r m ! • 
manders. The Cardinal-Infant was able to pursue his 
way to Brussels, with the assurance that he had done 
a good stroke of work on the way. 

The victories of mere force are never fruitful of good. 
As it had been after the successes of Tilly in 1622, and 
the successes of Wallenstein in 1626 and 1627, so it 

184 Wallenstehi s Death : Treaty 0/ Prague. 1635. 
was now with the successes of the King of 

g 4. French ° 

intervention. Hungary in 1634 and 1635. The imperialist 
armies had gained victories, and had taken cities. But 
the Emperor was none the nearer to the confidence of 
Germans. An alienated people, crushed by military 
force, served merely as a bait to tempt foreign aggression, 
and to make the way easy before it. After 1622, the 
King of Denmark had been called in. After 1627, an 
appeal was made to the King of Sweden. After 1634, 
Richelieu found his opportunity. The bonds between 
France and the mutilated League of Heiibronn were 
drawn more closely. German troops were to be taken 
into French pay, and the empty coffers of the League 
were filled with French livres. He who holds the purse 
holds the sceptre, and the princes of Southern and 
Western Germany, whether they wished it or not, were 
reduced to the position of satellites revolving round the 
central orb at Paris. 

Nowhere was the disgrace of submitting to French in- 
tervention felt so deeply as at Dresden. The battle of 
Nordlingen had cut short any hopes which 
Peace of John George might have entertained of ob- 

taining that which Wallenstein would wil- 
lingly have granted him. But, on the other hand, Fer- 
dinand had learned something from experience. He 
would allow the Edict of Restitution to fall, though he 
was resolved not to make the sacrifice in so many words. 
But he refused to replace the Empire in the condition 
in which it had been before the war. The year 1627 was 
to be chosen as the starting point for the new arrange- 
ment. The greater part of the northern bishoprics would 
thus be saved to Protestantism. But Halberstadt would 
remain in the hands of a Catholic bishop, and the Pa- 
latinate would be lost to Protestantism forever. Lusatia, 

1635- Imperialist Victories : Treaty of Prague. 185 

which had been held in the hands of the Elector of 
Saxony for his expenses in the war of 1620, was to be 
ceded to him permanently, and Protestantism in Silesia 
was to be placed under the guarantee of the Emperor. 
Finally, Lutheranism alone was still reckoned as the 
privileged religion, so that Hesse Cassel and the other 
Calvinist states gained no security at all. On May 30, 
1635, a treaty embodying these arrangements was signed 
at Prague by the representatives of the Emperor and 
the Elector of Saxony. It was intended not to be a 
separate treaty, but to be the starting point of a general 
pacification. Most of the princes and towns so accepted, 
it, after more or less delay, and acknowledged the su- 
premacy of the Emperor on its conditions. Yerit was 
not in the nature of things that it should put an end to 
the war. It was not an agreement which any one was 
likely to be enthusiastic about. The ties which bound 
Ferdinand to his Protestant subjects had been rudely 
broken, and the solemn promise to forget and forgive 
could not weld the nation into that unity of heart and spirit 
which was needed to resist the foreigner. A Protestant 
of the north might reasonably come to the conclusion 
that the price to be paid to the Swede and the French- 
man for the vindication of the rights of the southern 
Protestants was too high to make it prudent for him to 
continue the struggle against the Emperor. But it was 
hardly likely that he would be inclined to fight very 
vigorously for the Emperor on such terms. 

If the treaty gave no great encouragement to anyone 
who was comprehended by it, it threw still further into 
the arms of the enemy those who were ex- g 6. it fails in 
cepted from its benefits. The leading mem- |ra"ac«;pf- en * 
bers of the League of Heilbronn were ex- ance - 
cepted from the general amnesty, though hopes of better 

1 86 Wallensteiri 's Death : Treaty of Prague. 1635. 

treatment were held out to them if they made their sub- 
mission. The Landgrave of Hesse Cassel was shut out 
as a Calvinist. Besides such as nourished legitimate 
grievances, there were others who, like Bernhard, were 
bent upon carving out a fortune for themselves, or who 
had so blended in their own minds consideration for the 
public good as to lose all sense of any distinction be- 
tween the two. 

There was no lack here of materials for a long and 
terrible struggle. But there was no longer any noble 
aim in view on either side. The ideal of 
tioii ofthe'war" Ferdinand and Maximilian was gone. The 
Church was not to recover its lost property. 
The Empire was not to recover its lost dignity. The ideal 
of Gustavus of a Protestant political body was equally 
gone. Even the ideal of Wallenstein, that unity might 
be founded on an army, had vanished. From henceforth 
French and Swedes on the one side, Austrians and Span 
iards on the other, were busily engaged in riving at the 
corpse of the dead Empire. The great quarrel of princi- 
ple had merged into a mere quarrel between the Houses 
of Austria and Bourbon, in which the shred of principle 
which still remained in the question of the rights of the 
southern Protestants was almost entirely disregarded. 

Horrible as the war had been from its commencement, 
it was every day assuming a more horrible character. 
On both sides all traces of discipline had vanished in the 
dealings of the armies with the inhabitants of the coun- 
tries in which they were quartered. Sol- 
of Germany" diers treated men and women as none but 
the vilest of mankind would now treat 
brute beasts. ' He who had money,' says a contempo- 
rary, 'was their enemy. He who had none was tor- 
tured because he had it not.' Outrages of unspeaka- 

1636. Imperialist Victories : Treaty of Prague. 187 

ble atrocity were committed everywhere. Human be- 
ings were driven naked into the streets, their flesh 
pierced with needles, or cut to the bone with saws. 
Others were scalded with boiling water, or hunted with 
fierce dogs. The horrors of a town taken by storm 
were repeated every day in the open country. Even 
apart from its excesses, the war itself was terrible 
enough. When Augsburg was besieged by the impe-" 
rialists, after their victory at Niirdlingen, it contained an 
industrious population of 70,000 souls. After a siege of 
seven months, 10,000 living beings, wan and haggard 
with famine, remained to open the gates to the conquer- 
ors, and the great commercial city of the Fuggers dwin- 
dled down into a country town. 

How is it possible to bring such scenes before our eyes 
in their ghastly reality ? Let us turn for the 
moment to some notes taken by the com- g 9 . Notes of 
panion of an English ambassador who tra^nlr 511 
passed through the country in 1636. As the 
party were towed up the Rhine from Cologne, on the 
track so well known to the modern tourist, they passed 
" by many villages pillaged and shot down." Further 
on, a French garrison was in Ehrenbreitstein, firing down 
upon Coblentz, which had just been taken by the impe- 
rialists. " They in the town, if they do but look out of 
their windows, have a bullet presently presented at their 
head." More to the south, things grew worse. At Bac- 
harach, " the poor people are found dead with grass in 
their mouths." At Rudesheim, many persons were 
" praying where dead bones were in a little old house ; 
and here his Excellency gave some relief to the poor, 
which were almost starved, as it appeared by the vio- 
lence they used to get it from one another." At Mentz, 
the ambassador was obliged to remain "on shipboard. 

1 88 Wallensteiri 's Death : Treaty of Prague. 1635. 

for there was nothing to relieve us, since it was taken by 
the King of Sweden, and miserably battered. . . . Here, 
likewise, the poor people were almost starved, and those 
that could relieve others before now humbly begged 
to be relieved ; and after supper all had relief sent from 
the ship ashore, at the sight of which they strove so vio- 
lently that some of them fell into the Rhine, and were 
like to have been drowned." Up the Main, again, " all 
the towns, villages, and castles be battered, pillaged, or 
burnt." After leaving Wurzburg, the ambassador's train 
came to plundered villages, and then to Neustadt, 
"which hath been a fair city, though now pillaged and 
burnt miserably." Poor children were " sitting at their 
doors almost starved to death," his Excellency giving 
them food and leaving money with their parents to 
help them, if but for a time. In the Upper Palatinate, 
they passed "by churches demolished to the ground, 
and through woods in danger, understanding that Croats 
were lying hereabout." Further on they stayed for din- 
ner at a poor little village " which hath been pillaged 
eight-and-twenty times in two years, and twice in one 
day." And so on, and so on. The corner of the veil is 
lifted up in the pages of the old book, and the rest is 
left to the imagination to picture forth, as best it may, 
the misery behind. After reading the sober narrative, 
we shall perhaps not be inclined to be so very hard upon 
the Elector of Saxony for making peace at Prague. 



Section I. — Often Intervention of France. 

The peacemakers of Prague hoped to restore the Em- 
pire to its old form. But this could not be. Things done 
cannot pass away as though they had never 
been. I erdinand's attempt to gain a par- test-autism 
tizan's advantage for his religion by availing not yet out 

° ° * ° -of danger. 

himself uf legal forms had given rise to a 
general distrust Nations and governments, like indi- 
vidual men, are "tied and bound by the chain of their 
sins," from which they can be freed only when a new 
spirit is wreathed into them. Unsatisfactory as the ter- 
ritorial airangements of the peace were, the entire ab- 
sence ot *ny constitutional reform in connexion with the 
peace was more unsatisfactory stili. The majority in the 
two Upper Houses of the Diet was still Catholic; the 
Imperial Council was still altogether Catholic. It was 
possible that the Diet and Council, under the teaching 
of exper«mce, might refrain from pushing their preten- 
sions as far as they had pushed them before ; but a 
government which refrains from carrying out its princi- 
ples from motives of prudence cannot inspire confidence. 
A strong central power would never arise in such a way, 
and a strong central power to defend Germany against 
foreign invasion was the especial need of the hour. 
Jui the failure of the Elector of Saxony to obtain some 


tqo The Preponderance of France. 1&35' 

of the most reasonable of the Protestant demands lay the 
„,, best excuse of men like Bernhard of Saxe- 

jj 2. The 

allies of Weimar and William of Hesse Cassel for 

refusing the terms of accommodation of- 
fered. Largely as personal ambition and greed of ter- 
ritory found a place in the motives of these men, it is not 
absolutely necessary to assert that their religious enthu- 
siasm was nothing more than mere hypocrisy. They 
raised the war-cry of "God with us" before rushing to 
the storm of a city doomed to massacre and pilllage ; 
they set apart days for prayer and devotion when battle 
was at hand — veiling, perhaps, from their own eyes the 
hideous misery which they were spreading around, in 
contemplation of the loftiness of their aim : for, in all but 
the most vile, there is a natural tendency to shrink from 
contemplating the lower motives of action, and to fix the 
eyes solely on the higher. But the ardour inspired by 
a military career, and the mere love of fighting for its 
own sake, must have counted for much ; and the refusal 
to submit to a domination which had been so harshly 
used soon grew into a restless disdain of all authority 
whatever. The nobler motives which had imparted a 
glow to the work of Tilly and Gustavus, and which even 
lit up the profound selfishness of Wallenstein, flickered 
and died away, till the fatal disruption of the Empire 
was accomplished amidst the strivings and passions of 
heartless and unprincipled men. 

The work of riving Germany in pieces was not accom- 
plished by Germans alone. As in nature a living or- 
ganism which has become unhealthy and 
intervention! corrupt is seized upon by the lower forms of 
animal life, a nation divided amongst itself, 
and devoid of a sense of life within it higher than the 
aims of parties and individuals, becomes the prey of 

1 635. Open Intervention of France. 191 

neighbouring nations, which would not have ventured to 
meddle with it in the days of its strength. The carcase 
was there, and the eagles were gathered together. The 
gathering of Wallenstein's army in 1632, the overthrow 
of Wallenstein in 1634, had alike been made possible by 
the free use of Spanish gold. The victory of Nordlingen 
had been owing to the aid of Spanish troops ; and the 
aim of Spain was not the greatness or peace of Germany, 
but at the best the greatness of the House of Austria in 
Germany ; at the worst, the maintenance of the old sys- 
tem of intolerance and unthinking obedience, which 
had been the ruin of Germany. With Spain for an ally, 
France was a necessary enemy. The strife for supreme 
power between the two representative states of the old 
system and the new could not long be delayed, and the 
German parties would be dragged, consciously or uncon- 
sciously, in their wake. If Bernhard became a tool of 
Richelieu, Ferdinand became a tool of Spain. 

In this phase of the war Protestantism and Catholicism, 
tolerance and intolerance, ceased to be the immediate 
objects of the strife. The possession of Al- 
sace and Lorraine rose into primary impor- and Lor- 
tance, not because, as in our own days, 
Germany needed a bulwark against France, or France 
needed a bulwark against Germany, but because Ger- 
many was not strong enough to prevent these territories 
from becoming the highway of intercourse between 
Spain and the Spanish Netherlands. The command of 
the sea was in the hands of the Dutch, and the valley 
of the Upper Rhine was the artery through which the 
life blood of the Spanish monarchy flowed. If Spain ot 
the Emperor, the friend of Spain, could hold that val- 
ley, men and munitions of warfare would flow freely to 
the Netherlands to support the Cardinal-Infant in his 

192 The Preponderance of Franct. 1635. 

struggle with the Dutch. If Richelieu could lay his hand 
heavily upon it, he had seized his enemy by the throat, 
and could choke him as he lay. 

After the battle of Nordlingen, Richelieu's first demand 
l 5. Riche- from Oxenstjerna as the price of his assist- 
fonresses i*n ance had been the strong places held by 
Aisace. Swedish garrisons in Alsace. As soon as 

he had them safely under his control, he felt himself 
strong enough to declare war openly against Spain. 

On May 19, eleven days before peace was agreed upon 
at Prague, the declaration of war was delivered at Brus- 
sels by a French herald. To the astonish- 
between" ment of all, France was able to place in the 
France and field what was then considered the enor- 


mous number of 132,000 men. One army 
was to drive the Spaniards out of the Milanese, and to 
set free the Italian princes. Another was to defend 
Lorraine whilst Bernhard crossed the Rhine and carried 
on war in Germany. The main force was to be thrown 
upon the Spanish Netherlands, and, after effecting a 
junction with the Prince of Orange, was to strike directly 
at Brussels. 

Section II. — Spanish Successes. 
Precisely in the most ambitious part of his programme 
Richelieu failed most signally. The junction with the 
Dutch was effected without difficulty ; but 

j! 1. Failure 

of the French the hoped-for instrument of success proved 

attack on the ,, ... .... .^, 

Nether- the parent of disaster. Whatever r lemings 

lands. anc j B ra banters might think of Spain, they 

soon made it plain that they would have nothing to 
do with the Dutch. A national enthusiasm against Pro- 
testant aggression from the north made defence easy, 
and the French army had to return completely unsuc- 

1636. Spanish Successes. 193 

cessful. Failure, too, was reported from other quarters. 
The French armies had no experience of war on a large 
scale, and no military leader of eminent ability had yet 
appeared to command them. The Italian campaign 
came to nothing, and it was only by a supreme effort of 
military skill that Bernhard, driven to retreat, preserved 
his army from complete destruction. 

In 1636 France was invaded. The Cardinal-Infant 
crossed the Somme, took Corbie, and advanced to the 
banks of the Oise. All Paris was in com- „ 

3 a. Spanish 

motion. An immediate siege was expected, invasion of 
and inquiry was anxiously made into the 
state of the defences. Then Richelieu, coming out of his 
seclusion, threw himself upon the nation. He appealed 
to the great legal, ecclesiastical, and commercial cor- 
porations of Paris, and he did not appeal in vain. 
Money, voluntarily offered, came pouring into the trea- 
sury for the payment of the troops. Those who had no 
money gave themselves eagerly for military service. It 
was remarked that Paris, so fanatically Catholic in the 
days of St. Bartholomew and the League, entrusted its 
defence to the Protestant marshal La Force, whose repu- 
tation for integrity inspired universal confidence. 

The resistance undertaken in such a spirit in Paris 
was imitated by the other towns of the kingdom. Even 

the nobility, jealous as they were of the . „,, 

$ 3- The in- 
Cardinal, forgot their grievances as an aris- vaders driven 

tocracy in their duties as Frenchmen. 

Their devotion was not put to the test of action. The 

invaders, frightened at the unanimity opposed to them, 

hesitated and turned back. In September, Lewis took 

the field in person. In November he appeared before 

Corbie ; and the last days of the year saw the fortress 

ag^in in the keeping of a French garrison. The war, 

194 7he Preponderance of France. 1637. 

which was devastating Germany, was averted from 
France by the union produced by the mild tolerance of 

In Germany, too, affairs had taken a turn. The Elec- 
tor of Saxony had hoped to drive the Swedes across the 
sea ; but a victory gained on October 4, at Wittstock, by 
l Battle of th Q Swedish general, Baner, the ablest 
Wittstock. f the successors of Gustavus, frustrated his 
intentions. Henceforward North Germany was de- 
livered over to a desolation with which even the misery 
inflicted by Wallenstein affords no parallel. 

Amidst these scenes of failure and misfortune the man 
whose policy had been mainly responsible for the mise- 
a s Death of r i es °f bis country closed his eyes for ever. 
Ferdinand II. On February 1 5, 1637, Ferdinand II. died 
at Vienna. Shortly before his death the King of Hun- 
gary had been elected King of the Romans, and he now, 
by his father's death, became the Emperor Ferdinand 

The new Emperor had no vices. He did not even 
care, as his father did, for hunting and music. When 
I 6. Ferdi- tne battle of Nordlingen was won under his 
nandin. command he was praying in his tent whilst 

his soldiers were fighting. He sometimes took upon 
himself to give military orders, but the handwriting in 
which they were conveyed was such an abominable 
scrawl that they only served to enable his generals to ex- 
cuse their defeats by the impossibility of reading their in- 
structions. His great passion was for keeping strict ac- 
counts. Even the Jesuits, it is said, found out that, de- 
voted as he was to his religion, he had a sharp eye for 
his expenditure. One day they complained that some 
tolls bequeathed to them by his father had not been made 
over to them, and represented the value of the legacy as 

1638. The Struggle for Alsace. 195 

\ mere trifle of 500 florins a year. The Emperor at once 
gave them an order upon the treasury for the yearly 
payment of the sum named, and took possession of 
the tolls for the maintenance of the fortifications of 
Vienna. The income thus obtained is said to have been 
no less than 12,000 florins a year. 

Such a man was not likely to rescue the Empire from 
its miseries. The first year of his reign, however, was 
marked by a gleam of good fortune. Baner g 7 . cam 
lost all that he had gained at Wittstock, and P ai s n of l6 "- 
was driven back to the shores of the Baltic. On the 
western frontier the imperialists were equally successful. 
vVurtemberg accepted the Peace of Prague, and sub- 
mitted to the Emperor. A more general peace was 
talked of. But till Alsace was secured to one side or the 
other no peace was possible. 

Section III. — The Struggle for Alsace. 
The year 1638 was to decide the question. Bernhard 
was looking to the Austrian lands in Alsace and the 
Breisgau as a compensation for his lost , „,, 
duchy of Franconia. In February he was capture of 
besieging Rheinfelden. Driven off by the 
imperialists on the 26th, he re-appeared unexpectedly on 
March 3, taking the enemy by surprise. They had not 
even sufficient powder with them to load their guns, and 
the victory of Rheinfelden was the result. On the 24th 
Rheinfelden itself surrendered. Freiburg followed its 
example on April 22, and Bernhard proceeded to under- 
take the siege of Breisach, the great fortress which do- 
mineered over the whole valley of the Upper Rhine 
Small as his force was, he succeeded, by a series of rapid 
movements, in beating off every attempt to introduce sup- 
plies, and on December 19 he entered the place in triumph 

196 The Preponderance of France. 1638. 

The campaign of 163S was the turning point in the 
\ 2. The struggle between France and the united 

turning point House of Austria. A vantage ground was 
in the w^r. then won which was never lost 

Bernhard himself, however, was loth to realize the 
world-wide importance of the events in which he had 
played his part. He fancied that he had been fighting 
for his own, and he claimed the lands which he had 
conquered for himself. He received the homage of the 
_ , , citizens of Breisach in his own name. He 

ff 3. xSernhard 

wishes to keep celebrated a Lutheran thanksgiving festival 
in the cathedral. But the French Govern- 
ment looked upon the rise of an independent German 
principality in Alsace with as little pleasure as the 
Spanish government had contemplated the prospect of 
the establishment of Wallenstein in the Palatinate. They 
ordered Bernhard to place his conquests under the orders 
of the King of France. 

Strange as it may seem, the man who had done so 
much to tear in pieces the Empire believed, 

(J 4. Refuses . . 

to dismember in a sort of way, in the Empire still. " I will 
mpire. never su ffer," he said, in reply to the French 
demands, " that men can truly reproach me with being 
the first to dismember the Empire." 

The next year he crossed the Rhine with the most 
brilliant expectations. Baner had recovered strength, 
1 5. Death of an d was pushing on through North Germany 
Jjemhard. j nto Bohemia. Bernhard hoped that he too 

might strike a blow which would force on a peace on his 
own conditions. But his greatest achievement, the cap- 
ture of Breisach, was also his last. A fatal disease seized 
upon him when he had hardly entered upon the cam- 
paign. On July 8, 1639, he died. 

There was no longer any question of the ownership of 

1639- French Successes. 197 

the fortresses in Alsace and the Breisgau. French gov- 
ernors entered into possession. A French . 

i 6. Alsace in 

general took the command of Bernhard's French 
army. For the next two or three years Bern- ^ osscs "'" 
hard's old troops fought up and down Germany in con- 
junction with Baner, not without success, but without 
any decisive victory. The French soldiers were becom- 
ing, like the Germans, inured to war. The lands on the 
Rhine were not easily to be wrenched out of the strong 
hands which had grasped them. 

Section IV. — French Successes. 

Richelieu had other successes to count besides these 
victories on the Rhine. In 1637 the Spaniards drove 
out of Turin the Duchess-Regent Chris- » % State oi 
tiha, the mother of the young Duke of Ual y- 
Savoy. She was a sister of the King of France ; and, 
even if that had not been the case, the enemy of Spain 
was, in the nature of the case, the friend of France. 
In 1640 she re-entered her capital with French assist- 

At sea, too, where Spain, though unable to hold its 
own against the Dutch, had long continued to be superior 
to France, the supremacy of Spain was . 

\ 2. Maritime 

coming to an end. During the whole course warfare. 
of his ministry, Richelieu had paid special attention to 
the encouragement of commerce and the formation of 
a navy. Troops could no longer be despatched with 
safety to Italy from the coasts of Spain. In 1638 a 
French squadron burnt Spanish galleys in the Bay of 

In 1639 a great Spanish fleet on its way to the Nether- 
lands was strong enough to escape the French, who were 
watching to intercept it. It saned uf the English Chan- 

198 The Preponderance of France. 1639. 

nel with the not distant goal of the Flemish 
Spanish L ,«t ports almost in view. But the huge gal- 
ls the leons were ill-manned and ill-found. They 

Downs. * 

were still less able to resist the lighter, 
well-equipped vessels of the Dutch fleet, which was 
waiting to intercept them, than the Armada had been 
able to resist Drake and Raleigh fifty-one years before. 
The Spanish commander sought refuge in the Downs, 
under the protection of the neutral flag of England. 

The French ambassador pleaded hard with the king 
of England to allow the Dutch to follow up their success. 

The Spanish ambassador pleaded hard with 

2 4. Destruc- ... . . , , . , 

tion of the him for protection to those who had taken 
refuge on his shores. Charles saw in the 
occurrence an opportunity to make a bargain with one 
side or the other. He offered to abandon the Spaniards 
if the French would agree to restore his nephew, Charles 
Lewis, the son of his sister Elizabeth, to his inheritance 
in the Palatinate. He offered to protect the Spaniards 
if Spain would pay him the large sum which he would 
want for the armaments needed to bid defiance to 
France. Richelieu had no intention of completing the 
bargain offered to him. He deluded Charles with nego- 
tiations, whilst the Dutch admiral treated the English 
neutrality with scorn. He dashed amongst the tall 
Spanish ships as they lay anchored in the Downs : some 
he sank, some he set on fire. Eleven of the galleons 
were soon destroyed. The remainder took advantage 
of a thick fog, slipped across the Straits, and placed 
themselves in safety undertheguns of Dunkirk. Never 
again did such a fleet as this venture to leave the Spanish 
coast for the harbours of Flanders. The injury to Spain 
went far beyond the actual loss. Coming, as the blow 
did, within a few months after the surrender of Breisach, 

1659- French Successes. 199 

it all but severed the connexion for military purposes 
between Brussels and Madrid. 

Charles at first took no umbrage at the insult. He 
still hoped that Richelieu would forward his nephew's 
interests, and he even expected that Charles . 

g 5. France 

Lewis would be placed by the King of and England. 
France in command of the army which had been under 
Bernhard's orders. But Richelieu was in no mood to 
place a German at the head of these well-trained vete- 
rans, and the proposal was definitively rejected. The 
King of England, dissatisfied at this repulse, inclined 
once more to the side of Spain. But Richelieu found a 
way to prevent Spain from securing even what assistance 
it was in the power of a king so unpopular as Charles to 
render. It was easy to enter into communication with 
Charles's domestic enemies. His troubles, indeed, were 
mostly of his own making, and he would doubtless have 
lost his throne whether Richelieu had stirred the fire or 
not. But the French minister contributed all that was 
in his power to make the confusion greater, and en- 
couraged, as far as possible, the resistance which had 
already broken out in Scotland, and which was threaten- 
ing to break out in England. 

The failure of 1636 had been fully redeemed. No 
longer attacking any one of the masses of which the 
Spanish monarchy was composed, Riche- . , T 

. 2 "■ Insur- 

lieu placed his hands upon the lines of rection in 
communication between them. He made 
his presence felt not at Madrid, at Brussels, at Milan, or 
at Naples, but in Alsace, in the Mediterranean, in the 
English Channel. The effect was as complete as is the 
effect of snapping the wire of a telegraph. At once the 
Peninsula startled Europe by showing signs of dissolu- 
tion. Jn 1639 the Catalonians had manfully defended 

fcoo The Preponderance of France. 1041. 

Roussillon against a French invasion. In 1640 they 
were prepared to fight with equal vigour. But the 
Spanish Government, in its desperate straits, was not 
content to leave them to combat in their own way, after 
the irregular fashion which befitted mountaineers. Or- 
ders were issued commanding all men capable of fighting 
to arm themselves for the war, all women to bear food 
and supplies for the army on their backs. A royal edict 
followed, threatening those who showed themselves re- 
miss with imprisonment and the confiscation of their 

The cord which bound the hearts of Spaniards to their 

king was a strong one ; but it snapped at last. It was 

not by threats that Richelieu had defended France in 

1636. The old traditions of provincial independence 

~ , were strong in Catalonia, and the Catalans 

\ 7. Break-up , 

of the Spanish were soon in full revolt. Who were they, to 
be driven to the combat by menaces, as the 
Persian slaves had been driven on at Thermopylae by 
the blows of their masters' officers? 

Equally alarming was the news which reached Madrid 
from the other side of the Peninsula. Ever since the 
„ . days of Philip II. Portugal had formed an 

pendence of integral part of the Spanish monarchy. In 
December 1640 Portugal renounced its alle- 
giance, and reappeared amongst European States under 
a sovereign of the House of Braganza. 

Everything prospered in Richelieu's hands. In 1641 
a fresh attempt was made by the partizans of Spain to 
, „ .. raise France against him. The Count of 

g 9. failure _ ° 

of Soissons Soissons, a prince of the blood, placed him- 

in France. , .. , , . . . . ,. 

self at the head of an imperialist army to 
attack his native country. He succeeded in defeating 
the French forces sent to oppose him not far from Sedan. 

1 641. Aims and Character of Richelieu. 201 

But a chance shot passing through the brain of Soissons 
made the victory a barren one. His troops, without the 
support of his name, could not hope to rouse the coun- 
try against Richelieu. They had become mere invaders, 
and they were far too few to think of conquering France. 
Equal success attended the French arms in Germany. 
In 1641 Guebriant, with his German and Swedish army, 
defeated the imperialists at Wolfenbiittel, in ., _ , 

i 10. Riche- 

the north. In 1642 he defeated them again lieu'siast 
at Kempten, in the south. In the same year ys ' 
Roussillon submitted to France. Nor was Richelieu 
less fortunate at home. The conspiracy of a young 
courtier, the last of the efforts of the aristocracy to 
shake off the heavy rule of the Cardinal, was detected, 
and expiated on the scaffold. Richelieu did not long 
survive his latest triumph. He died on December 4 ,1642. 

Section V. — Aims and Character of Richelieu. 
Unlike Lewis XIV. and Napoleon, Richelieu counts 
amongst those few French statesmen whose fortune 
mounted with their lives. It is not difficult „ 

% 1. Kiche- 

to discover the cause. As in Gustavus, love lieu's domes- 
of action was tempered by extreme prudence 1C p ° ' cy ' 
and caution. But in Richelieu these ingredients of char- 
acter were mingled in different proportions. The love 
of action was far less impetuous. The caution was far 
stronger. No man had a keener eye to distinguish the 
conditions of success, or was more ready to throw aside 
the dearest schemes when he believed them to be ac- 
companied by insuperable difficulties. Braver heart 
never was. There was the highest courage in the con- 
stancy with which he, an invalid tottering for years on 
the brink of the grave, and supported by a king whose 
health was as feeble as his own, faced the whole might 

202 The Preponderance of France. 1641. 

of the aristocracy of France. If he was harsh and un- 
pitying it was to the enemies of the nation, to the nobles 
who trod under their feet the peasant and the serf, ana 
who counted the possession of power merely as the high- 
road to the advancement of their private fortunes. The 
establishment of a strong monarchical power was, as 
France was then constituted, the only chance for indus- 
try and commerce to lift up their heads, for the peace- 
able arts of life to develop themselves in security, for the 
intellect of man to have free course, and for the poor to 
be protected from oppression. 

All this was in Richelieu's heart; and some little of 
this he accomplished. The work of many generations 
was in this man's brain. Yet he never attempted to 
do more than the work of his own. As Bacon sketched 
out the lines within which science was to move in the 
days of Newton and of Faraday, so Richelieu 
signs only °" sketched out the lines within which French 
partially ac- statesmanship was to move in the days of 

ccmplished r J 

Colbert and of Turgot, or in those of the 
great Revolution itself. 

"All things for the people, nothing by the people." 
This maxim attributed to Napoleon embodied as well the 

policy of Richelieu. In it are embalmed the 
people e strength and weakness of French statesman- 

nothing in ship. The late growth of the royal power 

and the long continuance of aristocratic op- 
pression threw the people helpless and speechless into 
the arms of the monarchy. They were happy if some 
one should prove strong enough to take up their cause 
without putting them to the trouble or the risk of think- 
ing and speaking for themselves. It is no blame to 
Richelieu if, being a Frenchman of the seventeenth cen- 
tury, he worked under the only conditions which 

i(54i. Aims and Character of Richelieu. 203 

Frenchmen of the seventeenth century would admit. 
We can well fancy that he would think with scorn and 
contempt of the English Revolution, which was accom- 
plishing itself under his eyes. Yet in the England of the 
Civil War, men were learning not merely to be governed 
well, but to know what good government was. It was 
r greater thing for a nation to learn to choose good and 
to refuse evil, even if the progress was slow, than to be 
led blindfold with far more rapid steps. 

Richelieu's foreign policy was guided by the same 
deep calculation as his home policy. If at home he 
saw that France was greater than any faction, 
he had not arrived at the far higher notion foreign 
that Europe was greater than France, ex- po icy ' 
cepting so far as he saw in the system of intolerance 
supported by Spain an evil to be combated for the sake 
of others who were not Frenchmen. But there is no sign 
that he really cared for the prosperity of other nations 
when it was not coincident with the prosperity of France. 
As it is for the present generation a matter of complete 
indifference whether Breisach was to be garrisoned by 
Frenchmen or imperialists, it would be needless for us, 
if we regarded Richelieu's motives alone, to trouble 
ourselves much with the later years of the Thirty Years' 

But it is not always by purity of motive only that the 
world's progress advances. Richelieu, in order to make 
France strong, needed help, and he had to . 

Til r 1 1 1 2 5- His sup- 

iOOk about for help where the greatest port of rising 

amount of strength was to be found. An causes- 

ordinary man would have looked to the physical 

strength of armies, as Wallenstein did, or to the ideal 

strength of established institutions, as Ferdinand did. 

Richelieu knew better. He saw that for him who knows 

204 The Preponderance of France. 1641. 

how to use it there is no lever in the world like that of a 
rising cause, for a rising cause embodies the growing 
dissatisfaction of men with a long-established evil, which 
they have learned to detest, but which they have not yet 
learned to overthrow. 

In England Richelieu was on the side of Parliament- 
ary opposition to the crown. In Germany he was on 

2 6 A d f t ^ xe s '^ e °^ t ' ie °PP osn; i on °f tne princes 
those causes against the Emperor. In Italy he was on 

which were in . . . r , . , r . 

themselves the side of the independence of tne states 
go ° ' against Spain. In the Peninsula he was on 

the side of the provinces against the monarchy. There 
is not the slightest reason to suppose that he cared one 
atom for any of those causes except so far as they might 
promote his own ends. Yet in every case he selected 
those causes by which the real wants of the several 
countries were best expressed. 

It is this which distinguishes Richelieu from those 

who in later times have measured the foreign policy of 

France by French interests alone. They have taken up 

any cause which promised to weaken a 

4 7. Contrast ' * . . 

between powerful neighbour, without considering 

Richelieu and , . ., ., r^, r , 

later French what the cause was worth, ihey favoured 
politicians. Italian division in i860, and German divi- 
sion in 1870. Richelieu had a clearer insight into the 
nature of things than that. There can be no doubt that 
he would far rather have attacked Spain and Austria 
through the instrumentality of the League than through 
the instrumentality of Gustavus and the Protestants ; but 
he saw that the future was with Gustavus and not with 
the League. He sacrificed his wishes to his policy. He 
coquetted with the League, but he supported Gustavus. 

When once Richelieu had gained his point, he was 
contented with his success. He never aspired to more 

1 643. More French Victories. 205 

than he could accomplish : never struck, „ _ . 

, V , . * g 8 He has 

excepting for a purpose : never domineered no exorbitant 
through the mere insolence of power. He 
took good care to get Alsace into his hands, and to 
make himself master of the passes of the Alps by the 
possession of Pignerol; but he never dreamed of found- 
ing, like Napoleon, a French Confederation of the 
Rhine, or a French kingdom of Italy. His interference 
with his neighbours was as little obtrusive as possible. 

Richelieu was quickly followed to the grave by the 
sovereign in whose name he had accom- 

. . J< M3- 

plished so much. Lewis XIII. died on the ? 9. Death of 

^1 r ir r Lewis XIII. 

14th of May, 1643. 

Section VI. — More French Victories. 

His son and successor, Lewis XIV., was a mere child. 

His widow, Anne of Austria, claimed the regency, and 

forgot that she was the sister of the King of Spain and 

the sister-in-law of the Emperor, in the thought that she 

was the widow of one king of France and the mother of 

another. Her minister was Cardinal Maza- 

rin, an Italian, who had commended himself h. Rule of 

to Richelieu by his capacity for business 
and his complete independence of French party feeling. 
If he was noted rather for cleverness than for strength 
of character, he was at least anxious to carry out the 
policy of his predecessor, and to maintain the predomi- 
nance of the crown over aristocratic factions ; and for 
some time Richelieu's policy seemed to carry success 
with it through the impetus which he had given it. On 
May 19 a victory came to establish the new authority of 
the queen-regent, the first of a long series of French vic- 
tories, which was unbroken till die days of Marlborough 
and Blenheim. 

206 The Preponderance of France. 1643. 

The Spaniards had crossed the frontier of the Nether- 
lands, and were besieging Rocroy. The command ol 
„, the French forces was held by the duke of 

d 2. The . ■" 

Spaniards Enghien, better known to the world by the 

croy. title which he afterwards inherited from his 

father, as the Prince of Conde. Next to 
Gaston, Duke of Orleans, the late king's brother, he and 
his father stood first in succession to the throne, and had, 
for this reason, attached themselves to Richelieu when 
he was opposed by the great bulk of the aristocracy. Those 
who placed him at the head of the army probably ex- 
pected that a prince so young and so inexperienced 
would content himself with giving his name to the cam- 
paign, and would leave the direction of the troops to 
older heads. 

The older heads, after reconnoitring the Spanish posi- 
tion at Rocroy, advised Enghien not to 
and Enghien. fight. But there was a certain Gassion 
among the officers, who had served under 
Gustavus, and who had seen the solid legions of Tilly 
break down before the swift blows of the Swedish king 
at Breitenfeld. Gassion had learned to look upon that 
close Spanish formation with contempt, and he strove 
hard to persuade Enghien to give orders for the attack, 
and, truth to say, he had no very hard task. Enghien 
was young and sanguine, and whether he had a genius 
for war or not, he had at least a genius for battles. Al- 
ready conscious of the skill with which he was to direct 
the fortunes of many a well-fought field, he heartily 
adopted the views laid before him by Gassion. 

Rocroy was, so to speak, a second edition of Breiten- 
feld, a victory gained by vigour and flexibility over solid 
^ , r endurance. Unreasoning obedience once 

t 4. Battle of .... 

Ro«roy. more gave v/ay before disciplined intelli- 

1 643. More French Victories. 207 

gence. The Spanish masses stood with all the strength of 
a mediaeval fortress. There was no manceuvering power 
in them. The French artillery ploughed its way through 
the ranks, and the dashing charges of the infantry drove 
the disaster home. The glories of the Spanish armies, 
the glories which dated from the days of the Great Cap- 
tain, were clouded for ever. Yet if victory was lost to 
Spain, the cherished honour of the Spanish arms was 
safe. Man by man the warriors fell in the ranks in which 
they stood, like the English defenders of the banner of 
Harold at Senlac. Their leader, the Count of Fuentes, 
an old man worn with years and gout, and unable to stand, 
was seated in an arm-chair to direct the battle within a 
square composed of his veteran troops. Death found 
him at his post. He had fought in the old wars of 
Philip II. The last of a long heroic race of statesmen 
and soldiers had bowed his head before the rising genius 
of France. 

Thionville was then besieged. It surrendered in 
August. The cautious Richelieu had been , „ 

° £5. Extension 

contented to announce that he reserved all of the French 
question of the ownership of his conquests 
till it should be finally determined by a treaty of peace. 
After Rocroy, Mazarin had no such scruples. Thion- 
ville was formally annexed to France. A medal was 
struck on which Hope was borne in the hand of Vic- 
tory, and on which was inscribed the legend, Prima 
finium propagatic. 

In Germany the campaign of 1643 was less successful. 
Maximilian of Bavaria had put forth all his resources, 
and his generals, the dashing John of Werth 
and the prudent Mercy, of whom it was said | n j Turenne 
that he knew the plans of the enemy as well 
as if he had sat in their councils, were more than a 

ao8 The Preponderance of France. 1645 

1644. match for the French commanders. In 1644 

they were opposed by a soldier of a quality higher than 
their own. Turenne was sent amongst them, but his 
forces were too few to enable him to operate with suc- 
cess. Freiburg in the Breisgau was taken before his 
eyes. Breisach was threatened. Then Enghien came 
with 10,000 men to assume the command over the head 
of the modest soldier who had borne the weight of the 
campaign. Proud of his last year's victory he despised 
the counsel of Turenne, that it was better to out-manceu- 
vre the enemy than to fight him in an almost inaccessible 

The battle fought amongst the vineyards of Freiburg 

was the bloodiest battle of a bloody war. For three days 

Enghien led his men to the butchery. At last 

Freiburg. e ° Mercy, unable to provide food any longer for 

his troops, effected his retreat. The French 

reaped the prizes of a victory which they had not gained. 

On the 3d of August, 1645, a second battle of N5rd- 
lingen was fought. It was almost a repetition of the 
slaughter of Freiburg. As in the year before, 
g 8.' Battle Turenne had been left to do the hard work 
of Nordim- at ^g p en ing of the campaign with inferior 
forces, and had even suffered a check. 
Once more Enghien came up, gay and dashing, at the 
head of a reinforcement of picked men. Once more a 
fearful butchery ensued. But that Mercy was slain 
early in the fight, the day might have gone hard with 
the French. As it was, they were able to claim a vic- 
tory. The old German bands which had served under 
Bernhard held out to the uttermost and compelled the 
enemy to retreat. But the success was not lasting. The 
imperialists received reinforcements, and the French 
were driven back upon the Rhine. 

1 645. Turenne 1 s Strategy. 209 

The same year had opened with splendid expectations 
on the other side of the theatre of the war. The gouty 
Swedish general, Torstenson. who had taken 
up Baner's work in the north, burst suddenly of 9 j an kow. 
into Bohemia, and on the 6th of March in- 
flicted a crushing defeat on the imperialists at Jankow. 
He then harried Moravia, and pressed on to lay siege to 
Vienna, as if to repair the fault which it was the fashion 
to ascribe to Gustavus. But Vienna was unassailable, 
and Torstenson, like Turenne, was driven to retreat. 
He next tried to reduce Briinn. Failing in this he re- 
turned to Bohemia, where, worn out with his maladies, 
he delivered over the command to Wrangel, his ap- 
pointed successor. 



Section I. — Turenne s Strategy. 

At last the thought entered into men's minds that it was 

time to put a stop to this purposeless misery and slaughter. 

It was hopeless to think any longer of shak- 

ing the strong grasp of France upon the ji 1. Thoughts 

Rhine ; and if Sweden had been foiled in ° peace - 
striking to the heart of the Austrian monarchy, she 
could not be driven from the desolate wilderness which 
now, by the evil work of men's hands, stretched from 
the Baltic far away into the interior of Germany. Long 
ago the disciplined force which Gustavus had brought 
across the sea had melted away, and a Swedish army 
was now like other armies — a mere collection of merce- 
naries, without religion, without pity, and without remorse. 

210 The End of the War. 1645. 

Negotiations for peace were spoken of from time to 

time, and preparations were at last made for a great 

meeting of diplomatists. In order to prevent 

I 2. Meeting , , , • 

ot diploma- the usual quarrel about precedency it was 
decided that some of the ambassadors should 
hold their sittings at Osnabriick and others at Miinster. 
an arrangement which was not likely to conduce to a 
speedy settlement. The Emperor proved his sincerity 
by sending his representative early enough to arrive at 
Miinster in July, 1643, whilst the Swedish and French 
ambassadors only made their appearance in the March 
1644, an d April of the following year, and it was 
1645- on iy i n June, 1645, that the first formal pro- 
position was handed in. 

All who were concerned were in fact ready to make 

peace, but they all wished it made on their own terms. 

_, Ferdinand III. was not bound by his father's 

} 3. Reluc- , : 

tanceofthe antecedents. The Edict of Restitution had 
eive P up°ail been no work of his. Long before this he 
thatis asked. j la( j b een rea( jy to give all reasonable satis- 
faction to the Protestants. He had declared his readi- 
ness to include Calvinists as well as Lutherans in the re- 
ligious peace. He had offered to restore the Lower Pa- 
latinate to Frederick's son, and he actually issued a gene- 
ral amnesty to all who were still in arms ; but he shrank 
from the demand that these arrangements of the Empire 
should be treated of, not in the constitutional assemblies 
of the Empire, but in a congress of European powers. 
To do so would be to tear the last veil from the sad truth 
that the Empire was a mere shadow, and that the states 
of which it was composed had become practically in- 
dependent sovereignties. And behind this degradation 
lay another degradation, hardly less bitter to Ferdinr.nd. 
The proudest title of the great emperors of old had been 

1 645 • Turenne' s Strategy. 211 

that of Increaser of the Empire. Was he to go down to 
posterity with the title of Diminisher of the Empire ? And 
yet it was beyond his power to loosen the hold of France 
upon Alsace, or of Sweden upon Pomerania. 

Nor was it only as Emperor that Ferdinand would feel 
the loss of Alsace deeply. Together with the Breisgau it 
formed one of territories of the House of . 

? 4. Espe- 
Austria, but it was not his own. It was the cially the 

inheritance of the children of his uncle Leo- reis s au - 
pold, and he was loth to purchase peace for himself by 
agreeing to the spoliation of his orphan nephews. 

Maximilian of Bavaria viewed the question of peace 
from another point of view. To him Alsace was noth- 
ing, and he warmly recommended Ferdi- . 

j j ■ j- 1 j- ?5- Aims of 

nand to surrender it for the sake of peace, the Elector 
If concessions were to be made at all, he 
preferred making them to Catholic France rather than 
to the Protestants in the Empire, and he was convinced 
that if Alsace remained under French rule, the motive 
which had led France to support the Protestants would 
lose its chief weight. But besides these general con- 
siderations, Maximilian, like Ferdinand, had a special 
interest of his own. He was resolved, come what might, 
to retain at least the Upper Palatinate, and he trusted 
to be seconded in his resolve by the good offices of 

The position of Maximilian was thus something like 
that of John George of Saxony in 1632. He and his 
chief ally were both ready for peace, but 
his ally stood out for higher terms than he campaign of 
was prepared to demand. And as in 1632 r 4 ' 
Wallenstein saw in the comparative moderation of the 
Elector of Saxony only a reason for driving him by 
force to separate his cause from that of Gustavus, so in 

1 1 2 The End of the War. 1646. 

1646 the French government resolved to fall upon Ba- 
varia, and to force the elector to separate his cause from 
that of Ferdinand. 

The year before, the Elector of Saxony, crushed and 

ruined by the Swedes, had consented to a separate truce, 

and now Turenne was commissioned to do 

out-manceu" 6 tne same with Bavaria. In August he 

vres the effected a junction on the Lahn with Wran- 

Jjavarians. J 

gel and the Swedes, and if Enghien had 
been there, history would doubtless have had to tell of 
another butchery as resultless as those of Freiburg and 
NOrdlingen. But Enghien was far away in Flanders, 
laying siege to Dunkirk, and Turenne, for the first time 
at the head of a superior force, was about to teach the 
world a lesson in the art of war. Whilst the enemy was 
preparing for the expected attack by entrenching his 
position, the united French and Swedish armies slipped 
past them and marched straight for the heart of Bavaria, 
where an enemy had not been seen since Bernhard had 
been chased out in 1634. That one day, as Turenne 
truly said, altered the whole face of affairs. Everywhere 
the roads were open. Provisions were plentiful. The 
population was in the enjoyment of the blessings of 
peace. Turenne and Wrangel crossed the Danube 
without difficulty. Schorndorf, Wiirzburg, Nordlingen, 
Donauwbrth made no resistance to them. It was not 
till they came to Augsburg that they met with opposition. 
The enemy had time to come up. But there was no 
unanimity in the councils of the enemy. The Bavarian 
generals wanted to defend Bavaria. The imperialist 
generals wanted to defend the still remaining Austrian 
possessions in Swabia. The invaders were allowed to 
accomplish their purpose. They arrived at the gates of 
Munich before the citizens knew what had become of 

i6i$. The Treaty of Westphalia. 213 

their master's army. With grim purpose Turenne and 
Wrangel set themselves to make desolate the Bavarian 
plain, so that it might be rendered incapable of support- 
ing a Bavarian army. Maximilian was reduced to straits 
such as he had not known since the time when Tilly fell 
at the passage of the Lech. Sorely against his will he 
signed, in May, 1647, a separate truce with the enemy. 
The truce did not last long. In September Maxi- 
milian was once more on the Emperor's side. Bavaria 
paid dearly for the elector's defection. All , „ . 

, - , , , 2 8 - Las' 

that had been spared a year before fell a struggles of 
sacrifice to new devastation. The last great 
battle of the war was fought at Zusmarshausen on May 
17, 1648. The Bavarians were defeated and the work 
6f the destroyer went on yet for a while unchecked. In 
Bohemia half of Prague fell into the hands of the Swedes, 
and the Emperor was left unaided to bear up in the un- 
equal fight. 

Section II. — The Treaty of Westphalia. 

Ferdinand could resist no longer. On the 24th of 
October, 1648, a few months before Charles , _, 
I. ascended the scaffold at Whitehall, the Peace of 
Peace of Westphalia was signed. es p a ia. 

The religious difficulty in Germany was settled as i* 
ought to have been settled long before. Calvinism 
was to be placed on the same footing as 
Lutheranism. New- Year's day 1624. was ? 2 - Reli gi° u s 

_ ' T settlement. 

fixed upon as the date by which all dis- 
putes were to be tested. Whatever ecclesiastical bene- 
fice was in Catholic hands at that date was to remain in 
Catholic hands forever. Ecclesiastical benefices in Pro- 
testant hands at that date were to remain in Protestant 
keeping. Catholics would never again be able to lay 

214 The End of the War. 1648. 

claim to the bishoprics of the north. Even Halberstadt, 
which had been retained at the Peace of Prague, was 
tiow lost to them. To make this settlement permanent, 
the Imperial Court was reconstituted. Protestants and 
Catholics were to be members of the court in equal 
numbers. And if the judicial body was such as to make 
it certain that its sanction would never be given to an 
infringement of the peace, the Catholic majority in the 
Diet became powerless for evil. 

In political matters, Maximilian permanently united 
the Upper Palatinate to his duchy of Bavaria, and the 
Electorate was confirmed to him and his 
Lulemau" 1 descendants. An eighth electorate was 
created in favour of Charles Lewis, the 
worthless son of the Elector, Frederick, and the 
Lower Palatinate was given up to him. Sweden estab- 
lished herself firmly on the mouths of the great north- 
ern rivers. The Eastern part of Pomerania she sur- 
rendered to Brandenburg. But Western Pomerania, 
including within its frontier both banks of the lower 
Vistula, was surrendered to her ; whilst the possession 
of the bishoprics of Bremen and Verdun, on which 
Christian of Denmark had set his eyes at the beginning 
of the war, gave her a commanding position at the 
mouths of the Elbe and the Weser. The bishoprics of 
Halberstadt, Camin, Minden, and the greater part ot 
the diocese of Magdeburg, were made over to Branden- 
burg as a compensation for the loss of its claims to the 
whole of Pomerania, whilst a smaller portion of the 
diocese of Magdeburg was assigned to Saxony, that 
power, as a matter of course, retaining Lusatia. 

France, as a matter of course, retained its conquests. 
, „ . f It kept its hold upon Austrian Alsace, 

? 4. Gains of * r 

France. Strasburg, as a free city, and the. immediate 

1648. TJu Treaty of Westphalia. 215 

vassals of the Empire being, however, excluded from 
the cession. The strong fortress of Philippsburg, erected 
by the warlike Elector of Treves, received a French gar- 
rison, and the three bishoprics, Metz, Toul, and Verdun, 
which had been practically under French rule since 
the days of Henry II. of France, were now formally 
separated from the Empire. Equally formal was the 
separation of Switzerland and the Netherlands, both of 
which countries had long been practically independent. 
The importance of the peace of Westphalia in Eu- 
ropean history goes far beyond these territorial changes. 
That France should have a few miles more , _ 

2 5. 1 Re ques- 

and Germany a few miles less, or even that tioKofitoiera- 

1-. . , , , ..... . tion left to the 

r ranee should have acquired military and German 
political strength whilst Germany lost it, P ruiCS£ - 
are facts which in themselves need not have any very 
great interest for others than Frenchmen or Germans. 
That which gives to the Peace of Westphalia its promi- 
nent place amongst treaties is that it drew a final de- 
marcation between the two religions which divided Eu- 
rope. The struggle in England and France for the 
right of settling their own religious affairs without the 
interference of foreign nations had been brought to a close 
in the sixteenth century. In Germany it had not been 
brought to a close for the simple reason that it was not 
decided how far Germany was a nation at all. The 
government of England or France could tolerate or per- 
secute at home as far as its power or inclination per- 
mitted. But the central government of Germany was 
not strong enough to enforce its will upon the territorial 
governments ; nor on the other hand were the territorial 
governments strong enough to enforce their will with- 
out regard for the central government. Thirty years of 
war ended by a compromise under which the religious 

2i6 The End of the War. 1648. 

position of each territory was fixed by the intervention 
of foreign powers, whilst the rights of the central gov- 
ernment were entirely ignored. 

Such a settlement was by no means necessarily in 
favour of religious toleration. The right of an Elector of 
? 6. How Bavaria or an Elector of Saxony to impose 

th^resal" Zl* ft ^ s belief by force upon his dissident sub- 
this - jects was even more fully acknowledged 

than before. He could still give them their choice be- 
tween conversion or banishment. As late as in 1729 an 
Archbishop of Salzburg could drive thousands of indus- 
trious Protestants into exile from his Alpine valleys, leav- 
ing a void behind them which has not been filled up to 
this day. But if such cases were rare, their rarity was in- 
directly owing to the Peace of Westphalia. In 1617 a 
bishop who had to consider the question of religious per- 
secution, had to consider it with the fear of Christian of 
Anhalt before his eyes. Every Protestant in his do- 
minions was a possible traitor who would favour, if he 
did not actively support, the revolutionary attacks of 
the neighbouring Protestants. In 1649 all such fear was 
at an end for ever. The bishop was undisputed master 
of his territory, and he could look on with contemp- 
tuous indifference if a few of his subjects had sufficient 
love of singularity to profess a religion other than his 

It may perhaps be said that the assurance given by 

the Peace of Westphalia was after all no better than the 

™ ^ assurance given by the Peace of Augsburg, 

\ 7. The Peace i> 3 6. 6» 

oi Westphalia but even so far as the letter of the two 
the Peace of documents was concerned, this was very far 
Augsburg. from being the case. The Peace of Augs- 
burg was full of uncertainties, because the contracting 
parties were unable to abandon their respective desires. 

1648. Co?ulition of Germany. 217 

In the Peace of Westphalia all was definite. Evasion 
or misinterpretation was no longer possible. 

If the letter of the two treaties was entirely different, 
it was because the spirit in which they were conceived 
was also entirely different. In 1555 Protes- , „ _ 

3 "^ \%. General 

tantism was on the rise. The peace of 1555 desire for the 

, i>ii continuance of 

was a vain attempt to shut out the tide by peace, 
artificial dykes and barriers. In 1648 the tide had re- 
ceded. The line which divided the Protestant from 
the Catholic princes formed almost an exact division be- 
tween the Protestant and Catholic populations. The 
desire for making proselytes, once so strong on both 
sides, had been altogether extinguished by the numbing 
agony of the war. All Germany longed for peace with 
an inexpressible longing. The mutual distrust of 
Catholic and Protestant had grown exceedingly dull. 
The only feeling yet alive was hatred of the tyranny and 
exactions of the soldiers. 

Section III. — Condition of Germany. 
What a peace it was when it really came at last! 
Whatever life there was under that deadly blast of war 
had been attracted to the camps. The strong man who 
had lost his all turned soldier that he might be able to 
rob others in turn. The young girl, who in 
better times would have passed on to a life of 'the war. 
of honourable wedlock with some youth 
who had been the companion of her childhood in the 
sports around the village fountain, had turned aside, foi 
very starvation, to a life of shame in the train of one or 
other of the armies by which her home had been made 
desolate. In the later years of the war it was known 
that a body of 40,000 fighting men drew along with it a 
loathsome following of no less than 140,000 men, women, 

ai8 The End of the War. 1648. 

and children, contributing nothing to the efficiency of 
the army, and all of them living at the expense of the 
miserable peasants who still contrived to hold on to 
their ruined fields. If these were to live, they must steal 
what yet remained to be stolen ; they must devour, with 
the insatiable hunger of locusts, what yet remained to be 
devoured. And then, if sickness came, or wounds — 
and sickness was no infrequent visitor in those camps— 
wliat remained but misery or death ? Nor was it much 
better with the soldiers themselves. No careful surgeons 
passed over the battle-field to save life or limb. No 
hospitals received the wounded to the tender nursing 
of loving, gentle hands. Recruits were to be bought 
cheaply, and it cost less to enrol a new soldier than to 
cure an old one. 

The losses of the civil population were almost incre- 
dible. In a certain district of Thuringia which was pro- 
bably better off than the greater part of 

\ 2. Decrease ° * 

of the Germany, there were, before the war cloud 

popuation. burst, i,7i7 houses standing in nineteen 
villages. In 1649, only 627 houses were left. And even 
of the houses which remained many were untenanted. 
The 1,717 houses had been inhabited by 1,773 families. 
Only 316 families could be found to occupy the 627 
houses. Property fared still worse. In the same dis- 
trict 244 oxen alone remained of 1,402. Of 4,616 sheep, 
not one was left. Two centuries later the losses thus 
suffered were scarcely recovered. 

And, as is always the case, the physical decline of the 
population was accompanied by moral decadence. Men 
who had been accustomed to live by the 
decadence. strong arm, and men who had been accus- 
tomed to suffer all tilings from those who 
were strong, met one another, even in the days of peace, 

1648. Condition of Germany. 219 

without that mutual respect which forms the basis of well- 
ordered life. Courts were crowded with feather-brained 
soldiers whose highest ambition was to bedeck them- 
selves in a splendid uniform and to copy the latest 
fashion or folly which was in vogue at Paris or Versailles. 
In the country district a narrow-minded gentry, without 
knowledge or culture, domineered over all around, and 
strove to exact the uttermost farthing from the peasant 
in order to keep up the outward appearance of rank. 
The peasant whose father had been bullied by maraud- 
ing soldiers dared not lift up his head against the ex- 
actions of the squire. The burden of the general 
impoverishment fell heavily upon his shoulders. The 
very pattern of the chairs on which he sat, of the vessels 
out of which he ate and drank, assumed a ruder appear- 
ance than they had borne before the war. In all ranks 
life was meaner, poorer, harder than it had been at the 
beginning of the century. 

If much of all this was the result of the war, something 
was owing to causes antecedently at work. 

„,, „ , • 1 , . . r , 2 4- Intellec- 

The German people in the beginning of the tual decline 
seventeenth century was plainly inferior to thenar ° re 
the German people in the beginning of the 
sixteenth century. During the whole course of the war 
Maximilian of Bavaria was the only man of German 
birth who rose to eminence, and even he did not attain 
the first rank. The destinies of the land of Luther and 
Gothe, of Frederick II. and Stein were decided by a few 
men of foreign birth. Wallenstein was a Slavonian, 
Tilly a Walloon, Gustavus a Swede, Richelieu a French- 
man. The penalty borne by a race which was unable 
to control individual vigour within the limits of a large 
and fruitful national life was that individual vigour itself 
died out. 

»2o The End of the War. 1648. 

We may well leave to those who like such tasks the 
work of piling up articles of accusation against this man 

or that, of discovering that the war was all 
ties inherited" tae &u\t of Ferdinand, or all the fault of 
times early Frederick, as party feeling may lead them. 

Probably the most lenient judgment is also 
the truest one. With national and territorial institutions 
the mere chaos which they were, an amount of political 
intelligence was needed to set them right which would 
be rare in any country or in any age. 

As far as national institutions were concerned the 
Thirty Years' War made a clean sweep in Germany. 

Nominally, it is true, Emperor and Empire 
disintegration still remained. Ferdinand III. was still ac- 
ermany. CO rding to his titles head of all Christendom, 
if not of the whole human race. The Diet still gathered 
to discuss the affairs of the Empire. The imperial court, 
re-established on the principle of equality between the 
two religions, still met to dispense justice between the 
estates of the Empire. But from these high-sounding 
names all reality had fled. The rule over German men 
had passed for many a long day into the hands of the 
princes. It was for the princes to strive with one 
another in peace or war under the protection of foreign 
alliances ; and by and by, half consciously, half uncon- 
sciously, to compete for the leadership of Germany by the 
intelligence and discipline which they were able to fos- 
ter under their sway. 

When the days of this competition arrived it was of 
inestimable advantage to Germany that, whatever else 

had been lost, Protestantism had been 
ant'ism saved", saved. Wherever Protestantism had firmly 

rooted itself there sprang up in course of 
ti-me a mighty race of intellectual giants. Gdthe and 

1648. War between France and Spain. 221 

Schiller, Lessing and Kant, Stein and Humboldt, with 
thousands more of names which have made German in- 
tellect a household word in the whole civilized world, 
sprung from Protestant Germany. When Bavaria, 
scarcely more than two generations ago, awoke to the 
consciousness that she had not more than the merest ru- 
diments of education to give to her children, she had to 
apply to the Protestant north for teachers. 

For Germany in 1648 the worst was over. Physically, 
at least she had no more to suffer. One „ m 

§ 8. The 

page of her history was closed and another worst over for 
had not yet been opened. She lay for a etma °y- 
time in the insensibility of exhaustion. 

Section IV, — Continuance of the War between France 
and Spain. 
For France T64S is hardly a date at all. She was rid 
of the war in Germany. But her war with Spain was 
not browght to an end. And if Spain would . „ 

*» r . I s. Peace 

no longer have the support of the imperial- between Spa™ 

• ^ j- j-* t- t. *.i aiKl the .Dutch. 

ists of Germany, France was at the same 
time deprived of the support of a far more vigorous ally. 
Spain at last lowered its haughty neck to accept condi- 
tions of peace on terra&s of equality from the Dutch re- 
public. The eighty years' war of the Netherlands was 
brought to a conclusion simultaneously with the thirty 
years' war of Germany. Spain could mow send rein- 
forcements to Flanders by sea without fearing the over- 
whelming superiority of the Dutch marirae, and could 
defend the southern frontier of the obedient provinces 
without having to provide against an attack in the rear. 
In the long run, a duel between France and Spain 
could be of no doubtful issue. It was a contest between 
the old system of immobility and intolerance and the 

222 TJie End of the War. 1652. 

new system of intelligence and tolerance ; between 4 
1 2. France government which despised industry and 
and Spam. commerce, and a government which fostered 
them. But however excellent might be the aims which 
the French government kept in view, it was still in it? 
nature an absolute government. No free discussion en' 
lightened its judgment. No popular intervention kept 
in check its caprices. It was apt to strike roughly and 
ignorantly, to wound many feelings and to impose griev- 
ous burdens upon the poor and the weak whose lamen- 
tations never reached the height of the throne. 

Suddenly, when Mazarin's government appeared most 
firmly rooted, there was an explosion which threatened 
i 3. The t0 change the whole face of France. An 

Fronde. outcry arose for placing restrictions upon 

rights of the crown, for establishing constitutional and 
individual liberties. The Fronde, as the party which 
uttered the cry was called, did its best to imitate the 
English Long Parliament whose deeds were then ringing 
through the world. But there were no elements in France 
upon which to establish constitutional government. The 
Parliament of Paris, which wished itself to be considered 
the chief organ of that government, was a close corpora- 
tion of lawyers, who had bought or inherited judicial 
places ; and of all governments, a government in the 
hands of a close corporation of lawyers is likely, in the 
long run, to be the most narrow-minded and unprogres- 
sive of all possible combinations; for it is the business of 
a lawyer to administer the law as it exists, not to modify 
it in accordance with the new facts which rise constantly 
to the surface of social and political life. Nor were the 
lawyers of the parliament fortunate in their supporters. 
The Paris mob, combined with a knot of intriguing 
courtiers, could form no firm basis for a healthy revolu* 

i657- War between France and Spain. 223 

tion. It was still worse when Conde, quarrelling on a 
personal question with Mazarin, raised the standard of 
aristocratic revolt, and threw himself into the arms of the 
Spanish invader. Mazarin and the young king repre- 
sented the nation against aristocratic selfishness and in- 
trigue ; and when they obtained the services of Turenne, 
the issue was hardly doubtful. In 1652 Louis XIV. entered 
Paris in triumph. In 1653 Conde, in conjunction with a 
Spanish army, invaded France, and pushed on hopefully 
for Paris. But Turenne was there with a handful of troops ; 
and if Conde was the successor of Gustavus in the art of 
fighting battles, Turenne was Wallenstein's successor in 
the art of strategy. Conde could neither fight nor advance 
with effect. The siege and reduction of Rocroy was the 
only result of a campaign which had been commenced 
in the expectation of reducing France to submission. 

In 1654 Conde and the Spaniards laid siege to Arras, 
whilst the French were besieging Stenay. Stenay was 
taken; Arras was relieved. In 1655 further g 4 The war 
progress was made by the French on the with s P ain - 
frontier of the Netherlands ; but in 1656 they failed in the 
siege of Valenciennes. 

With the check thus inflicted, a new danger appeared 
above the horizon. In England there had 
arisen, under Cromwell, a new and power- Cromwell, and 
ful military state upon the ruins of the mon- pain ' 
archy of the Stuarts. To Cromwell Spain addressed itself 
with the most tempting offers. The old English jealousy 
of France, and the political advantage of resisting its 
growing strength, were urged in favour of a Spanish alli- 
ance. Cromwell might renew the old glories of the Plan- 
tagenets, and might gather round him the forces of the Hu- 
guenots of the south. If Charles I. had failed at Rochelle, 
Cromwell might establish himself firmly at Eordeaux. 

224 The End of tfie War. 1660. 

For a moment Cromwell was shaken. Then he made 
two demands of the Spanish ambassador. He must 
have, he said freedom for Englishmen to 
rcfiises 3 " 1 trade in the Indies, and permission for Eng- 

te r rms WeU ' S lishmen carrying on commercial inter- 
course with Spain to profess their religion 
openly without interference. " To give you this," was 
the Spaniard's cool reply, " would be to give you my 
master's two eyes." 

To beat down religious exclusiveness and commercial 
exclusiveness was the work to which Cromwell girded 
himself. An alliance with France was 
between' 3 " quickly made. The arrogant intolerance of 
England" 1 " 1 Spain was to perish through its refusal to 
admit the new principle of toleration. The 
politic tolerance of France was to rise to still higher 
fortunes by the admission of the principle on which all 
its successes had been based since Richelieu's accession 
to power. In 1657, six thousand of Cromwell's Ironsides 
landed to take part in continental warfare. The union 
of Turenne's strategy with the valour and discipline 
which had broken down opposition at Naseby and Wor- 
cester was irresistible. That autumn the small Flemish 
port of Mardyke surrendered. In 1658 Dunkirk was 
taken, and given over, according to compact, to the 
English auxiliaries. But France, too, reaped an ample 
harvest. Gravelines, Oudenarde, Ypres saw the white 
flag of France flying from their ramparts. 

Spain was reduced to seek for peace. In 1660 the 

Treaty of the Pyrenees, a supplement as it were to 

the Treaty of Westphalia, put an end to the 

Treaty of the long war. The advantages of the peace 

were all on the side of France. Roussillon 

and Artois, with Thionville, Landrecies, and Avesnes, 

i66o. War between France and Spain. 225 

were incorporated with France. Another condition was 
pregnant with future evil. Lewis XIV. gave his hand to 
the sister of Philip IV. of Spain, the next heiress to the 
Spanish monarchy after the sickly infant who became 
afterwards the imbecile and childish Charles II. At 
her marriage she abandoned all right to the great in- 
heritance ; but even at the time there were not wanting 
Frenchmen of authority to point to circumstances which 
rendered the renunciation null and void. 

Richelieu's power had been based upon tolerance at 
home and moderation abroad. Was it likely that his 
successors would always imitate his exam- 1 The 
pie? What guarantee could be given that greatness of 
the French monarchy would not turn its on its tolerance, 
back upon the principles from which its strength had 
been derived ? In a land of free discussion, every gain 
is a permanent one. When Protestantism, or toleration, 
or freedom of the press, or freedom of trade had been 
once accepted in England, they were never abandoned; 
they became articles of popular belief, on which no hesi- 
tation, except by scattered individuals, was possible. 
Multitudes who would find it difficult to give a good 
reason why they thought one thing to be true and 
another untrue, had yet a hazy confidence in the result of 
the battle of reason which had taken place, much in the 
same way as there are millions of people in the world 
who believe implicitly that the earth goes round the sun, 
without being able to give a reason for their belief. 

In France it was hard for anything of the kind to take 
place. Tolerance was admitted there by the mere will of 
the government in the seventeenth century, 
just as free trade was admitted by the mere appended 'on 
will of the government in the nineteenth ^ e wiU of tne 
century. The hand that gave could also 

236 The End of the War. 1660. 

take away ; and it depended on the young king to 
decide whether he would walk in the steps of the great 
minister who had cleared the way before him, or whether 
he would wander into devious paths of his own seeking. 
At first everything promised well. A great statesman, 
Colbert, filled the early part of the manhood of Lewis 

XIV. with a series of domestic reforms, the 
tolerance of least of which would have gladdened the 

heart of Richelieu. Taxation was reduced, 
the tolls taken upon the passage of goods from one pro- 
vince to another were diminished in number, trade and 
industry were encouraged, the administration of justice 
was improved ; all, in short, that it was possible to do 
within the circle of one man's activity was done to make 
France a prosperous and contented land. But the happy 
time was not of long duration. The war fever took pos- 
session of Lewis ; the lust of absolute domination entered 
into his heart. He became the tyrant and bully of Eu- 
rope ; and as abroad he preferred to be feared rather 
than to be loved, at home he would be content with 
nothing else than the absolute mastery over the con- 
sciences as well as over the hearts of his subjects. The 
Edict of Nantes, issued by Henry IV. and confirmed by 
the policy of Richelieu, was revoked, and intolerance 
and persecution became the law of the French monarchy, 
as it had been the law of the Spanish monarchy. 

It was not for this that Henry IV. and Rl- 
l 12. Fate chelieu had laboured. The tree that bears no 
French f rint must be cut down to the ground, or it will 

monarchy perish by its own inherent rottenness. As the 

Empire had fallen, as the Spanish monarchy had fallen, 
the French monarchy, shaken by the thunders of La 
Hogue and Blenheim, fell at last, when, amidstthe corrup* 
tion of Versailles, it ceased to do any useful work for man. 



AACHEN (Aix-la-Chaj>elle) 
place of coronation, 2. 

Administrators. See Bishoprics. 

Aix la-Chapelle. See Aachen. 

Aldringer, offers to assist Wallen- 
stein, 175 ; declares against him, 
177 ; tries to seize him, 177. 

Alsace, Mansfeld in, 50 ; his designs 
there, 56 ; Mansfeld returns, to, 60 ; 
pioposed march of Mansfeld to 75 ; 
its possession of importance to 
France, 191 ; comes into French 
possession, 197. 

Anhalt. Prince of. See character of 

Anne of Austria, Regent of France, 

Anspach, the Margrave of, hopes for 
a revolution, 135. 

Anstruther, Sir Robert, his mission 
to the King of Denmark, 84. 

Arnim, ordered by Wallenstein to 
besiege Stralsund, 108 ; commands 
the Saxons at Breitenfeld, 139 ; his 
conference with Wallenstein, 153 ; 
is expected to meet Wallenstein at 
Eger, 179. 

Arras, besieged by Conde, 223. 

Augsburg, city of, swears obedience 
to Gustavus, 150 ; besieged by the 
imperialists, 187; resists Turenne, 

Augsburg, Peace of, 9 ; questions 
arising out of \\, 10 ; evaded by the 
Protestants, 11. 

Austria, Lower, estates of, attempt 
to wring concessions from Ferdi- 
nand, 36. 
Austria, Upper, surrenders to Maxi- 
milian, 42 ; pledged to Maximilian, 
46; restored to Ferdinand, 119. 


Austria, the House of; territories 

governed by it, 9 ; its branches, 24. 
Avesnes incorporated with France, 

BAUTZEN, besieged by John 
George, 42. 

Bergen-op-zoom, siege of, 63. 

Bernhard of Weimar, joins the King 
of Denmark, 101 ; joins Gustavus, 
138; takes the command of the 
Swedes at Liitzen, 163; his expec- 
tations after the death of Gustavus, 
166 ; his duchy of Franconia. 167; 
takes Ratisbon, 173 ; is invited to 
assist Wallenstein, 179; prepares 
to march to Eger, 179; is defeated 
at Nbnilingen, 183; loses his duchy 
of Franconia, 183 ; his alliance with 
France, 190 ; defeats the imperial- 
ists at Rheinfelden and takes 
kheinfelden. F'eiburg, and Brei- 
sach, 195 ; his death, 196. 

Bachararch, misery at, 187. 

Baden-Durlach, Margrave of, joins 
Frederick, 54 ; defeated at Wimp- 
fen, 57; abandons his allies, 60; 
aids the King of Denmark, 101. 

Bamberg and Wiirzburg, Bishop of, 
attacked by Mansfeld, 49. 

Baner, defeats the Imperialists at 
Wittstock, 194; is driven back to 
the coast of the Baliic, 195; fights 
in different parts of Germany, 196. 

B&rwalde, treaty of, 132. 

Bethlen Gabor, P'ince of Transylva- 
nia, attacks Austria, 40 ; prepares 
to aid Frederick, 44 ; defeats Buc- 
quoi, 49 ; threatens Austria, 88, 
94; is joined by Mansfeld, 97; 
withdraws from the contest, 101. 




Bishoprics, question connected with 
them left unsettled at the Peace of 
Augsburg, 10 ; in the north they 
mainly fall under Protestant ad 
ministrators, 12 ; forcible recon- 
version of the population where 
this is not the case, 14; Protestant 
administrators not acknowledged 
by the Diet, 14 ; attempt to brin.^ 
over Cologne and Strasburg to 
Protestantism, 14 ; questions relat- 
ing to them settled for a time at 
Miihlhausen, 41; reopened after 
the battle of Stadtlohn, 67 ; names 
of those reclaimed in the Edict of 
Restitution, 121 ; arrangement for 
them at the treaty of Prague, 184. 

Boguslav, Duke of Pomerania, com- 

f)elled to accept a garrison by Wal- 
enstein, 108 ; supports Wallenstein 
in the siege of Stralsund no ; com- 
plains of Wallenstein's soldiers, 
127 ; submits to Gustavus, 130. 

Bohemia, the Royal Charter granted 
in, 25; its infringement, 27; ac- 
knowledgment of Ferdinand as its 
king, 28 ; revolution in 29 ; direc- 
tors appointed. 32 ; war begins in, 
32 ; political incapacity of the re- 
volutionary government, 32 ; it 
make^ application to foreign powers, 
35 ; election of Frederick as king, 
38 ; suppression of the Revolution, 
45 ; occupied by John George, 151.; 
the Saxons driven out of, 155 ; Tor- 
stenson's occupation of, 209. 

Bohemia King of, h s functions as 
an Elector, 1. See also Rudolph 
If., Matthias, Frederic* V., and 
Ferdinand II. 

Bohemian Brethren expelled from 
Bohemia, 46. 

Brande burg, bishopric of, named in 
the Edict of Restitution, 131. 

Brandenburg, Elector of, 1. See also 
John Sigismund, and George 

Biaunau, Protestant church at, 27. 

Breda, siege of, 76 

Breisach, taken by Bernhard, 195. 

Bieisgan, taken possession of by the 
French, 195. 

Breitenfeld, battle of, 141. 

Bremen, archbishopric of, connexion 
of. with Christian IV., 78; named 
in the Edict of Restitution, 120; 
given up to Sweden, 214. 


Bridge of Dessau, battle of, 96. 

Brunn, besieged by Torstenson, 209, 

Brunswick, peace negotiations at, 93. 

Brussels, conferences for peace at, 52. 
57. 6°/ 

Bucquoi, commands the army in- 
vad" lg Bohemia, 32 ; defeats Mans- 
fcld, 3- ; joined by Maximilian, 43 ; 
advises to delay a battle, 44 ; is 
killed, 49. 

Buckingham, Duke of, his expedition 
to Rhe, 114; intends to raise the 
siege of Rochelle, 115 ; is mur- 
dered, 115. 

Budweis, attacked by the Bohemians, 

Burgundy, Eastern. See Franche 

Butler, receives orders to capture 
Wallenstein, 180 : consults on the 
murder with Leslie and Gordon, 

CALVINISM in Germany, 18. _ 
Camin, bishopric of, named in 
the Edict of Restitution, 121. 

Casale, sieges of, 1.-2, 123. 

Catalonia, insurrection of, 199. 

Charles I., King of England, lorms an 
alliance with Christian IV., 86 ; is 
unable to fulfil his engagement, 95 ; 
sends Sir C. Morgan to aid Chris- 
tian IV., 101 ; quarrels with France, 
xii ; attempts to succour Rochelle, 
113; his arrangements about the 
Spanish fleet in the Downs, 198. 

Charles V., his strength external to 
the empire, 8; his meeting with 
Luiher, 9 ; forced to yield to lh« 
Protestants, 9. 

Charles Emanuel, Duke of Savoy, 
helps the Bohemians, 33 ; plans Kir 
his advancement in Germany, 35 ; 
attacks Genoa, 76; reduced to sub- 
mission by Richelieu, 122. 

Charles L wis. Elector Palatine, 
claims his father's dominion, 198; 
rect lves the Lower Palatinate, 214. 

Charles, Prince of Wales proposed 
marriage with an Infanta, 51 ; 
treaty with Spain broken off, 70 ; 
proposed marriage with Henrietta 
Maria. 74. See shades 1., King 
of England. 

Charles the Great (Charlemagne) 
nature of his authority, 2. 

Cherasco, tieaty of, 135. 




Chichester, Lord, his embassy to the 
Palatinate, 59. 

Christian IV., King of Denmark; 
his connection with Germany, 78 ; 
his views on the course of the war, 
79 ; his offers to England to make 
war, 84 ; his offer accepted, 85 ; at- 
tacked by Tilly, 94 ; defeated at 
Luiter, 96 ; refuses Wallenstein's 
terms of peace, 101 ; sends agents 
to Stralsund, 109 ; makes peace at 
Liibeck, 117. 

Christian of Anhalt, leader of the 
German Calvinists, 38; his cha- 
racter and policy, 18 ; his part in 
the foundation of the Union, 21 ; 
his intrigues in Austria, 26; his 
plan for supporting the Bohemians, 
34 ; commands the Bohemian 
army, 44. 

Christian of Brunswick, administra- 
tor of Halberstadt, his instalment 
in the cathedral, 54; resolves to 
take part in the war, 55 ; invades 
the diocese of Paderborn, 55 ; de- 
feated at Hochst, 59 ; retreats to 
Alsace, 60; marches through Lor- 
raine, 63 ; loses his arm at Fleurus, 
64 ; threatens the Lower Saxon 
Circle, 65 ; negotiates with the Em- 
peror, 6f ; is defeated at Stadtlohn, 
and resigns the See of Halberstadt, 
67 ; joins Christian IV., 95 ; dies, 96. 

Christina, Queen cf Sweden, 166. 

Christina, Regent of Savoy, assisted 
by the French, 197. 

Church lands secularized, 10, 11 ; 
legal decision about them against 
the Protestants, 14. 

Cities, free imperial, their part in the 
Diet, 6. 

Cleves, war of succession in, 21. 

Coblentz, fired at by the French in 
Ehrenbreitstein, 187. 

Colbert, his reforms, 226. 

Cclogne, Elector of, 1 ; failure of an 
attempt by him to bring over the 
electorate to Protestantism, 14. 

Conde, Prince of, takes part with 
Spain, 223. 

Convention of Passau. See Pas- 

Corbie, taken by the Spaniards, and 

retaken by the French, 193. 
Cordova, Gonzales de, commands 
the Spaniards in the Lower Palati- 
nate, 50; takes Hurt in the battle 


ofWimpfen, 57; joins in defeating 
Christian of Brunswick at K6chst c 
59 ; c mmands at Fleurus, 63. 

Corneille, writes " The Cid," 169. 

Cromwell, courted by France and 
Spain, 223; decides to help France, 

DANHOLM, seized by Wallen. 
stein's soldiers, 109. 

Darmstadt, entered by Mansfeld, 58. 

Descartes, his first work published, 

Dessau, the Bridge of, battle of, 96. 

Devereux, murders Wallenstein, 180. 

Diet of the Empire, 1 ; its reform in 
the J5th century, 5; its constitu- 
tion, 5 ; how far opposed to Pro- 
testantism, 8 ; its meeting in 1608, 

Directors of Bohemia appointed, 31. 

Donauworth, occupation of, 20 ; en- 
tered by Gustavus, 149; surren- 
ders to Turenne 212. 

Downs, the Spanish fleet takes refuge 
in the, 198. 

Dunkirk, surrender of, 224. 

EAST FRIESLAND, invaded by 
Mansfeld, 64. 

Ecclesiastical reservation, the. See 

Edict of Restitution, issued, 120. 

Eger, Wallenstein summons his colo- 
nels to, 179. 

Eggenberg confers with Wallenstein, 
99 ; favours Wallenstein's restora- 
tion, 151 ; joins Onate against Wal- 
lenstein, 176. 

Ehrenbreitstein, receives a French 
garrison, 170; fires on Coblentz, 187. 

Elector Palatine, 1. See also Frede- 
rick IV., and Frederick V. 

Electors, functions of, 1 ; their part 
in the Diet, 6 ; their quarrel with 
Wallenstein, 103, 124 ; demand 
Wallenstein's dismissal, T27. 

Eliot, Sir John, his satisfaction at the 
victories of Gustavus, 142. 

Elizabeth, Electress Palatine, en- 
courages her husband to accept the 
crown of Bohemia, 39. 

Emperor, functions of, 1 ; he is prac- 
tically scarcely more than a Ger- 
man king, 2. 




Enghien, Duke of (afterwards Prince 
of Conde), defeats the Spaniards at 
Rocroy, 206 ; commands at the 
battle of Freiburg and Nordlingen, 
208. See Conde, Prince of. 

England. See James I., Chaides I., 
l. harles, Prince of Wales. 

English ambassador (the Earl of Ar- 
undel >, notes of his journey through 
Germany, 187. 

Erfurt, Gustavus at, 147. 

FABRIC1US, thrown out of win- 
dow, 30. 

Felton, murders Buckingham. 115, 

Ferdinand, the Archduke, afterwards 
the Emperor Ferdinand I., repre- 
sents Charles V., at Augsburg, 

Ferdinand, Archduke (afterwards the 
Emperor Ferdinand II.) rules Sty- 
ria, Carinthia, and Carniola, 24 ; 
puts down Protestantism there, 24 ; 
acknowledged as Ki g of Bohemia, 
28 ; his character, 28 ; swears to 
the Royal Charter, 29 ; elected 
Kingof Hungary, 32 ; receives help 
from Spain, 33 ; promises to re- 
spect the Royal Charter, 36; be- 
sieged by Mansfeld, 37 ; elected 
.h-mperor, 38 ; comes to terms with 
Maximilian, 40 ; puts Frederick to 
the ban, 46 ; refuses to go beyond 
the agreement of MUhlhausen, 68 ; 
accepts Wallenstein's offer to raise 
an army, 89 ; grants Mecklenburg 
to Wallenstei.i, 105, 118 ; oppresses 
the Protestants, 120 ; recovers Up- 
per Austria, 119 ; takes part in the 
Mantuau war, 121 ; carries out the 
Edict of Restitution, 126; despises 
Gustavus, 134; refuses to aband 11 
the Edict, 137 ; looks to Spain for 
help, 15c; hesitates what to do 
about Wallenstein, 174; decides 
against him, 176 ; consents to the 
Peace of Prague, 184 • his death, 
. '94- 

»"erdinand, King of Hungary (after- 
wards the Emperor Ferdinand 
III.); his marriage, 174 ; com- 
mands the army after Wallens'ein's 
death, 182 ; becomes Emperor, 
194; reluctance to surrender Al- 
sace to the French, 210. 

Ferdinand, tha Cardinal-infant ; pro- 


posed command of, resisted by 
Wallenstein, 171 ; joins the King 
of Hungary before the battle of 
Nordlingen, 182 ; proceeds to Brus- 
sels, 183; invades France, 192. 

Fleurus, battle of, 63. 

France, takes precautions against 
Mansfeld, 63 ; its internal dissen- 
sions, 77, 112 ; at war with Eng- 
land, 113; intervenes in Italy and 
makes peace with England, 122 ; 
supremacy of Richelieu in, 168 ; 
places itself at the head of a Ger- 
man alliance, 189 ; declares war 
openly against Spain, 192 ; con- 
tinues the war with Spain, 197 ; its 
victories over Spain, 205 ; its vic- 
tories in Germany, 307; its gains 
by the Peace of Westphalia, 214 ; 
continuance of its war with Spain, 
221 ; successes of, in Flanders, 
224 ; its gains by the treaty of the 
Pyrenees , 224 ; its condition under 
Lewis XIV , 226. 

Franche t_omte, included in the Em- 
pire, 2. 

Franconia, duchy of, assigned to 
Bernhard, 167 ; taken from him, 

„ [8 3- 

Frankenthal, garrisoned by Vere's 
troops, 57 ; given up to the Span- 
iards, 60. 

Frankfort-on-the Main, place of coro- 
nation, 2. 

Frankfort-on-the-Oder, taken by 
Gustavus, 134. 

Frederick III., the Emperor, words 
used to him. 2. 

Frederick IV., Elector Palatine, 
nominal leader of the Calvinists, 
18 ; his death, 31. 

Frederick V., Elector Palatine, his 
marriage, 31 ; encourages the Bohe- 
mians, 31 ; proposal that he shall 
mediate in Bohemia, 34 ; is elected 
King of Bohemia, 38 ; becomes un- 
popular at Prague, 43 ; his defeat 
at the White Hill, 45 ; takes refuge 
at the Hague, 45 ; put to the ban, 
46 ; maintains his claims to Bo- 
hemia, 48 ; proposal that his eldest 
son shall be educated at Vienna, 
52 ; his prospects in 1O22, 53 ; joins 
Mansfeld in Alsace, 57 ; seizes the 
Landgrave of Darmstadt, 58 ; 
driven back to Mannheim 59; re- 
turns to the Hague, ou ; enters 




Munich with Gustavus, 150; his 

dea.h, 171. 
Freiburg (in the Breisgau\ surrenders 

to Berahard, 195 ; retaken, 208 ; 

battle of; 208. 
Friedland, Prince and Duke of. See 

Friesiand. See East FriesLand. 
Fronde, the, 217. 
Fuentes, Count of, killed at Rocroy, 

Fiirth, Wallenstein's entrenchments 

at, 158. 

GALLAS, offers to assist Wallen- 
stein, 175. 

Gassion advises the French to give 
battle at Rocroy, 206. 

Gaston, Duke of Orleans, leaves 
France, 167 ; takes part in a re- 
bellion, 168. 

George of Ltineburg, a Lutheran in 
' Wallenstein's service, 98 : sent into 
Silesia, roi. 

George William, Elector of Branden- 
burg, consents to his sister's mar- 
riage with Gustavus, 81 ; refuses to 
join Gustavus, 131 ; compelled to 
submit to him, 135. 

Germany, its political institutions, 
1-7 ; what it included, 2 ; divided 
into circles, 6 ; its miserable condi- 
tion, 186 ; its condition after the 
Peace of Westphalia. 217. 

Gliickstadt, fortified by Christian IV., 
78 ; siege of, 117. 

Gordon, his part in Wallenstein's 
murder, 180. 

Gravelines surrenders to the French, 

Guebriant, defeats the Imperialists at 
Wolfenbiittel and Kempten, 201. 

Guise, the Dukeof, leaves France, r68. 

Guiton, Mayor of Rochelle, 115. 

Gustavus Adolphus, King of Sweden, 
his character, 79; early struggles, 
80; visits Germany, 81 ; hostile to 
the growth of the Empire, 82 ; 
views on religion and politics, 83 ; 
projects a general league against 
the House of Austria, 84; refuses 
to taice part in it on the terms of- 
fered, and attacks Poland, 86 ; sends 
help to Stralsund, 104 ; makes peac^ 
with Poland, 124 ; negotiates with 
France, 224 ; lands in Pomerania, 


127 ; gains possession of the lands 
on the Baltic coast, 131 ; negotiates 
with France, 131 ; signs the treaty 
of Birwalde, 132; compels the 
Elector of Brandenburg to join him, 
135 ; fails to relieve Magdeburg, 
136 ; entrenches himself at Wer- 
ben, 138 ; allies himself with Saxony, 
139 ; his skill as a commander, 140 ; 
defeats Tilly at Breitenfeld, 141 ; 
receives overtures from Wallenstein, 
143 ; his political plans, 144 ; de- 
termines to march to the Rhine, 
145 ; keeps Christmas at Mentz, 
147; his reception at Nuremberg, 
148; enters Donauwarth, and de- 
feats Tilly at the Lech, 149 ; occu- 
pies Munich, 1 50 ; lays down terms 
of peace, 1 56 ; proposes a league of 
the cities, 157 ; rebukes his officers, 
159 ; fails in storming Wallenstein's 
entrenchments, 160 ; follows Wal- 
lenstein into Saxony, 161 ; attacks 
Wallenstein at Lotzen, 162 ; his 
death, 163 ; his future plans, 165. 

IT AGENAU, seized by Mansfeld, 

Hague, the, Frederick takes refuge 
there, 45 ; returns after his cam- 
paign in Germany, 60. 

Halberstadt, diocese of, Christian of 
Brunswick Bishop of it, 54 ; for- 
feited by his treason, 65 ; occupied 
by Wallenstein, 92 ; named in the 
Edict of Restitution, 120; execu- 
tion of the Edict at, 125 ; not re- 
covered by the Protestants at the 
treaty of Prague, 184; restored at 
the peace of Westphalia, 214. 

Halle, Pappenheim's march to, 162. 

Hamburg, its commerce, 78 ; refuses 
to submit to Wallenstein, no. 

Hanse Towns, offers made them by 
the Emperor, 106. 

Havelberg,bishopricof, named in the 
Edict of Restitution, 121. 

Heidelberg, garrisoned by Vere, 57 ; 
taken by Tilly, 61 ; treatment of 
Protectants at, 119. 

Heilbronn, the league of, 167 ; its 
leading members excepted from the 
amnesty of the treaty of Prague, 

Heiligenhafen, combat of, 102. 

Henry IV., King of France, plans in- 
tervention in Germany, 22. 

23 a 



Henry the Fowler, notan emperor, 2. 
Hesse Cassel, L.ndgrave of. See 

Maurice, and William. 
Hesse Darmstadt. See Lewis. 
Hochst, battle of, 59. 
Horn, commands a Swedish force in 

Mecklenburg, 134 ; is defeated at 

Niirdiingen, 18.3. 
Huguenots, nature of toleration 

granted to, 173; insurrection of 77, 

112; tolerated by Richelieu, 116. 
Hungary, political divisions of, 40. 

IMPERIAL Council {Reichsho- 
frath) intervenes in the case of 
Donauworth, 20. 
Imperial Court (Re-ichskammerge- 
richt), institution, 6 ; out of work- 
ing order, 19. 
Ingolstadt, Tilly's death at, 149. 
Italy, kingdom of, 3., 122. 

JAMES I., K ng of England, offers 
to mediate In Bohemia and Ger- 
many, 35, 47 ; proposes to pay 
Mansfeld, 51 ; his negotiations with 
Spain, 51, jo ; desires aid from 
France, 71 ; supports Mansfeld, 75 ; 
orders him not to relieve Breda, 
76 ; agreement with Christian IV., 
85 ; death of, 86 

Jankow, battle of, 209. 

Jesuits, the, appear in Germany, 13. 

John Ernest, Duke of Saxe- Weimar, 
ideas of religious liberty, 94; sup- 
ports Mansield, 96; dies., 101. 

John George, Elector of Saxony, at 
the head of the Lutheran and neu- 
tral party, 15, 22 ; wishes to pacify 
Bohemia, 31 : his. share in Ferdi- 
nand's election to the Empire, 38; 
is gained over by Maximilian 41 ; 
his vacillations in 1622, 62 ; refuses 
to join in the Danish war, 87 ; his 
son elected administrator of Mag- 
deburg, 126 ; attempts to mediate 
between Gustavus and the Em- 
peror, 133, 134 ; joins Gustavus, 
139 ; failure of his army at Breiten- 
feld, 141 ; despatched into Bohe- 
mia, 151 ; enters Prague, 151 ; is 
driven out of Bohemia, 155; pro- 
poses terms of peace to Gustavus, 
156; refuses to join the league of 
Heilbruun, 167; negotiates, with 


Wallenstein, 170 ; hopes for peace, 
184 ; agrees to the Peace of Prague, 
185; his troops defeated at Witt- 
stock, 194. 

John Sigismund, Elector of Branden- 
burg his claim to the duchy oi 
Cleves, 21 ; turns l.alvinist, 22. 

Joseph Father, employed as Riche- 
lieu's agent, 128. 

KEMPTEN, battle of, 201. 
Klostergrab, Protestant church 
at, 27. 
Kiiln. See Cologne. 

LA FORCE, commands at Paris, 

Lamonnain, Father. Ferdinand's 
confessor, declares against peace, 

Landrecies incorporated with France, 

League, the Catholic, its formation, 
21 ; agrees to the treaty ef Ulni, 
42. See Maximilian, Duke of Ba- 

Lebus. bishopric of, 121. 

Lech, battle at the passage of the, 149. 

Leipzig, assembly at, 133. 

Leipzig, batde of. See Breitenfeld. 

Leslie, his part in Wallenstein's mur- 
der, 180. 

Leuchtenberg, Landgrave of, taken 
prisoner by Mansfeld, 40. 

Lewis XIII., King of France, hit 
character, 72 ; his jealousy of Spain, 
73 ; summons Richelieu to his 
council, 74 ; takes part against 
Spain, 75 ; his policy towards the 
Huguenots, 112 ; at war with Eng- 
land, 113 ; invades Italy, 122 ; dis- 
likes the success of Gustavus, 148 ; 
takes the field against Spain, 193 ; 
dies, 205. 

Lewis X1Y., King of France, acces- 
sion of, 205. 

Lewis, Landgrave of Hesse Darm- 
stadt, ta en prisoner, 58. 

Lombardy, the iron crown of, 3. 

Lorraine (Lothringen), included in 
the Empire. 2 ; Mansfeld and Chris- 
tian of Brunswick, in, 63. 

Lorraine, Duke of, joins the Span- 
iards against Gustavus, 158; is re- 
duced to subjection by France, 170. 




Lower Saxony, Circle of, threatened 
by Christian of Brunswick and 
Tilly, 64 ; refuses to support Chris- 
tian, 65 ; disunion amongst its 
members, 68 ; attacked by Tilly, 87. 

Llibeck, bishopric of named in the 
Edict of Restitution, 121. 

Liibeck, Peace of, 117. 

Lusatia, invaded by the Saxons, 42. 

Luther, his meeting with Charles V.,9. 

Lutherans, 17; their estrangements 
from Frederick in Bohemia, 43 ; 
still remain in Paderborn, 55. 

Lutter, battle of, 96. 

Liitzen, battle of, 161. 

MAGDEBURG, city of, refuses to 
admit Wallenstein's troops, 105, 
126 ; declares for Gustavus, 134 ; 
stormed and sacked, 136. 

Mag eburg, diocese of, occupied by 
WalleLStein, 92 ; included in the 
' Edict of Restitution, 120 ; execu- 
tion of the Edict at, 126. 

M.igdeburg, Protest .nt administra- 
tor of, not acknowledged as Arch- 
bishop by the Diet, 14. 

Maintz. See Mentz. 

Majest'dtsbrief. See Royal Charter. 

Manheim, garrisoned by Vere, 57 ; 
retreat of Frederick and Mansfeld 
to, 59 ; taken by Tilly, 60. 

MansLld, C unt Ernest of, takes 
service with the Bohemians and 
besieges Pilsen, 33; tikes the field 
against Bucquoi, 36 ; is defea ed by 
him, 37 ; character of his army, 

48 ; occupies the Upper Palatinate, 

49 ; marches into Alsace, 50 ; aims 
at becoming master of part of it, 
56 ; invades the Lower Palatinate, 
57; seizes the La ndgrav of Darm- 
stadt, 58 ; state of his army, 59 ; 
retreats to Alsace, 60 ; occupies 
Lorraine, 63 ; cuts his way through 
the Spanish, Netherlands, relieves 
Bergen-op-zoom, and invades East 
Friesland, 64 ; returns to the Neth- 
erlands, 69 ; assisted by France, 
74 ; proposed march into Alsace, 
75 ; fails to relieve Breda 76 ; sent 
to help the King of Denmark, 86 ; 
joins Christian IV., 94 ,- defea ed 
at the Bridge of, 96 ; 
marches through Silesia into Hun- 
gary, 96 ; dies, 97. 


Mantua and Montferrat, war of suc- 
cession .n, 121. 

Mardyke, surrender of, 224. 

Martinitz, one of the Regents of Bo- 
hemia, thrown out ot window, 30. 

Mary of Medici, opposes Richelieu, 
132 ; obliged to leave France, 160. 

Matthias, Archduke, rises against 
Rudolph II., 25 ; succeeeds as 
Em eror, 26. See Matthias, Em- 

Matthias, Emperor, his election, 26 ; 
his attempts to brea't the Royal 
Charter, 27 ; his death, 36. 

Maurice-, Landgrave of Hesse Cassel, 
submits to Spinola, 47. 

Maximilian, Archduke, governs Ty- 
rol, 24. 

Maximilian, Duke of Bavaria, his 
character and policy, 15 ; his part 
in the formation of the League 21 ; 
prepares tu attack Bohemia, 39 ; 
proposed transference of the Pa- 
latinate Electorate to, 40 ; gains 
over the North German princes, 
41; attaches Austria and Bohemia, 
42 ; receives Upper Austria in 
pledge, 46 ; receives the Electorate, 
6t ; his policy after the peace of 
LUbeck, 118 ; makes an iffort 
against the French, 207; is ready 
to surrender Alsace to the French, 
211 ; but refuses to surrender the 
Upper Palatinate, 211 ; makes a 
truce, which does not last long, 213. 

Mayence. See Mentz 

Mazarin, Cardinal, Minister of Anne 
cf Austria, 205. 

Mecklenburg, Dukes of their land 
pledged to Wallenstein, 105 ; for- 
mally given to Wallenstein, 118. 

Meissen. See Misnia. 

Melancthon, his protect against theo- 
logical disputation, 13. 

Mentz, entered by Spinola, 42 ; 
treaty for the dissolution of the 
Union signed at, 47. 

Mentz, Archbishop of, one of the 
Electors, 6 ; lays claim to lands in 
North Germany, 98. 

Mentz, city of, Gustavus at, 147 ; 
given over to Oxenstjerna, 148 ; 
misery at, 187. 

Mercy, prudence of, 208 ; is killed, 
208 ; 

Merseburg, bishopric of, named in 
the Edict of Restitution, 121. 




Merseburg, city of, taken by Pap- 
penheim, 139. 

Metz, annexed by France. 215. 

Minden, bishopric of, named in the 
Edict of Restitution , lai. 

Misnia, bishopric of, named in the 
Edict of Restitution, 121. 

Montmorenci, Duke of, his rebellion, 

Morgan, Sir Charles, commands an 
English force sent in aid of Den- 
mark, 101. 

M'uhlhau- en (in Thuringia), agree- 
ment of, 41 ; meeting of the Electors 
at, 103. 

Munich, occupied by G istavus, 150. 

Miinster, meeiing of diplomatists at, 

Miinster, diocese of, threatened by 
Mansfeld, 64. 

NANCY taken possession of by 
the French, 180. 
Nantes, Edict of, 71 ; its revocation, 

Naumburg, bishopric of, named in 

the Edict of Restitution, 121. 
Naurnburg, city of, entered by Gus- 

tavus, 161. 
Netherlands, the, included in the 

Kmpire, 2. 
Netherlands, the Spanish, defended 

against a French attack, 191. 
Netherlands, United States of the, 

end of their truce with Spain, 51 ; 

acknowledgment of their indepen- 
dence, 221 
Neuberg, Wolfgang Wilhelm, Count 

Palatine of, lays claim to the 

duchy of Cleves, 22 ; has his ears 

boxed, 22. 
Neustadt, misery at, 188. 
Nevers, Duke of, his claims to the 

succession in Mantua, 122. 
New Brandenburg, taken by Tilly, 

J 34- 
Nienburg, holds out for Christian IV., 

Nordheim, holds out for Christian 

IV., 101. 
N<*r lingen. treatment of the Pro- 
test nts at, 120 ; battle of, 183 ; 

second battle of, 208 ; surrenders 

to Turenne, 213. 
Nureiiibi-rg joins the Union, 20, 21 ; 

meeting of the Union at, 41 ; de- 


serts the Union, 47 ; welcomes 
Gustavus, 148 ; despatches Gustav- 
us against Wallenstein, 158; suffer- 
ings of, 158. 

ONATE, opposes Wallenstein, 
175; proposes to kill Wallen- 
stein, 177. 
Oppenheim, stormed by Gustavus, 


Os. abriick, election of a Catholic 
Bishop of, 67 ; meeting of diploma- 
tists ai, 217. 

Otto the Great, becomes Emperor, 2. 

Oudenarde, surrender to the French, 

Oxenstjerna, his view of Gustavus' 
march upon the Rhine, 145 ; re- 
ceives the government of Mentz. 
148 ; his position after the dea'.h of 
Gustavus, 166 ; a<ked to help Wal- 
lenstein. 172 ; keeps his doubts till 
the last, 179 ; surrenders fortresses 
in Alsace to Richelieu, 192. 

PADERBORN, attack upon by 
Christian of Brunswick, 55. 

Palatinate, the Lower, attacked by 
Spinola, 43 ; defended by Vere, 49 ; 
invaded by Tilly, 50 ; conquered by 
Tilly, 60 ; the eastern part made 
over to Maximilian, 119 ; the 
whole restored to Charles Lewis, 

Palatinate, the Upper, Mansfeld's 
occupation of, 50 ; its conquest Ly 
Tilly, 50; made over to Maximi- 
lian, 119 ; secured to him by the 
peace of Westphalia, 214. 

Pappenheim, confidence that Gusta- 
vus will be beaten, 139 ; storms 
Magdeburg, 135 ; commands on 
the Rhine, 161 ; leaves Wallen- 
stein before the batile of Liitzen, 
161 ; is kille-t at Lutzen, 161. 

Passau, convention of, Q. 

Peace of Augsburg See Augsburg. 

Peace of Phillipsburg, French garri- 
son of, 215. 

Piccolomini, offers to join Wallen- 
stein, 175 ; declares against him, 
177 ; tries to seize him, 177 ; orders 
Butler to cnp.u e Wallenstein, 180. 

Pignerol, seized by Kichelieu, 124. 

Pliscau refuses to lake part with the 


2 35 


Bohemian directors, 32 ; besieged 
and taken by Mansfeld, 33 ; Wal- 
lenstein holds a meeting of officers 
at, 177. 

Pomerania laid wa te by Wal en- 
stein's troops, 127 : Gustavus lands 
in, 128 ; divided between Branden- 
burg and Sweden, 214. 

Pomerania, Duke of. See Boguslav. 

Portugal, independence of, 200. 

Prague, revolution at, 29 ; Frederick 
crowned King of Bohemia at. 38 ; 
Frederick's growing unpopu'arity 

- there, 43 ; battle at the White Hill 
near, 45 ; entered by the Saxons, 
151 ; recovered by Wallenstein, 
155 ; part of it taken by the Swedes, 

2I 3- 

Prague, the treaty of, 184. 

Prin es of the Empire, their increas- 
ing power, 3 ; compared with the 
French vassals, 4 ; care little for 
the Diet, 5 ; their part in the Diet, 
6; the majority opposed to Pro- 
testantism, 9. 

Protestantism, its ri=e in Germany, 
7 ; its position in North Germany, 
12 ; its divisi ">n, 12 ; contrast be- 
tween it in the north and the south, 

Pyrenees, treaty of the, 224. 

RATISBON, diets held at, 61, 
127; taken by Bernhard, 173. | 

Ratseburg, bishopric of, named in 1 
the Edict of Restitution, 121. 

Regensburg. See Ratisb m. ! 

Reichshofrath. See Imperial Council. 

Reichskammergericht. See Imperial 
C >urt. 

Rhe, Isle of, Buckingham's expedi- 
tion to, 114. 

Rheinfelden, battli of, 195. 

Richelieu, bee imcs a minister of 
Louis XIII., 74 ; recovers the Val- 
telline 75 ; his plans frustrated by 
the insurrection of the Huguenots, 
77; wishe. to make peace with 
them, 112 ; causes of his success, 
116; his policy of toleration, 116; 
takes part in the Mantuan War, 
122 ; negotiates wiih Swede ', 124; 
is startled by the victories of Gus- 
tavus, 148: defends himself against 
the French aristocracy, 167 ; na- 
ture of the government esta lished 


by him, 168 ; his aims in Europe. 
169 ; intervenes more decidedly in 
Germany, 184, 190 ; aims at the 
conquest of Alsace, 191 ; obtains 
conirol ov r for resses in Alsace, 

192 ; failure of his a'tack upon the 
S anish Netherlands, 192 ; suc- 
cessfully resists a Spanish invasion, 

193 ; continues the struggle with 
Spain, 197 ; his successes, 197, 201 ; 
his deithan 1 policy, 201. 

Rochelle, insurrection of, 77, 112 ; 

siege of, 114; surrender of, 115; 

subsequent treatment of, 116. 
Rocroy, attacked by the Spaniards, 

206 ; battle of, 207. 
Rohan, Duke of, insurrection of, 123. 
Rostock, its harbour blocked up by 

Wauenstein, 108. 
Roussitlon, conquered by France, 

200, 201 ; annexed to France, 224. 
Royal Charter, the ( Majest'dtsbrief), 

granted by Rudolph II., 25 , its for- 
feiture declared, 45 
Riidesheim, misery at, 187. 
Rudolph II., Emperor, his part in 

the Austrian territjries, 24; grants 

the Royal Charter of Bohr-mia, 5 ; 

tries to withdraw it 26; dies, 26; 

fate of his art-treasures, 43. 
Rupert, Prince, his birth at Prague, 


SALUCES, siezed by Richelieu, 

Salzburg, persecution of Protestants 
of, 216. 

Saxony, Elector of, 1. See also John 

Savoy, Duke of. See Charles Emanuel. 

Schorndorf, surrenders to Turenne, 

Sigismund, King of Poland, a claim- 
ant to the crown o 1 Sweden, 81. 

Sigismund, the Emperor, anecdote 
of, 2. 

Slawata, one of the Regents ■ f Bohe- 
mia, 30 ; thrown out of window 30. 

Soissons, Count of, rebels in France, 

Soubise, Duke of, rebels, 77. 

Spain, intervenes in the war, 42 ; 
anxious for peace, 43 ; military 
position of in 1624, 74 ; loses tie 
Valtelline, 75 ; takes part in the 
Mantua war, 121 ; supports Wal- 




lenstein, 151 ; takes part in the 
war on the Rhino, is8; turns 
against Wallenstein, 171 ; at war 
with France, 192 ; invades France, 
193 ; naval inferiority of, 197, 198 ; 
rebellion of the Catalans, 199 ; loss 
of Portugal, 200 ; continues the 
war with France after the Peace 
of We tphalia, 221; continues the 
war with Fi ance, 221 ; agrees to the 
Peace of the Pyrenees, 224. 

Spens, Sir James, his mission to 
Sweden, 84. 

Spinola, attacks the Palatinate, 42 ; 
returns to Brussels, 50; besieges 
Bergen-op-znom, 63 ; besieges Bre- 
da, 75 ; besieg"S Casale, 123. 

Spires, Bishop of, attacked by Vere, 

Stade, taken by Tilly, 117. 

Stadtlohn. battle of, 66. 

Stenay, besieged by Conde, 223. 

Stralsund, siege of, 108. 

Strasburg, Bishopric of, failure of an 
attempt to place it in Protestant 
hands, 14. 

Strasburg, city of joins the Union, 
20, 21 ; deserts it, 47. 

Sweden, her gains at the Peace of 
Westphalia, 214. 

Switzerland included in the Empire, 

TABOR, occupied by Mansfeld, 

Thionville, besieged by the French, 
207 ; annexed to France, 224. 

Thirty Years' War, the disputes 
which led to it, 14 ; commencement 
of, 30 ; end of, 213. 

Thurn, ('ount He.i y of, his part in 
the Bohemian Revolution, 30; his 
operations against Bucquot, 33; 
besieges Vienna, 36; aids Chris- 
tian IV., 101. 

Tilly, commands the army of the 
League, 42 ; his part in the con- 
quest of fiohem a, 44; his army, 
48 ; conquers the Upper Palati- 
nate, 50 ; invade* the Lower Pa- 
latinate, 51 ; his prospects in 1622, 
55 ; defeats the Margrave of Baden 
at Wimpfen, 57 ; defeats 1 hristian 
of Brunswick at H<J hst, 59 ; con- 
quers the Lower Palatinate, 61 ; 
threatens the Lower Saxon Circle, 


64 ; defeats Christian of Bruns- 
wick at Stadtlohn, 66 ; attacks 
Lower Saxony, 87 ; makes head 
against Christian IV., 95 ; defeats 
him at Lutter, 96 ; besieges Stade 
and Gluckstadt, 117 ; his campaign 
against Gustavus, 134 ; takes Mag- 
deburg, 136; attacks Saxony, ng; 
defeated at Breitenfeld, 141 ; his 
defeat and death at the passage of 
the Lech, 149. 

Torgau, holds out against Wallen- 
stein, 161. 

Torstenson, his campaign of 1645, 

Toul, annexed to France, 215. 

Treves, Elector of, 1 ; makes an alli- 
ance with France, 170. 

Trier. See Treves. 

TUbingen, university of, 17. 

Turenne, his part in the campaigns 
of 1644 and 1645,208; his strategy 
in Bavaria in 1646, 212. 

Turin, changes of government in, 

ULM, joins the Union, 20, 21 ; 
deserts it, 47. 
Ulm, treaty of, 42. 
Union, the Protestant, formation 
of, 21 ; enters into an agreement 
with the Duke of Savoy, 33 ; its 
coolness in the cause of the Bohe- 
mians, 34 ; refuses to support Fre- 
derick in Bohemia, 41 ; agre<s to 
the treaty of Ulm, 42 ; its dissolu- 
tion, 47. 

VALTELLINE, the Spaniards 
driven from the, 7.5. 

Verdi n, bishopric of, occupied by a 
son of Christian IV, 78; named 
in the EdiU of Restitution, 121 ; 
given up to Sweden, 215. 

Verdun, annexed to France, 214. 

Vere, Sir Horace, defends the Lower 
Palatinate, 49, 57. 

Vienni, besieged by Thurn, 36; at- 
tacked by Hethlcn Gabor, 40 ; at- 
tacked by Torstenson, 209. 

WALT.ENSTFIN, his birth and 
education. 88; r-Kcs an arm) 
for the Emperoi, and is created 




Ptfnce of Friedland, 89 ; his mode 
of carrying on wa-, 90 ; enters 
Magdeburg and Halberstadt, 92 ; 
defeats Mansfeld at the Bridge of, 
Dessaa, 06 ; his quarrel with the 
Leaguo, 08 ; confers with Eggen- 
berg, 90 ; is created Duke of Fried- 
land. 1. k>; subdues Silesia, rot ; 
conq-iers SchJ swig and Jutland, 
Ivj2 ; cotipiajnts of the Electors 
against him, 103 ; his fresh levies, 
it 4 ; Mt-cldeaburt; pledged to him, 
105 ; named Admiral of the Baltic, 
108 ; attempts to burn the Swedish 
fleet, 108 ; besieges Stralsund, 108 ; 
assists in the siege of Gluckstadt, 
117; his inves'iture with the Due >y 
of MeckSenburg, 118; his bre ch 
with the Electors, 124; talks njf 
sacking Rome, .127 ; his depriva- 
tion denaanded, 127 ; his dismis- 
sal, i'9 ; mafces overtures to Gus- 
tavus, 142 ; feTcaks off his imrer- 
course with G .stavus, 15; ; is ire- 
instated in command <bv it-he Em- 
peror, 153 ,• •character <of his army, 
153; drives tfee Sax'unsoutof Bo- 
hemia, 155 ; eotrewches himself 
near Niir imberg, 158 ; repulses 
Gustavus aradiEarches initoSaKOnv, 
t6o ; takes up a position at Liitzen • 
is defeated, rot ; snegistiaies wi th 
the Saxons, 170 ; hopes to bring 
about peace, iyt,; 'Begcstiates with 
the Swedes, 172 ; prepares to fcuve 
the Emperor to accept peace from 
Jiim, 174 ; opposition to him, 175 ; | 
the Emperor decides against him, j 
176 ; throws himself upon his offi- 
cers, 177; is declared a traitor, 
*nd Abandoned by the garrison of I 


Prague 178 ; his murder, 181 ; 
causes of his failure, 18 1. 

Werben, camp of Gustavus at, 138. 

Werth, John of, g^icral in Maximi- 
lian's service, 207. 

Weston, Sir Richard, represents Eng- 
land sat the Congress at Brussels, 

Westphalia, the Peace of, opening of 
negotiations for, 209 ; signature of, 
E13 ; its results, 215. 

White Hill, battle of the, 45. 

Wiesloch, combat of, 57. 

William, Landgrave of Hesse Cassel, 
joins Gustavus, 138 ; shut out from 
*he benefits of the treaty of Prague, 
186 ; his alliance with France, 190. 

Wimpfen, battle of, 57. 

Winter-king, nickname of Frederick, 

Wisraiar in WaSlemstein's hands, io3. 
Wittinjgau, occupied by Mansfeld, 48. 
Wittstock battle of, 194. 
Wolfeisbuittel holds out for Christian 

IV., lot ; battie at, 201. 
Wramgel, succeeds Torstemson as 

commander of the Swedes, 209 ; 

jjoiins Turenrse, 212. 
Wiirteanfeerg, accepts tfee terms of the 

treaty of Prague, 195. 
Waraburg takem by Gflastavus, 147; 

surrenders to Turenne, 212. 


PRES, surrenders to the French, 

ZNAIM, Wallenstein confers witlh 
Eggenberg ax, 153. 
.Zusmarsiiauseu, battle of, 231. 

The volumes contain the ripe results of the studies of men who 
are authorities in their respective fields." — The Nation. 



Eleven volumes, i6mo, 


Eighteen volumes, i6mo, 

The Epoch volumes have most successfully borne the test of 
experience, and are universally acknowledged to be the best series 
of historical manuals in existence. They are admirably adapted in 
form and matter to the needs of colleges, schools, reading circles, 
and private classes. Attention is called to them as giving the 
utmost satisfaction as class hand-books. 

Noah Porter, President of Yale College. 
"The ' Epochs of History' have been prepared with knowl. 
edge and artistic skill to meet the wants of a large number of 
leaders. To the young they furnish an outline or compendium. 
To those who are older they present a convenient ^etch of the 
heads of the knowledge which they have already acquired. The 
outlines are by no means destitute of spirit, and may be used with 
great profit for family reading, and in select classes or reading clubs. " 

Charles Kendall Adams, President of Cornell University. 
"A series of concise and carefully prepared volumes on special 
eras of history. Each is also complete in itself, and has no especial 
connection with the other members of the series. The works are 
al> written by authors selected by the editor on account of some 
especial qualifications for a portrayal of the period they respectively 
describe. The volumes form an excellent collection, especially 
adapted to the wants of a general reader." 

The Publishers will supply these volumes to teachers at SPECIAL 

NE T RA TES, and would solicit correspondence concerning 

terms for examination and introduction copies. 


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is the best proof of its general popularity, and the excellence of 
the various volumes is further attested by their having been 
adopted as text-books in many of our leading educational institu- 
tions. The publishers beg to call attention to the following list 
comprising some of the most prominent institutions using volumes 
of the series : 

Smith College, Northampton, Mass, 
Univ. of Vermont, Burlington, Vt. 
Yale Univ., New Haven, Conn. 
Harvard Univ., Cambridge, Mass. 
Bellewood Sem., Anchorage, Ky. 
Vanderbilt Univ., Nashville, Tenn. 
State Univ., Minneapolis, Minn. 
Christian Coll., Columbia, Mo. 
Adelphi Acad., Brooklyn, N. Y. 
Earlham Coll., Richmond, Ind. 
Granger Place School, Canandaigua, 

N. Y. 
Salt Lake Acad., Salt Lake City , Utah. 
Beloit Col., Beloit. Wis. 
Logan Female Coll., Russell vi He, Ky. 
No. West Univ., Evanston, 111. 
State Normal School, Baltimore, Md. 
Hamilton Coll., Clinton, N. Y. 
Doane Coll., Crete, Neb. 
Princeton College, Princeton, N.J. 
Williams Coll., Williamstown, Mass. 
Cornell Univ., Ithacn, N. Y. 
Illinois Coll., Jacksonville, 111. 

Univ. of South, Sewaunee, Tenn. 
Westeyan Univ., Mt. Pleasant, la. 
Univ. of Cal., Berkeley, Cal. 
So. Car. Coll., Columbia, S. C. 
Amsterdam Acad., Amsterdam, 

N. Y. 
Carleton Coll., Northfield, Minn. 
Wesleyan Univ., Middletown, Mass. 
Albion Coll., Albion, Mich. 
Dartmouth Coll , Hnnover, N. H. 
Wilmington Coll., Wilmington, O. 
Madison Univ., Hamilton, N. Y. 
Syracuse Univ., Syracuse, N. Y, 
Univ. of Wis., Madison, Wis. 
Union Coll., Schenectady, N. Y. 
Norwich Free Acad., Norwich, Conn. 
Greenwich Acad., Greenwich, Conn. 
Univ. of Neb., Lincoln, Neb. 
Kalamazoo Coll., Kalamazoo, Mich, 
Olivet Coll., Olivet, Mich. 
Amherst Coll., Amherst, Mass. 
Ohio State Univ., Columbus, O. 
Free Schools, Oswego, N. Y. 

Bishop J. F. HURST, ex-President of Drew Theol. Sem. 
" It appears to me that the idea of Morris in his Epochs is 
strictly in harmony with the philosophy of history — namely, that 
great movements should be treated not according to narrow 
geographical and national limits and distinction, but universally, 
according to their place in the general life of the world. The 
historical Maps and the copious Indices are welcome additions 
to ujc volumes." 





Edited by 

Rev. G. W. Cox and Charles Sankey, M.A 

Eleven volumes, i6mo, with 41 Maps and Plans, 
Sold separately. 

LITERATURE. By S. G. W. Benjamin. 

" The task of the author has been to gather into a clear 
and very readable narrative all that is known of legendary, 
historical, and geographical Troy, and to tell the story of 
Homer, and weigh and compare the different theories in the 
Homeric controversy. The work is well done. His book is 
altogether candid, and is a very valuable and entertaining 
compendium." — Hartford Courant. 

"As a monograph on Troy, covering all sides of the ques- 
tion, it is of great value, and supplies a long vacant place in 
our fund of classical knowledge." — N. Y. Christian Advocate. 

Rev G. W. Cox. 

"It covers the ground in a perfectly satisfactory wav. 
The work is clear, succinct, and readable." — New York 

' Marked by thoiough and comprehensive scholarship and 
by a skillful style." — Congregalionalist. 

"It would be hard to find a more creditable book. The 
author's prefatory remarks upon the origin and growth of 
Greek civilization are alone worth the price of the volume ' 
—Christian i/nwn, 


of Xerxes to the Fall of Athens. By Rev. 
G. W. Cox. 

" Mr. Cox writes in such a way as to bring before the 
reader everything which is important to be known or learned; 
and his narrative cannot fail to give a good idea of the men 
and deeds with which he is concerned." — The Churchman. 

"Mr. Cox has done his work with the honesty of a true 
student. It shows persevering scholarship and a desire to 
get at the truth." — New York Herald. 

CIES. By Charles Sankey, M.A. 

" This volume covers the period between the disasters of 
Athens at the close of the Pelopenesian war and the rise of 
Macedon. It is a very striking and instructive picture of the 
political life of the Grecian commonwealth at that time."— 
The Churchman. 

" It is singularly interesting to read, and in respect to 
arrangement, maps, etc., is all that can be desired." — Boston 

Culmination to Death of Alexander the 
Great. By A. M. Curteis, M.A. 

"A good and satisfactory history of a very important period. 
The maps are excellent, and the story is lucidly and vigor* 
ously told. " — The Nation. 

" The same compressive style and yet completeness of 
detail that have characterized the previous issues in this 
delightful series, are found in this volume. Certainly the art 
of conciseness in writing was never carried to a higher or 
more effective point." — fioston Saturday Evening Gaeelte. 

**# The above Jive vuiumes give a connected and complete 
history of Greece from the earliest times te the death *f 


EARLY ROME— From the Foundation of the 
City to its Destruction by the Gauls. By 
W. Ihne, Ph.D. 

" Those who want to know the truth instead of the tra- 
ditions that used to be learned of our fathers, will find in i »>ft 
work entertainment, careful scholarship, and sound sense. 1 -— 
Cincinnati Times. 

" The book is excellently well done. The views are those 
of a learned and able man, and they are presented in this 
volume with great force and clearness." — The Nation. 


By R. Bosworth Smith. 

" By blending the account of Rome and Carthage the ac- 
complished author presents a succinct and vivid picture of 
two great cities and people which leaves a deep impression. 
The story is full of intrinsic interest, and was never better 
told." — Christian Union. 

" The volume is one of rare interest and value." — Chicago 

"An admirably condensed history of Carthage, from its 
establishment by the adventurous Phoenician traders to its 
sad and disastrous fall." — New York Herald. 


A. H. Beesley. 

" A concise and scholarly historical sketch, descriptive of 
the decay of the Roman Republic, and the events which paved 
the way for the advent of the conquering Csesar. It is an 
excellent account of the leaders and legislation ol the repub- 
lic." — Boston Post. 

"It is prepared in succinct but comprehensive style, and is 
an excellent book for reading and reference." — New York 

" No better condensed account of the two Gracchi and the 
turbulent careers of Marius and Sulla has yet appeared."— 
New York Independent 



Charles Merivale, D.D. 

" In brevity, clear and scholail^ ^eatment of the subject, 
and the convenience of map, index, and side notes, the 
volume is a model." — New York Tribune. 

" An admirable presentation, and in style vigorous and 
picturesque. " — Hartford Courant. 

THE EARLY EMPIRE— From the Assassina- 
tion of Julius Caesar to the Assassination 
Of Domitian. By Rev. W. Wolfe Capes, M.A. 

" It is written with great clearness and simplicity of style, 
and is as attractive an account as has ever been given in 
brief of one of the most interesting periods of Roman 
History." — Boston Saturttay Evening Gazette. 

"It is a clear, well-proportioned, and trustworthy perfor- 
mance, and well deserves to be studied." — Christian at 

Empire of the Second Century. By Rev. 

W. Wolfe Capes, M.A. 

" The Roman Empire during the second century is the 
broad subject discussed in this book, and discussed with 
learning and intelligence." — New York Independent. 

" The writer's diction is clear and elegant, and his narra- 
tion is free from any touch of pedantry. In the treatment of 
its prolific and interesting theme, and in its general plan, the 
book is a model of works of its class " — New York Herald. 

"We are glad to commend it. It is written clearly, and 
with care and accuracy. It is also in such neat and compact 
form as to be the more attractive." — Congregationalist. 

* # * The above six volumes give the History of Rome from 
the founding of the City to the death of Marcus Aureliui 




Edited by 
Edward E. Morris. 

Eighteen volumes, i6mo, with 74-Maps, Plans, and Tables, 
Sold separately. 

England and Europe in the Ninth Century. 
By the Very Rev. R. W. Church, M.A. 

"A remarkably thoughtful and satisfactory discussion ol 
the causes and results of the vast changes which came upon 
Europe during the period discussed. The book is adapted to 
be exceedingly serviceable." — Chicago Standard. 

"At once readable and valuable. It is comprehensive and 
yet gives the details of a period most interesting to the student 
of history. " — Herald and Presbyter. 

"It is written with a clearness and vividness of statement 
which make it the pleasantest reading. It represents a great 
deal of patient research, and is careful and scholarly."— 
Boston Journal. 

System and England under the Norman 
Kings. By Rev. A. H. Johnson, M.A. 

" Its pictures of the Normans in their home, of the Scan- 
dinavian exodus, the conquest of England, and Norman 
administration, are full of vigor and cannot fail of holding the 
reader's attention." — Episcopal Register. 

" The style of the author is vigorous and animated, and he 
has given a valuable sketch of the origin and progress of the 
great Northern movement that has shaped the history ol 
modern Europe. " — Boston Transcript. 


THE CRUSADES. By Rev. G. W. Cox. 

" To be warmly commended for important qualities. The 
author shows conscientious fidelity to the materials, and such 
skill in the use of them, that, as a result, the reader has 
before him a narrative related in a style that makes it truly 
fascinating. ' ' — Congregationalist. 

" It is written in a pure and flowing style, and its arrange, 
ment and treatment of subject are exceptional." — Christian 

THE EARLY k "» L A N T AG EN ETS— Their 
Relation to the History of Europe; The 
Foundation and Growth of Constitutional 
Government. By Rev. W. Stubbs, M.A. 

" Nothing could be desired more clear, succinct, and well 
arranged. AH parts of the book are well done. It may be 
pronounced the best existing brief history of the constitution 
for this, its most important period." — The Nation. 

"Prof. Stubbs has presented leading events with such fair- 
ness and wisdom as are seldom found. He is remarkably 
clear and satisfactory." — The Churchman. 

EDWARD III. By Rev. W. Warburton, M.A. 

"The author has done his work well, and we commend it 
as containing in small space all essential matter." — New York 

" Events and movements are admirably condensed by the 
author, and presented in such attractive form as to entertain 
as well as instruct." — Chicago Interior. 

— The Conquest and Loss of France. By 

James Gairdner. 

" Prepared in a most careful and thorough manner, and 
ought to be read by every student. " — New York Times. 

"It leaves nothing to be desired as regards compactness, 
accuracy, and excellence of literary execution." — Boston